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ISSN 2067-6557

ISSN-L 2247/2371

Faculty of Humanistic and Social Sciences of “Aurel Vlaicu”,
Arad

Journal of Humanistic *and* Social Studies



J  S S

Volume III, No. 1 (5)/2012

JESS

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JESS

THEORY, HISTORY AND LITERARY CRITICISM

JESS

Cioran et Barrès

Ciprian Vălcan*

Cioran and Barrès

Abstract:

This article presents the impact that the writings of Barrès had over Cioran. Cioran read some of Barrès' books and studies about several historical personalities, about the image of the Spanish people and Spain, which influenced his future writings and which made him draw up a comparison between people and their similarities and differences regarding several aspects. Thus, a close connection arises between these two famous writers and philosophers.

Keywords: portrait of Elizabeth of Austria, vision, image of Spain/Spanish people, similarities and differences, influence

L'image de Barrès dans les écrits de Cioran

Maurice Barrès est un des écrivains français les plus influents en Roumanie pendant la jeunesse de Cioran, grâce à son dosage étrange de vitalisme frénétique, d'esthétisme mélancolique, de nationalisme turbulent et de catholicisme exigeant. Ses plaidoyers à la façon de Nietzsche pour l'intensification sans cesse du vécu, combinée avec une certaine pose aristocratique-romantique, son penchant pour l'exotisme mis à côté de l'exaltation des valeurs de la France, l'appréciation religieuse de l'art égale à la réhabilitation de l'importance de la foi, tout cela fascine les jeunes intellectuels roumains engagés dans une vraie croisade contre le rationalisme et contre les symboles de la démocratie, toujours à la recherche de modèles célèbres pour justifier leur pensée aux accents violemment protestataires, décidée à proclamer la nécessité du changement au nom d'une existence mise en entier sous le signe du vif, du vécu authentique.

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Le jeune Cioran, lecteur insatiable, dévore des livres tels *Amori et Dolori sacrum, Du sang, de la volupté et de la mort* ou *Un jardin sur l'Oronte* (Cioran, 1997: 133). Au printemps de 1935, à München, il lit *Une impératrice de la solitude*, par l'intermédiaire duquel il découvre sa passion pour Élisabeth d'Autriche (*Ibidem*: 203), à laquelle il reste fidèle toute sa vie. Les traces de la lecture intense des écrits de Barrès sont visibles dans ses articles et dans ses volumes roumains, son nom étant un des plus invoqués parmi les personnalités françaises, les références à son nom étant surmontées uniquement par celles à Pascal et à Baudelaire. En échange, dès qu'il commence à écrire en français, Barrès disparaît complètement, n'étant évoqué que quatre fois dans ses *Cahiers* publiés après sa mort.

En général, les références à Barrès ne sont pas substantielles, ne permettant pas la création d'une image trop consistante, ayant plutôt le rôle d'exemples ou bien introduisant des citations considérées significatives. Ainsi, Cioran le cite (1994: 143), il en restitue l'avis sur les premières compositions de Mozart¹, il rappelle son regret de ne pas avoir eu d'hallucinations², il lui reproche d'avoir remplacé la vraie image sur l'Espagne par une image purement onirique³, il constate qu'à Venise, lui et Proust auraient mené la même vie qu'à Paris, ne pouvant s'échapper au charme de cette ville obsédante (2004: 390), il en commente la relation avec le rationalisme et avec le catholicisme: « Un homme qui s'est délecté dans toutes les valeurs de l'Europe doit les étouffer et les enterrer dans la passion d'autolimitation qui est le rationalisme. L'Europe doit avoir pourri dans le sang de Barrès. Il refaisait sur le plan politique ce *abêtissez-vous* de Pascal. À chaque fois que vous vous décidez à renoncer à l'universel, c'est l'Europe qui pleure au fond de vous... C'est ainsi que l'on explique pourquoi Barrès a considéré le catholicisme comme un correctif du nationalisme » (1990: 178).

Les *Cahiers*, d'habitude les plus pertinents en ce qui concerne ses jugements sur les différentes personnalités évoquées dans ses écrits, n'offrent pas cette fois trop de détails. Parmi les quatre références à

¹ Cioran, 1995: 176–177: « Je garde en mémoire comme un remords, un regret et une obsession ce que Maurice Barrès écrivait un jour des premières compositions de Mozart, de ses premiers menuets conçus à l'âge de six ans : qu'un enfant ait pu entrevoir de telles harmonies est une preuve de l'existence du paradis par le désir ».

² Cioran, 2004: 34: « Que de poésie Barrès n'a-t-il pas mise dans ses regrets de n'avoir pas eu d'hallucinations lors des promenades qu'il faisait dans la campagne lorraine afin de vivre des visions païennes! ».

³ Cioran, 2004: 365: « Je ne pardonne pas à Barrès de s'être abandonné exclusivement à la rêverie quand il était en Espagne et, refusant la moindre concession à la vie, d'avoir substitué un songe à un pays ».

Barrès, il y en a une qui rappelle le contexte de la naissance de sa passion pour Sissi (1997: 203), une autre renferme une citation (*Ibidem*: 758), alors qu'une troisième restitue un fragment considéré touchant de ses écrits (*Ibidem*: 545). Le seul fragment relevant, une note datant du 14 décembre 1961 occasionnée par le centenaire de Barrès ponctue ses traits considérés essentiels: « Nul Français, en ce siècle, n'aura eu un sentiment plus profond de la mort que lui. Nul non plus qui ait retrouvé avec une telle ferveur le secret de la mélancolie » (*Ibidem*: 133).

Même s'il n'est pas un écrivain dont l'œuvre ait contribué décisivement à la cristallisation de la pensée cioranienne, Barrès est important pour découvrir la source de certains motifs secondaires, mais récurrents, des écrits de l'auteur des *Syllogismes de l'amertume*. Or, il y a au moins deux tels thèmes qui le fascinent jusqu'à la fin de sa vie qui semblent avoir été découvertes par Cioran après la lecture des livres de Barrès. Il s'agit de la figure profondément mélancolique d'Élisabeth d'Autriche, et de l'image fortement stylisée de l'Espagne et des Espagnols.

Le portrait d'Élisabeth d'Autriche

Il ne passe que deux ans après l'assassinat d'Élisabeth d'Autriche en 1898 par un anarchiste italien lorsque Maurice Barrès en compose un vrai panégyrique dans la préface au volume *Élisabeth de Bavière, impératrice d'Autriche. Pages de journal*, écrit par celui que Jacques Le Rider le considère un Eckermann de l'impératrice (Le Rider, 2000: 223), Constantinos Christomanos. Impressionné par sa mort tragique aussi bien que par la misanthropie raffinée dont elle a témoigné toute sa vie, Barrès en peint une image romantique, d'esprit supérieur et incompris, contraint à se retirer en soi-même et à considérer avec une immense douleur la cavalcade ignoble de l'existence, incapable d'adhérer au spectacle pitoyable d'une humanité préoccupée uniquement par la mécanique stupide des intérêts purement matériels ou bien des instincts, une humanité loin de tout penchant spirituel. Celle qui communiquait par voie médiumnique avec l'esprit de Heine ou bien de Louis II de Bavière, celle qui satirisait impitoyablement dans son journal la cour des tsars aussi bien que la monarchie habsbourgique (*Ibidem*: 225), est considérée très proche, de par son attitude, du profil d'un philosophe nietzschéen: « Ces accents stridents, ces états nerveux qu'elle appréciait si fort chez Heine et qui sont proprement des accès méphistophéliques, lui étaient familiers. C'est une sorte de désespoir, où l'humilité et l'orgueil se combattent; c'est d'une nature hautaine qu'elle raille les conditions mêmes de l'humanité [...] Des railleries de cette

qualité et dans un pareil moment offensent la piété des gens simples. Mais ne semble-t-il pas au lecteur que des états analogues existent chez le philosophe? Epris de plus beaux cas de noblesse, il vit dans le siècle, il en voit la duperie et devient dur. Il est amené à considérer les choses sous un aspect immoral, parce qu'il les regarde d'un point où bien peu de personnes se placent. L'Impératrice Elisabeth cherchait toujours à sortir de la vie, à ne se laisser posséder ni par les choses, ni par les êtres [...] On sait qu'elle interposait constamment son éventail, son ombrelle, entre son visage et les regards. Ceux-ci paraissaient vraiment la faire souffrir. Ils la privaient d'elle-même » (Barrès, 1900: 24–25).

Pour Barrès, Sissi n'est pas seulement une impératrice excentrique, un être qui fuit le faste et le cérémonial de la cour, l'agitation inévitable que provoque la relation avec les hommes, se réfugiant dans une forme quasipathologique d'angoisse, se tenant dans une isolation presque impénétrable, mais elle est, avant tout, un esprit supérieur doué d'une sensibilité spéciale, la même qu'on peut retrouver dans le cas des artistes ou bien des fondateurs de religions. Sans le dire explicitement, Barrès insiste sur ses traits dont on considère qu'ils font partie traditionnellement du portrait du génie esquissé dans le XXXe problème de Pseudo-Aristotele suite à l'hégémonie de la bile noire sur les autres humeurs, expliquant sa nature éminemment mélancolique: « Mais ces états de faiblesse irritable, ces angoisses sans cause, ces vagues inquiétudes, ces noires lycanthropies, c'est la sécrétion particulière aux natures supérieures. Avec une régularité qui mènerait au désespoir les hommes assez imprudents pour s'attarder à réfléchir sur notre effroyable impuissance, nous mettons éternellement nos pas dans les pas de nos prédécesseurs. Tous les grands poètes ont souffert, comme Élisabeth d'Autriche, de la vulgarité du siècle; ils se sont sentis soulevés au moins de désir vers un plus haut idéal; ils ont éprouvé cet éloignement pour les intelligences obtuses et courtes, contentes d'être, satisfaites du monde et de la destinée. C'est l'état de sensibilité d'où sortent les grandes singularités artistiques ou religieuses qui sont l'honneur de l'humanité » (*Ibidem*: 33).

La manière dont il reconstruit la personnalité d'Élisabeth d'Autriche permet à Barrès de la transformer en un véritable penseur nihiliste qui perce, grâce à l'altitude de sa vision, le bouclier de fictions utilisé d'habitude pour la conservation de certitudes confortables, usant de son acuité intellectuelle pour dénoncer la médiocrité du vécu dans le monde sublunaire hybride, pour crier son scepticisme et son désespoir. Sissi n'est plus une inadaptée de bonne famille, un personnage historique tragique et mystérieux, elle est incluse dans la généalogie des esprits illustres de l'Occident, étant considérée importante non pas grâce

à son statut de figure royale, d'impératrice habsburgique aux vagues penchants artistiques, mais grâce à la force de son talent supérieur: « L'audace et l'ironie amère, l'invincible dégoût de toutes choses, le sentiment perpétuel de la mort et même ces enfantillages esthétiques d'une mélancolique qui cherche à s'étourdir me font considérer ces *idées et sensations* d'Élisabeth d'Autriche comme le plus étonnant poème nihiliste qu'on ait vécu dans nos climats. Il semble que chez cette duchesse en Bavière des fusées orientales soient venues irriter les forces du rêve. Cet accent sceptique et fataliste, ce mépris absolu des choses d'ici-bas, cette perpétuelle contemplation ou mieux cette constante présence de l'idéal indiquent une âme ardente et blasée, mais d'une qualité esthétique que je trouve seulement chez ces incomparables soufis persans qui couraient le monde dans la familiarité de la mort » (*Ibidem*: 31–32).

Cioran note que le début de sa passion pour la personnalité d'Élisabeth d'Autriche peut se situer en 1935, lorsqu'il était à München et qu'il a lu *Une impératrice de la solitude* de Barrès (1997: 203), étant marqué par une citation attribuée à l'impératrice qu'il reproduit pendant son entretien avec Verena von der Heyden-Rynsch: « L'idée de la mort purifie et fait l'office du jardinier qui arrache la mauvaise herbe dans son jardin. Mais ce jardinier veut toujours être seul et se fâche si des curieux regardent par-dessus son mur. Ainsi je me cache la figure derrière mon ombrelle et mon éventail, pour que l'idée de la mort puisse jardiner paisiblement en moi » (Cioran, 1995: 113). À la fin de 1963, il remarque que, cette année-là, il avait lu trois ou quatre livres sur Sissi (1997: 203), après avoir avoué en 1962, toujours dans ses *Cahiers*: « Rien n'est plus révélateur pour ce que je suis que ma passion pour Élisabeth d'Autriche » (*Ibidem*: 185).

Mais la façon de Cioran de se rapporter à la figure de l'impératrice est toute à fait différente de la manière de Barrès, préoccupé, en accord avec la tonalité générale de son œuvre, par l'embellissement de son portrait, par sa transformation en un grand artiste, en un génie de sang impérial. Cioran rejette les exagérations de Barrès, considérant qu'il est déplacé d'essayer de faire d'Élisabeth d'Autriche un champion du nihilisme, de laisser croire que ses réflexions désabusées sont issues d'une pensée philosophique représentant l'écho des débats idéologiques de l'époque. Complètement détachée du monde, ayant une formation intellectuelle presque entièrement littéraire, elle témoigne d'une ironie suprême et d'une lucidité désespérée, son discours ressemblant beaucoup à celui des bouffons de Shakespeare (1995: 114).

Dans le cas de Cioran, l'accent se déplace du côté artistique de la personnalité de Sissi vers sa dimension d'être torturé, accablé par une anxiété innée, par un sentiment d'inadaptation radicale. Son retrait du monde n'est pas une conséquence des malheurs qu'avaient frappé sa famille et des déceptions subies suite au contact avec les hommes, comme le croyait sa fille, Marie-Valérie, car, pour Cioran, « elle était née déçue » (*Ibidem*: 114), mais il représente l'impulsion naturelle d'une femme incapable d'adhérer aux conventions impliquées par la comédie universelle de la vie et qui éprouve le besoin profond de dénoncer les illusions et les certitudes sur lesquelles se base le faux équilibre de l'existence. Cioran se dit fasciné par Élisabeth d'Autriche non pas parce qu'il en apprécie les qualités intellectuelles, qu'il en admire le talent, mais parce qu'il est attiré par son tensionné voisinage avec la folie, par son attraction pour tout ce qui est marginal et excentrique: « Pourquoi aimait-elle tant les bouffons de Shakespeare? Pourquoi visitait-elle les asiles de fous partout où elle allait? Elle avait une passion marquée pour tout ce qui est extrême, pour tout ce qui s'écarte de la destinée commune, pour tout ce qui est en marge. Elle savait que la folie était en elle, et cette menace la flattait peut-être » (*Ibidem*: 115).

Pour Cioran, Élisabeth d'Autriche a l'allure d'un personnage shakespearien, la comparant avec le roi Lear (*Ibidem*: 116). Incapable d'une vraie passion à cause de sa lucidité dévastatrice, s'éloignant toujours plus de ses semblables et ne tolérant que les gens simples, les paysans, les pêcheurs ou bien les fous du village, elle cherche son repos dans la solitude, trouvant ses confidents dans la nature: elle proclame l'océan son confesseur, considérant un arbre de Gödölö son meilleur ami (*Ibidem*: 115). Ces obsessions et ces bizarreries, qui n'auraient dû représenter que les épisodes accidentels de la biographie d'une impératrice, les excentricités faciles à tolérer d'une femme à nombre de penchants maladifs acquièrent une dimension symbolique sur le fond de l'écroulement des Habsburgs et du déclin de l'Europe, faisant de Sissi un personnage symptomatique, une figure tragique. Cioran semble rendre le mieux la tristesse désolante d'une individualité pareille, la comparant avec la patiente d'un hospice qu'il avait connue lors de sa jeunesse: « Une figure me vient à l'esprit, celle d'une Finlandaise d'une quarantaine d'années, toujours vêtue de noir, avec laquelle, dans ma jeunesse, je m'entretenais souvent dans le parc de l'asile d'aliénés de Sibiu, en Transylvanie. Nous parlions allemand ensemble, car elle ne savait ni le roumain ni le français. Elle avait l'habitude de se promener toute seule dans une allée écartée. C'est là que je lui ai demandé une fois: *Que pouvez-vous faire ici toute la journée?* Et elle: *Ich*

hamletisier, *J'hamlétise*. C'est une réponse qu'aurait pu donner Sissi » (*Ibidem*: 116).

L'Espagne et les Espagnols

L'Espagne de Barrès est la contrée d'un perpétuel vécu extrême, d'une intensification permanente des sensations, une île de vitalité dans l'océan de la désolation et de la fadeur en lesquelles s'est transformé l'Occident. Le monde bureaucraté et technicisé de la modernité n'a pas porté atteinte aux principales caractéristiques des Espagnols, leur permettant ainsi de garder leur allure de personnages de grandes époques révolues. Point influencés par les valeurs bourgeoises qui ont modifié en profondeur la physionomie des autres Européens, imposant la suprématie de vertus secondaires, telles l'honnêteté, la ponctualité, la propreté ou bien l'assiduité au travail (Amery, 1963: 92 apud Voegelin, 2003: 92), les Espagnols semblent défier l'esprit de l'époque, restant attachés avec acharnement à leur tradition dans laquelle les instincts et les sentiments relèvent de l'envergure individuelle, tandis que la raison est un auxiliaire moins significatif. Peu intéressés par le style de vie du brave citoyen qui a intériorisé les principes de l'éthique protestante qui est à la base du capitalisme, dédaignant les idéaux strictement quantitatifs d'*animal laborans* (Arendt, 2003), ils représentent la preuve la plus éloquente des vraies capacités de l'homme qui refuse la prudence, la précaution, la simple survivance à tout prix, choisissant le risque, la confrontation, l'aventure. Celui qui visite l'Espagne comprend d'un coup ce que la vraie splendeur de la vie signifie: « Pour rompre l'atonie, l'Espagne est une grande ressource. Je ne sais pas de pays où la vie ait tant de saveur. Elle réveille l'homme le mieux maté par l'administration moderne. Là, enfin, on entrevoit que la sensibilité humaine n'est pas limitée à ces deux ou trois sensations fortes (l'amour, le duel ou la Cour d'assises) qui, seules, subsistent dans notre civilisation parisienne. C'est une Afrique : elle met dans l'âme une sorte de fureur aussi prompt qu'un piment dans la bouche » (Barrès, 1948: 175).

L'Espagne de Barrès est le pays où le sang bouillit, gouvernant toutes les préoccupations des hommes, en leur infusant la vitalité monstrueuse devenue incompréhensible pour le reste des Occidentaux, le sens de la barbarie transfigurante dont manquent les individus affaiblis et blasés des grandes capitales européennes, dévastés par le scepticisme et par le sceau fatal de la décadence. Les Espagnols ne font pas marche arrière devant les événements que le destin met à travers de leur voie, ils ne ferment pas les yeux avec pudeur devant la douleur et

devant l'horreur, ils n'essaient pas d'en nier l'existence, par le maquillage du visage souvent hideux du monde. Bien au contraire, ils ont besoin d'un certain spectacle de la souffrance, prisant avec enthousiasme « les voluptés de la taumachie et de l'autodafé » (*Ibidem*, 1948: 171) et s'assumant ardemment leur sublimation dans les formes d'ascétisme les plus rigoureuses. Pour eux, la vie va de pair avec la mort, au spasme érotique suit l'agonie: le plaisir mérite d'être vécu jusqu'au seuil de la désintégration, acquérant sa noblesse uniquement s'il peut conduire à la destruction, s'il implique une mise qui met en discussion la survivance même de l'individu.

Barrès ne peut s'empêcher de découvrir dans leur fascination pour tous les spectacles sanglants une espèce raffinée de sadisme qui les pousse jusqu'à une forme raffinée de blasphémie, les soupçonnant « d'avoir trouvé du plaisir dans la vue des souffrances du Christ » (*Ibidem*, 1948: 172). L'image qu'il esquisse est d'une virilité cruelle, dominée par la prééminence du sang: « Sur toute l'Espagne, j'entends ce cri dur qui, dans Cadix désert, montait à travers l'air pur, du peuple pressé au cirque des taureaux et d'heure en heure acclamant le sang qui jaillissait. Sur les dalles fraîches de l'Alcazar de Séville, j'ai respiré le sang, le jeune et vigoureux sang des amants et des ambitieux qui s'y assassinèrent; te sur ces dalles encore, quelques chose de léger qui flotte m'en avertit, des tapis furent jetés pour qu'elles devinssent des chambres à coucher. Tant de fois lavées et si muettes, ces longues salles pourtant ne peuvent me refuser l'aveu de la plus violente vie nerveuse qu'il ait été donné à l'homme de vivre » (*Ibidem*, 1948: 172).

La solution envisagée par Barrès en partant du cas particulier des Espagnols est l'arrachement de la platitude d'une existence prévisible grâce à l'acceptation d'une certaine dualité du vécu dont le but est d'induire une tension constante au centre de la vie de chaque individu. Le moderne, incapable d'innovation, incapable de proposer des manières nouvelles de se rapporter à l'être à cause du sentiment que tout ce qu'il y avait d'important s'est déjà produit, que l'histoire du monde se poursuit en vertu de l'inertie, sans qu'aucun événement vraiment significatif puisse encore survenir, ne dispose que d'une seule solution risquée, à savoir la tentative d'introduire une certaine variation dans son paysage spirituel par la combinaison des éléments préexistents, insufflant un peu de vitalité à des sentiments devenus désuets au prix de l'accélération de son écroulement inévitable, au prix de l'assumption d'un vécu scindé, nourri de contradictions permanentes: « Il n'y a plus de solitude; il n'est plus de vie que nous puissions inventer de toutes pièces. Toutes les biographies sont prévues, classées, étiquetées. Pour donner quelque saveur à des sentiments trop banalisés, trop usés, nous

n'avons plus qu'un expédient, c'est de les mêler: comme l'Espagne, nous composer une vie intense et contrastée.

L'âpre plaisir de vivre une vie double! La volupté si profonde d'associer des contraires! Comme la sirène doit être heureuse d'avoir la voix si douce! Mais rien qui use plus profondément: c'est la pire débauche. Quelques-uns sentirent leur âme en mourir à tous sentiments profonds » (*Ibidem*, 1948: 182).

Tandis que Barrès ne parle pas ouvertement de la décadence des Espagnols, laissant comprendre qu'un type d'existence pareil au leur ne peut que conduire à un épuisement rapide des ressources vitales, au tarissement des énergies instinctuelles dont dispose cette existence, gaspillées à cause de l'intensité avec laquelle ils vivent chaque instant de la vie, pour Cioran il est sûr que « la décadence est en Espagne un concept courant, national, un cliché, une devise officielle » (*Oeuvres*, 1995: 848). Reprochant à Barrès d'avoir remplacé l'image réelle de l'Espagne, dominée par la pauvreté et par une misère aigue, par un édifice purement esthétisant, résultat de la rêverie et de fortes influences romantiques (2004: 365), Cioran essaie de deceler les causes de son déclin, incriminant avant tout le catholicisme. De son point de vue, le catholicisme a été bénéfique au début, jouant un rôle vitalisant, permettant la création d'une forme qui renferme la turbulence explosive de l'âme espagnole, menacée autrement par la désintégration à cause de la violence de ses passions. Toutefois, ensuite, le monopole spirituel du catholicisme, « la seule respiration de l'Espagne » (*Ibidem*: 367), s'est avéré néfaste, la condamnant à l'immobilisme et l'arriérage, déterminant son immobilisation dans une mentalité révolue et engendrant l'analphabétisme et la précarité, la rendant incapable de se moderniser.

La deuxième raison pour le déclin de l'Espagne est, selon Cioran, l'absence d'un grand destin politique. À la façon des analyses spengleriennes, il remarque: « Le critère d'appréciation de la vitalité d'une grande puissance est son mode de réalisation impérialiste. Lorsqu'un impérialisme s'affirme brillamment mais brièvement, c'est qu'on a affaire à une nation n'ayant pas une grande destinée politique. L'Espagne a ébloui le monde à un moment donné. Mais par la suite, celle qui avait été la première des nations s'est traînée à la remorque, elle a dégénéré jusqu'à observer une honteuse neutralité pendant la Grande Guerre [...] Sans son originalité spirituelle, que peut lui envier n'importe quelle nation, l'Espagne n'aurait pas connu un sort politique supérieur à celui des Pays-Bas, qui s'élevèrent aussi pendant un temps au rang de grande puissance, après quoi ils retombèrent dans un anonymat insignifiant et compromettant » (*Ibidem*: 368–369).

À ces arguments exposés dans un article de 1936 il vient s'ajouter un troisième, avancé dans *Petite théorie du destin*, qui relie la décadence des Espagnols à leur excessive préoccupation pour les problèmes essentiels, qui leur fait négliger les aspects concrets de la vie, à leur déficit de frivolité qui trahit le renoncement à la réalité au profit d'une exploration maniacale du néant: « Comment rattraperaient-ils les autres nations, comment seraient-ils à la page, alors qu'ils ont épuisé le meilleur d'eux-mêmes à ruminer sur la mort, à s'y engraisser, à en faire une expérience viscérale? Rétrogradant sans cesse vers l'essentiel, ils se sont perdus par excès de profondeur. L'idée de décadence ne les préoccuperait pas tant si elle ne traduisait en termes d'histoire leur grand faible pour le néant, leur obsession du squelette » (1995: 848).

Une autre explication que Cioran offre pour le mystérieux déclin de l'Espagne est le renoncement à l'action, à l'immense effort de conquête du monde déployé dans ses moments d'apogée, pour se consacrer à une interrogation nuisible et sans fin sur son propre destin, d'une permanente mise en cause du présent par rapport à un passé grandiose, ce qui a engendré un sentiment épuisant d'impuissance, imposant l'idée d'une dégénérescence fatale dont la contemplation est devenue une véritable obsession nationale, trahissant un penchant évident pour le masochisme: « Après avoir connu, du temps des conquistadores, une surhumanité bestiale, elle s'est employée à ruminer son passé, à rabâcher ses lacunes, à laisser moisir ses vertus et son génie; en revanche, amoureuse de son déclin, elle l'a adopté comme une nouvelle suprématie. Ce masochisme historique, comment ne pas s'apercevoir qu'il cesse d'être une singularité espagnole, pour devenir le climat et comme la recette de déchéance d'un continent? » (1995: 805).

Quoiqu'il critique Barrès d'avoir littérisé excessivement l'image de l'Espagne, ignorant de manière coupable sa réalité concrète, Cioran partage les lignes générales de sa vision. Pour lui aussi, l'élément central de toute tentative de description des Espagnols est leur passionalité, la terrible ardeur des sentiments qu'ils éprouvent, la dévalorisation de la raison au profit des instincts, le déchaînement passionnel de leurs désirs. Tandis que Barrès insiste plus sur leur sensualité démesurée, sur le plaisir contagieux avec lequel ils savent vivre leur vie de façon extrême, Cioran s'intéresse avant tout à leur religiosité spasmodique, au fanatisme épouvantable de leur foi, qui rend compte le mieux de leur nature excessive: « L'Espagne est le symbole du désert impitoyable de l'âme, de la désolation au parfum divin, des chaleurs maximales du cœur. Sans elle, nous accorderons moins de folie aux saints et le spectacle de leur vie nous désabuserait avec bonté et fadeur. Le mérite de l'Espagne n'est pas seulement d'avoir sauvé

l'absurde dans le monde, mais d'avoir montré que la température normale de l'homme est la folie. Voilà pourquoi rien de plus naturel chez ce peuple qui a supprimé la distance entre le ciel et la terre. Si Dieu était cyclope, l'Espagne serait son œil » (1994: 70–71).

De plus, Cioran est fasciné par « la façon dont ils associèrent l'évangile au meurtre, le crucifix au poignard » (1995: 849), par leur catholicisme sanglant qui se présente à lui comme une preuve de vitalité de la religion. Le goût des Espagnols pour les massacres, leur penchant pour la cruauté, que Barrès ponctue lui aussi, mais qui est nié par Keyserling⁴, sont considérés des tentatives de surprendre directement les mystères de la vie, sans le regrettable détournement impliqué par la lymphatique interrogation philosophique, sans la déplorable intercession de la raison: « Seuls les peuples cruels ont l'heur de se rapprocher des sources mêmes de la vie, de ses palpitations, de ses arcanes qui réchauffent: la vie ne dévoile son essence qu'à des yeux injectés de sang... » (1995: 849).

Une autre caractéristique des Espagnols ponctuée par Cioran est leur inadaptabilité, leur impossibilité de s'assumer les rythmes du monde moderne, d'accepter le triomphe des valeurs strictement économiques au détriment de leur attachement obstiné devant le culte de la noblesse. Méprisant le travail et toutes les activités considérées serviles, préférant mourir de faim plutôt que de consentir aux moindres concessions concernant leur idée sur l'honneur, les Espagnols ont acquis toujours plus le statut de spectres illustres, tandis que leur pays « est ainsi devenu un tombeau de l'histoire dont les romantiques ont fait le berceau de leurs mélancolies » (2004: 368). Orgueilleux, repliés sur leurs propres idéaux devenus depuis longtemps désuets, ils sont arriérés de quelques siècles par rapport au reste de l'Europe, de sorte que « Changeraient-ils un jour leurs anciennes marottes contre d'autres plus modernes, qu'ils resteraient néanmoins marqués par une si longue absence. Hors d'état de s'accorder au rythme de la *civilisation*, calotins ou anarchistes, ils ne sauraient renoncer à leur inactualité » (1995: 848).

⁴ Hermann Keyserling, 1930: 73–74: « L'Espagnol n'est point cruel; uniquement les mesquins sont cruels. Appeler cruelles la joie du sang, voire la soif de sang, ne témoigne que de lâcheté morale et physique, car celui qui affirme véritablement la vie doit affirmer aussi une mort, qui, dans un monde de la liberté, peut être le meurtre. Dès que la passion n'est plus impliquée, l'Espagnol semble être extrêmement humain. Il n'y a pas de prisons plus humaines que les prisons espagnoles. Justement parce que le peuple défoule son plaisir du sang dans la *corrida*, il est plus humain que les peuples qui n'avouent pas leur joie à la vue du sang – tout comme les chirurgiens et les infirmières sont d'habitude particulièrement gais et amicaux ».

Influencé probablement, à cet égard, par Keyserling (1930: 79–83), Cioran éprouve le besoin de considérer les Espagnols et les Russes ensemble, considérant qu'entre les deux peuples il y a une similitude qui peut être rendue manifeste par la révélation de plusieurs caractéristiques communes. Ainsi, les Espagnols aussi bien que les Russes, ayant une histoire spéciale et une évolution « anormale » (1995: 850) sont obsédés par leur sort, s'arrêtant sans cesse sur leur propre destin et essayant de découvrir le rôle que leur réserve dans ses projets la providence. Quelle que soit sa condition, « l'Espagnol ou le Russe qui s'interroge sur son pays aborde la seule question qui compte à ses yeux » (*Ibidem*: 849).

Une autre caractéristique qui rapproche les deux peuples est leur intense religiosité, leur foi fervente et effrénée qui menace de mettre en danger l'équilibre cosmique même. Pour Cioran, il est évident que « Le Russe ou l'Espagnol le plus sceptique est plus passionné de Dieu que tout métaphysicien allemand » (1994: 113) et que, bien qu'il y ait d'autres peuples intensément religieux, ils ne peuvent intérioriser au même degré la foi que les Russes ou bien les Espagnols, qui la transforment en la coordonnée essentielle de leur être, en leur préoccupation exclusive et dévorante: « Dieu oscille entre la Russie et l'Espagne (entre Dostoïevski et El Greco). Des pays *enceints* de Dieu. Il y en a d'autres encore, pourtant ils ne le portent pas dans leurs entrailles, mais se contentent de le connaître » (*Ibidem*: 112). Pour se mettre à l'abri contre la passion insensée de ses adorateurs, qui menacent de tarir son mystère par leur amour, il ne resterait à la divinité que la solution préventive de la multiplication des athées, la voie paradoxale d'encourager leur athéisme pour se défendre contre la combustion impliquée par l'ardeur insupportable dégagee par leur délire: « L'athéisme russe et espagnol est inspiré par Celui d'en haut: la crainte que la soif dévorante de ces déments célestes pourrait ôter son auréole... Par l'athéisme, Dieu se protège lui-même de l'anéantissement par la foi » (*Ibidem*: 112).

Cioran détache encore une caractéristique commune des Espagnols et des Russes en partant de leur passionalité, de leur manque de talent pour l'abstraction, pour la manipulation neutre des idées. Incapables d'aborder les problèmes par un intérêt purement théorique, pas préparés pour séparer la pensée de l'action, habitués à vivre leur obsessions jusqu'au bout, à se laisser gouverner par les viscères et à se manifester de façon extrême, témoignant d'un certain don pour le fanatisme et pour les excès, les Espagnols et les Russes sont des peuples dont aucun grand philosophe n'est issu, regardant toujours d'un œil méfiant la primauté de la raison, considérant suspects le détachement et l'objectivité, étant d'avis qu'une connaissance purement intellectuelle est une opération

sans mise et sans importance. C'est bien pourquoi « ils entretiennent des rapports assez bizarres avec l'Idée. Combattent-ils avec elle? Ils ont toujours le dessous; elle s'empare d'eux, les subjugue, les opprime; martyrs consentants, ils ne demandent qu'à souffrir pour elle. Avec eux, nous sommes loin du domaine où l'esprit joue avec soi et les choses, loin de toute perplexité méthodique » (1995: 849–850).

L'attraction de Cioran pour l'Espagne et pour les Espagnols reste constante toute sa vie, ce dont témoignent les voyages qu'il entreprend volontiers en Espagne, aussi bien les réflexions qu'il consacre à ce sujet. Et si, pendant sa jeunesse, il notait « j'aime passionnément l'Espagne, mais je ne peux pas la prendre au sérieux » (2004: 371), il est probable que son attitude définitoire est surprise le plus clairement dans un aveu des *Syllogismes de l'amertume*: « Tour à tour, j'ai adoré et exécré nombre de peuples; – jamais il ne me vint à l'esprit de renier l'Espagnol que j'eusse aimé être... » (1995: 772).

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JESS

Le totalitarisme dans *L'Homme révolté* et *L'État de siège* d'Albert Camus

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Totalitarianism in Albert Camus's *The Rebel* and *The State of Siege*

Abstract:

The present article investigates the representation of totalitarianism in Albert Camus's philosophical essay *The Rebel* (1951) and the play *The State of Siege* (1948). A political allegory that denounces the illegitimate and demagogical power of totalitarian regimes, *The State of Siege* depicts the effects of dictatorship on the community of Cadix. My analysis draws on Camus's reflections on rebellion and solidarity formulated in *The Rebel*, in an attempt to provide a privileged access to the situational implications of these theoretical concepts in the play of my choice.

Keywords: Camus, totalitarianism, solidarity, rebellion

Ancrés dans la tension politique et idéologique des années d'après-guerre ravagées par le drame de la Shoah, les textes camusiens de notre choix – l'essai philosophique *L'Homme révolté* (1951) et la pièce de théâtre *L'État de siège* (1948) – évoquent le crédo et la mission de leur auteur : servir la justice en disant la vérité, c'est-à-dire se révolter contre l'Histoire et les idéologies qui se sont si souvent trompées. En outre, ces deux ouvrages reflètent un trait essentiel de l'écriture camusienne : la fusion entre littérature et philosophie. Ainsi, *L'État de siège* se révèle comme un complément nécessaire de *L'Homme révolté* exprimant la même révolte solidaire contre le Mal formulée dans le « Je me révolte, donc nous sommes » (Camus, 1987: 38) de son corollaire philosophique.

Adversaire convaincu de tout système totalitaire, Camus « a su braver la force et les tentations de l'occupant nazi, non seulement en se

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tenant sur la réserve, mais en s'engageant effectivement dans la Résistance »¹. De plus, à l'émergence du communisme peu après la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, il figure parmi les rares intellectuels de son époque à comprendre dès très tôt que les deux « tyrannies, » le fascisme et le communisme, s'engendrent jusqu'à devenir une même chose. Sa capacité de juger et de prendre position le démarque de « presque tous les hommes de gauche ... [qui] ont voulu être antifascistes sans être antitotalitaires »². Car pour Camus, l'antitotalitarisme ne représente ni la lutte contre le fascisme ni une alternative à celui-ci, mais repose sur l'opposition tranchante entre totalitarisme et démocratie.

L'Espagne

Le choix de l'Espagne comme lieu d'action de *L'État de siège* prolonge le même engagement antitotalitaire de l'auteur, orienté cette fois contre le régime franquiste dont la survie après l'écroulement du fascisme lui devient inacceptable. Son indignation farouche contre l'Espagne franquiste – manifestée aussi à travers de nombreux articles et discours, ainsi que par sa relation avec les libertaires espagnoles – rejoint sa fidélité au peuple espagnol qu'il défend sans cesse, ressentant son drame « comme une tragédie personnelle » : « On a pu dire que le peuple espagnol était l'aristocratie de l'Europe. [...] Par malheur, cette aristocratie est aujourd'hui celle du sacrifice »³. L'on ne saurait oublier que Camus, espagnol par sa mère, portait « l'Espagne sur le cœur », n'hésitant pas à la considérer sa « seconde patrie »⁴. Son engagement pour l'Espagne s'avère donc double : idéologique et sentimental à la fois.

En outre, L'Espagne évoquait pour Camus non seulement le régime franquiste, mais elle était « la représentante, par excellence, de tous [l]es totalitarismes à l'œuvre »⁵ : « Et de citer les régimes russe,

¹ Brigitte Sändig, *L'immunité envers la 'pensée captive'*, in Agnès Spiquel et Alain Schaffner, *Albert Camus : l'exigence morale. Hommage à Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi*, Paris, Le Manuscrit, 2006, p. 246.

² *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell: As I Please, 1943-1945*, Vol. 2, London, Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1968, p. 236, cité par Yves Guérin in *Écriture(s) de l'histoire*, ed. Gisèle Séginger, p. 101.

³ Albert Camus, *Préface à 'L'Espagne libre'*, in *Essais*, ed. Roger Quilliot et Louis Faucon, Paris, Gallimard, 1965, p. 1799.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 1604.

⁵ Hélène Rufat, *Au-delà de l'Espagne franquiste. Albert Camus, le libertaire espagnol*, in *Albert Camus et l'Espagne*, ed. Frédéric-Jacques Temple et al., Aix-en-Provence, Édisud, 2005, p. 90.

allemand et espagnol puis Hitler, Mussolini et Franco. Dans ce texte de circonstance, le totalitarisme est caractérisé par « l'État policier et bureaucratique » et par un recours à des moyens extrêmes qu'illustre le nom de Guernica »⁶. Il est important de souligner que les premières occurrences du mot « totalitaire » chez Camus se trouvent justement dans son commentaire de *L'État de siège*.

Néanmoins, la ville espagnole de Cadix, représente avant tout une ville imaginaire sur laquelle Camus projette ses lectures et ses espoirs concernant l'espace méditerranéen. Comme l'affirme Hélène Rufat dans son article *Au-delà de l'Espagne franquiste. Albert Camus, le libertaire espagnol*, Camus « représente le peuple espagnol qui vit sur cette terre (celui de *L'État de siège* en particulier) comme s'il s'agissait de celui d'Alger, qu'il connaissait et parmi lequel il avait vécu, mais il lui attribue en plus, tous les idéaux qu'il lui suppose. Car faire parler le peuple de la chair et de la fierté c'est faire parler le peuple espagnol. Camus n'y voit pas d'autre possibilité »⁷.

L'Homme révolté

Prenant comme point de départ la réalité d'une époque où les massacres sont devenus des lois d'État, *L'Homme révolté* poursuit, « devant le meurtre et la révolte », la « réflexion commencée autour du suicide et de la notion de l'absurde » (Camus, 1987: 17) dans le premier essai philosophique de Camus, *Le Mythe de Sisyphe*. « Étude du processus théorique et de la justification historique » (Figuero, 2008: 192) qui a conduit au totalitarisme, *L'Homme révolté* clôt dans la production camusienne le cycle dédié à la révolte et à la solidarité tout en rejoignant le roman *La Peste* et les pièces de théâtre *L'État de siège* et *Les Justes*.

Dans un effort de comprendre la situation tragique de son temps qui a imposé le meurtre comme un de ses phénomènes les plus frappants, Camus part dans ses recherches du postulat suivant: « Nous ne saurons rien tant que nous ne saurons pas si nous avons le droit de tuer cet autre devant nous ou de consentir qu'il soit tué. Puisque toute action aujourd'hui débouche sur le meurtre, direct ou indirect, nous ne pouvons pas agir avant de savoir si, et pourquoi, nous devons donner la mort » (Camus, 1987: 16). Afin de défendre la vie, la révolte contre la mort devient la seule attitude efficace de l'homme moderne. Vivant

⁶ Jean-Yves Guérin, *La représentation de l'état totalitaire dans L'État de siège*, in Gisèle Séginger, *Écriture(s) de l'histoire*, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2005, p. 101.

⁷ Hélène Rufat, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

dans une histoire désacralisée, celui-ci fait de la révolte sa réalité historique. Dans les mots de Camus, un homme révolté est un homme qui dit non, « [m]ais s'il refuse, il ne renonce pas : c'est aussi un homme qui dit oui, dès son premier mouvement » (Camus, 1987: 27).

Bien que la révolte éveille un sentiment de plénitude individuelle, elle doit toutefois franchir l'univers intérieur de l'homme isolé et chercher la collectivité. Car la révolte appartient à la conscience collective, elle est l'aventure de tous. Il s'agit ainsi d'une solidarité mutuelle des révoltés conscients de leur condition commune où chacun se définit ontologiquement par sa révolte et par son rapport à autrui : « Pour être, l'homme doit se révolter, mais sa révolte doit respecter la limite qu'elle découvre en elle-même et où les hommes, en se rejoignant, commencent d'être » (Camus, 1987: 37). Chaque conscience implique donc les autres, d'où cette réplique au cartésianisme : « Je me révolte, donc nous sommes » (Camus, 1987: 38).

Ainsi, l'individu tiré de sa solitude se consacre à l'action collective, à la solidarité humaine : « Le premier progrès d'un esprit saisi d'étrangeté est donc de reconnaître qu'il partage cette étrangeté avec tous les hommes et que la réalité humaine, dans sa totalité, souffre de cette distance par rapport à soi et au monde. Le mal qu'éprouvait un seul homme devient peste collective » (Camus, 1987: 38).

Par la solidarité qu'elle implique, la révolte cherche les valeurs capables d'unifier les collectivités humaines et d'universaliser les résultats créateurs. Elle n'a rien de commun ni avec le désordre ni avec le ressentiment. Bien que négative en apparence, car « elle ne crée rien, la révolte est profondément positive puisqu'elle révèle ce qui, en l'homme, est toujours à défendre » (Camus, 1987: 34).

Camus complète sa vision sur la révolte en dévoilant la relativité de celle-ci, voire sa dépendance des époques historiques et du développement des civilisations. Ainsi, du mythe prométhéen à la pensée révolutionnaire socialiste, il entreprend une ample investigation des hypostases de la révolte tout en insistant sur sa dégradation en action révolutionnaire, basée sur la violence et le crime.

Mais le pivot de *L'Homme révolté*, celui qui suscite davantage notre intérêt et justifie notre démarche, c'est l'examen du fascisme. Quoique Camus rejette celui-ci avec véhémence, l'étude des sources spirituelles du nazisme éclate en lui un drame intellectuel : sa fascination pour Nietzsche, dont la pensée est à la base du programme de crime élaboré par les Nazis, doit s'éteindre devant une condamnation honnête. Poursuivant son enquête avec la pensée d'Ernst

Junger, responsable pour avoir « donné au nazisme une apparence de philosophie » (Camus, 1987: 228). Camus n'a toutefois aucune illusion par rapport aux sources du nazisme : la spiritualité n'étant qu'une apparence, le nazisme trahit un grave déficit de la civilisation occidentale.

Le fascisme, poursuit Camus, a instauré au niveau européen la morale du gang, la plus monstrueuse action de perversion des masses, signifiant « triomphe et vengeance, défaite et ressentiment [...] l'exaltation des puissances obscures du sang et de l'instinct, la justification biologique de ce que l'instinct de domination produit de pire » (Camus, 1987: 229).

Camus condamne à cor et à cri l'antihumanisme manifeste et violent des doctrines fascistes, ainsi que la destruction qu'elles se proposent, « non seulement de la personne, mais des possibilités universelles de la personne » par « des moyens directs de désintégration » tels « [l]a propagande, la torture [...]; plus encore la déchéance systématique, l'amalgame avec le criminel cynique, la complicité forcée » (Camus, 1987: 235).

Pour l'écrivain toujours à la recherche d'une morale, la perversion morale que proclame la propagande fasciste à travers le mythe d'une culpabilité universelle s'avère terrifiante :

Quand l'idée d'innocence disparaît chez l'innocent lui-même, la valeur de puissance règne définitivement sur un monde désespéré. C'est pourquoi une ignoble et cruelle pénitence règne sur ce monde où seules les pierres son innocentes. Les condamnés sont obligés de se pendre les uns les autres. Le cri pur de la maternité est lui-même tué, comme chez cette mère grecque qu'un officier força de choisir celui de ces trois fils qui serait fusillé. C'est ainsi qu'on est enfin libre. La puissance de tuer et d'avilir sauve l'âme servile du néant. La liberté allemande se chante alors, au son d'orchestre de bagnards, dans les camps de la mort. (Camus, 1987: 235)

Camus achève sa diatribe contre le fascisme, la forme la plus évoluée du nihilisme, avec des considérations sur ses crimes tout en soulignant que l'histoire de l'humanité n'a jamais connu « une doctrine de destruction aussi totale » (Camus, 1987: 235) que le fascisme.

Quant au communisme russe basé sur la doctrine marxiste, il n'échappe pas non plus à sa critique virulente. Puisque celui-ci se propose « comme but la révolution définitive et l'unification finale du monde » (Camus, 1987: 238) tout en prophétisant une société sans

classes, Camus le perçoit comme une nouvelle Église où le mal et le bien arrivent à se confondre.

Pour Camus, l'histoire représente une source du nihilisme qui autorise des conséquences extrêmes. Bien que l'homme révolté s'oppose au crime et à la violence, l'histoire les situe à côté de la vertu, dévoilant ainsi son aspect antihumain. Le révolté devient ainsi l'ennemi déclaré de cette histoire qui incite au totalitarisme : « la pensée grecque était celle de l'unité, justement parce qu'elle ne pouvait pas se passer d'intermédiaires, et qu'elle ignorait au contraire l'esprit historique de totalité que le christianisme a inventé et qui, coupé de ses origines religieuses, risque aujourd'hui de tuer l'Europe » (Camus, 1987: 245).

Si le révolté refuse l'acte révolutionnaire, conséquence directe et immédiate de toute révolte, c'est bien parce que la révolte exclut la violence. Tout au contraire, la révolution a toujours une transfiguration politique, signifiant violence et sang. Si la revendication de la révolte est l'unité, celle de la révolution historique est la totalité. L'une est créatrice, tandis que l'autre est nihiliste.

En fin de compte, l'on pourrait dire que *L'Homme révolté* présente le malheur historique de l'homme : la succession ininterrompue de révolutions et de tyrannies. Si la révolution ne peut être une solution contre la tyrannie c'est parce qu'elle détruit une certaine tyrannie uniquement pour en préparer une autre. C'est un cercle vicieux qui fait de l'histoire une source permanente de souffrance. Afin d'en sortir, Camus propose une solution utopique, celle d'opter « pour la vie » : une vie de type méditerranéen dépourvue de violence et d'agressivité, source de bonheur et de luminosité. Ainsi, la promesse d'une révolte efficace débouche sur une philosophie de non-violence qui annule ce projet, Camus refusant catégoriquement de remédier le mal par le mal.

L'État de siège

Si dans ses essais philosophiques Camus stylise, à l'aide des métaphores, des symboles ou des mythes, la condition humaine, ses fictions deviennent à leur tour, des corollaires de ses réflexions philosophiques. Ainsi, comme nous l'avons mentionné plus haut, *L'État de siège* transpose, par l'intermédiaire de l'allégorie, la pensée camusienne du cycle de la révolte théorisée dans *L'Homme révolté*. Bien que, dans ce cas, l'essai soit postérieur à la pièce de théâtre, l'on découvre dans ses *Carnets* que Camus travaillait à *L'Homme révolté* en même temps qu'il écrivait *L'État de siège*.

Notons que la pièce de notre choix n'est jamais devenue un classique antitotalitaire. Même sa représentation était un grand échec

malgré la distribution prestigieuse, son metteur en scène célèbre et ses décors riches. Néanmoins, en dépit de son échec auprès de la critique et du public, *L'État de siège* reste pour son auteur « celui de [s]es écrits qui [lui] ressemble le plus » (Camus, 2006: 372). C'est la raison pour laquelle, dans la préface à l'édition américaine de *Caligula and Three Other Plays*, Camus tient à avertir ses lecteurs :

L'État de siège n'est pas une pièce de conception classique. On pourrait la rapprocher, au contraire, de ce qu'on appelait dans notre Moyen-Âge, les « moralités » et, en Espagne, les « autos sacramentales », sorte de spectacles allégoriques qui mettaient en scène des sujets connus à l'avance de tous les spectateurs. J'ai centré mon spectacle autour de ce qui me paraît être la seule religion vivante, aux siècles des tyrans et des esclaves, je veux dire la liberté. (Camus, 2006: 372)

Toutefois, les critiques positives, bien que moins nombreuses, ne manquent pas : on apprécie sa richesse symbolique, son lyrisme éclatant, sa représentation de la collectivité ou la dimension collective du spectacle. Ainsi, pour n'en donner que quelques exemples, Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi parle d'« une œuvre véritable, aux richesses étonnantes », Michel Autrand la considère « comme un moment détaché d'une des directions de recherche essentielles dans notre théâtre depuis la Renaissance : ce rêve toujours recommencé de la mise en spectacle de la Ville et du personnage collectif », tandis que Thierry Maulnier trouve que « [j]amais le style de Camus n'a été plus ferme, plus dur, plus éclatant dans le lyrisme »⁸.

Comme l'on a déjà précisé tout à l'heure, l'action de la pièce se déroule dans la ville espagnole de Cadix, à une époque imprécise qui évoque le Moyen-Âge. Une comète, signe annonciateur de catastrophes, traverse le ciel à l'ouverture de la pièce afin d'installer un climat de peur et de confusion propice au développement du fléau à venir. Punition divine, la peste frappe la cité corrompue et appelle le peuple à la pénitence, car, comme le remarque le critique Jean-Yves Guérin, « [t]out est pêché [...]; tout le monde est coupable de quelque chose, de ce qui a été fait et pas fait [...]. Tout le monde est suspect fors les élus qui se sont investis d'une mission historique »⁹. Certes, ceci n'est pas sans rappeler la perversion morale de la propagande fasciste qui instaure une « ignoble et cruelle pénitence [...] sur ce

⁸ Michel Autrand, *L'État de siège ou le rêve de la Ville au théâtre*, in Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi, *Albert Camus et le théâtre*, Paris, Imec Éditions, 1992, p. 57.

⁹ Yves Guérin, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

monde où seules les pierres sont innocentes » de *L'Homme révolté*. C'est une culpabilité totale qui correspond chez Camus au crime logique commis au nom d'une abstraction ou de l'Histoire.

Quant aux personnages, il faut souligner que Camus, s'inspirant des autos sacramentales qui mettaient en scène des notions chrétiennes comme la Piété, le Péché, la Mort, ou le Diable, recourt à l'allégorie afin de donner un visage humain à ses abstractions. Le personnage de la Peste, par exemple, incarne le mal absolu, le dictateur, pouvant aussi bien évoquer Mussolini en 1922, qu'Hitler en 1933, ou Pétain en 1940. Son arrivée dans la ville instaure un nouvel ordre; les portes de la ville refermées et l'état de siège déclaré, son pouvoir s'accroît au fur et à mesure que la peur collective et la mort conquièrent la cité. La Peste est donc un étranger qui introduit le fléau de l'extérieur, une allusion au caractère exogène du fascisme en France. Comme dans *L'Homme révolté*, Camus incrimine l'idéologie allemande : car le slogan de La Peste, « Une seule peste, un seul peuple » (Camus, 2006: 335), fait écho à celui de Hitler, « Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer ». Le gouverneur s'étant retiré, La Peste devient la seule source de légitimité : « Moi, je règne, c'est un fait, donc un droit » (Camus, 2006: 322). Afin de construire une « nouvelle société », il impose ses décisions et applique son programme idéologique avec brutalité. Cependant, c'est à travers le personnage de la secrétaire que se révèle le fantasme totalitaire : induire la culpabilité pour pouvoir mieux contrôler.

Dès le lever du rideau, on se rend compte d'assister à l'aube d'un état totalitaire. Les signes sont là : on interdit les rassemblements et les divertissements, on nie, à travers la propagande, les ravages de l'épidémie, on camoufle les faits. Mais les habitants de la ville assiégée prennent conscience de l'absurde et mettent en échec la tyrannie par leur solidarité. Camus élève le personnage collectif – le cœur –, au rang de personnage principal. En lui confiant l'ouverture de la pièce, le pouvoir de la présence collective se fait sentir à travers la langue du peuple, même si incompréhensible aux spectateurs. L'on pourrait dire que c'est le seul personnage réel : la plupart des personnages ont des noms génériques – le gouverneur, le pêcheur, le curé – et sont très peu individualisés. Même les protagonistes, tels que Diego et Victoria – l'Homme et la Femme – ou Nada, le nihiliste, incarnent des personnages-types.

Le personnage de Diego, l'amoureux, est construit en opposition avec celui de Nada, l'intellectuel collaborateur. Diego valorise l'honneur – il prononce le mot six fois dans la pièce – et c'est lui qui incarne la résistance au totalitarisme. Il surmonte sa peur et se révolte contre La Peste, ce qui entraîne le vacillement de la machine totalitaire.

L'honneur signifie pour lui une dignité d'homme, un devoir, ce qui le tient debout. Par contre, Nada représente l'intellectuel qui se rallie à l'état totalitaire, le nihiliste qui ricane de tout, surtout de l'honneur. Il devient le chancre officiel du régime totalitaire, le porte-parole du tyran, La Peste. Le gouverneur, un homme d'ordre qui déteste le changement, soutient aussi le tyran. Ne pensant qu'à ses propres plaisirs, il ne s'inquiète pas de l'épidémie frappant les quartiers pauvres. Guidé par la peur, son seul désir est d'avoir la vie sauve.

L'hyper-rationalisme du nouveau pouvoir nous rappelle la distinction faite par l'auteur de *L'Homme révolté* entre l'hyper-rationalisme marxiste et l'irrationalisme national-socialiste. La Peste se distingue des dirigeants traditionnels par la logique de son pouvoir, son organisation, sa conception de l'ordre bureaucratique qui passe par des listes, des fiches, des statistiques aussi inutiles que « les certificats d'existence provisoire » (Camus, 2006: 327) accordés par sa secrétaire. Ainsi se justifie l'existence d'une bureaucratie parasitaire et improductive. Instituant « l'absolue justice », La Peste s'installe dans « l'efficacité immédiate » (Camus, 1987: 18), sa réponse à l'absurde étant la légitimation de la violence.

Il nous semble essentiel de remarquer les allusions au système concentrationnaire, le « mal radical ». Ainsi une didascalie mentionne cabanes et barbelés, puis il y a les fours et l'incinération, menant à l'idée d'une élimination planifiée qui ne doit pas laisser des traces. L'on ne saurait oublier l'étoile noire, qui rappelle l'étoile jaune des Juifs ou l'étoile rouge communiste, les déportations et concentrations qui semblent faire allusion aux camps soviétiques.

En outre, on constate l'existence d'un jargon qui correspond à la langue de bois de l'ordre totalitaire, servant à faire impossible la libre communication. Visant à remodeler la société, l'état s'appuie sur la propagande dans le but de détruire toute spontanéité. Ainsi, le langage menteur et obscur devient « un véhicule de l'infection » dans un état qui contrôle tout. Le peuple est embrigadé, tout est surveillé, il n'y a plus de sphère privée.

Dans la dernière partie de la pièce on assiste à la chute de la machine totalitaire. Bien que La Peste veuille détruire Cadix, la ville résiste et lui échappe. Il se retire donc laissant après lui le mépris des hommes. Son objectif ultime étant de soumettre des peuples entiers, il reste convaincu que son projet sera repris ailleurs.

A travers le personnage de Diego, Camus affirme que la résistance est possible pour celui qui n'a plus peur. Au moment où la secrétaire veut inspirer la crainte des bouleversements à venir en parlant des

nettoyages et des règlement de comptes, Diego reprend l'initiative et son ascendant sur le peuple et clame : « Ni peur ni haine » (Camus, 2006: 355). Quand la Peste prend Victoria en otage, il est prêt à mourir à sa place mais elle ne peut accepter son sacrifice. A la fin, il avoue : « Je me suis desséché dans ce combat. Je ne suis plus un homme et il est juste que je meure » (Camus, 2006: 363). Avec deux fautes à expier – celle d'avoir abandonné Victoria et d'avoir pris en otage le fils du juge –, Diego a le sentiment d'avoir franchi une limite. Sans être un personnage pur, il est humain : il sacrifie sa vie heureuse avec Victoria pour sauver les habitants de Cadix. Diego comprend ainsi les limites de la liberté : « Mais la liberté de ces hommes leur appartient. Je ne puis en disposer » (Camus, 2006: 358).

A la fin de la pièce, on est confronté, dans les mots de Jean-Yves Guérin, avec « un scénario optimiste de sortie du totalitarisme. Camus ne fonctionnalise pas la fin apocalyptique du Troisième Reich, puisqu'à aucun moment il n'est question d'une guerre impérialiste perdue. On est tenté de voir, de façon anachronique, le final de la pièce comme une révolution de velours morale et non-violente » (Séginger, 2005: 114).

Avec *L'Homme révolté* et *L'État de siège*, Camus s'efforce de comprendre et d'illustrer l'esprit tragique de son temps tout en se prononçant contre une volonté de totalisation dont on a pu mesurer dans l'histoire les risques politiques. L'écriture camusienne est un acte de révolte contre le mal absolu, donnant voix à un discours universel qui concerne tous les êtres humains.

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Nuances of Spirituality in the Select Indian English Novels

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Abstract:

The concept of spirituality is a remarkable feature of Indian religion and culture. It considers “spirituality” above other worldly possessions. Spiritual experience is the foundation stone of Indian religion and culture. Since Bankim’s time, these wonderful characters often occur in the Indian English fiction. There are some Indian English novels where the concept of spirituality have been discussed and explored through the characterization of spiritual persons at a great length, such as – Kamala Markanday’s *A Silence of Desire* and *Possession*, Ruth Praver Jhabvala’s *Heat and Dust* and *A New Dominion*, and Gita Mehta’s *Karma Cola* and *A River Sutra*. The present paper is an attempt to rediscover the definite connotations of spirituality in the select Indian English novels.

Keywords: spirituality, Swami, Sadhu, life, Karma

Introduction

The concept of spirituality is difficult to be described in a few words but when it is expressed in terms of qualities like humility, selflessness and moral courage, one cannot but be drawn towards it. Various authors have expressed their views about the concept of spirituality. Elkins (1998: 10) describes spirituality as “a way of being and experiencing that comes about through awareness of a transcendent dimension and that is characterized by certain identifiable values in regard to self, others, nature, life and whatever one considers being the ultimate”. Kelly (1995) describes it as “a personal affirmation of a transcendent connectedness in the universe”. Shafranske and Gorsuch (1984) express it as, “the courage to look within and to trust. What is seen and trusted

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appears to be a deep sense of belonging, of wholeness of connectedness and of openness to the infinite”.

To the Indians, spiritual enlightenment has always represented the goal in life, the one thing that gives it meaning and purpose. The average individual, however, would need many incarnations to become enlightened, to see God, to become one the Absolute, to merge one's mind with cosmic consciousness, to become spiritual. The concept of spirituality is the remarkable feature of Indian religion and culture.

The various Indian ideologies have been discussed at a great length in Indian English fiction such as – Kamala Markandaya's *A Silence of Desire and Possession*, Ruth Praver Jhabvala's *Heat and Dust* and *A New Dominion*, and Gita Mehta's *Karma Cola* and *A River Sutra*.

Markandaya's *A Silence of Desire & Possession*

The spiritual man in Kamala Markandaya's *A Silence of Desire*, the Swami¹ appears to be malevolent at first but in reality he is far from being malevolent. He lives on a higher level of spirituality and satisfies the needs of the people who want an object of faith. He represents a convincing concept of true spirituality. He teaches the spiritual values of self-realization freedom and healing.

Dandekar, the husband of Sarojini, soon realizes that the power he is fighting is such that he cannot prevent Sarojini's spiritual belief in the faith cure. Therefore, he resorts to seeking the Swami's help. He then realizes that there are some areas in which no one can trespass into another's way of life: “Even so I want to stop”, Dandekar cried stubbornly, childishly, “I want you to make her stop” (1960: 155). And Swami Remarks “Compulsion is the beginning of corruption” (1960: 166). So, compulsion of an individual is an infringement of other's spiritual freedom.

Sarojini is a typical middle class orthodox Hindu housewife. Hindu culture permits the woman the necessary freedom to be truly herself in a religious, heroic or aesthetic sphere. “A woman of the East may be called a slave by Western critics but in the Hindu society; freedom for the woman is not identified with mere self-assertion” (Coomarswamy, 1976: 166). She has a religious code of faith and ritual. In the process of healing, she surrenders her will to the Swami and becomes indifferent to the family. She loses sympathy and consideration. However, she goes to Swami out of her own free will as she believes in the spirituality of the Swami and the Swami does not compel her. She also offers valuables to him equally free. Thus the Swami teaches her the lesson of non-

¹ Swami/Sadhu is a saint or yogi or a great devotee of god.

attachment and non-possession. This is quite close to the concept of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism.

The Swamis' concept of spirituality becomes the effective instrument for the resolution of the plot, with the departure of the Swami; Sarojini accepts the scientific spirit of the age. But she also learns the philosophy of acceptance from the Swami. She agrees to undergo the operation because of Swami's advice and assurance that she would be cured.

Freedom in Indian sense is awareness. In Kamala Markandaya's *Possession*, the Swami leads Val to this vision without compulsion. He teaches him to vision the truth and Val ultimately perceives the Truth. The Swami teaches Val the freedom, which is pure and untainted by personal motives. The Swami is a spiritual, pitted against the materialism of Caroline and the last scene of the novel is a true representative of the clash of values and ideals. He embodies the Hindu ideal of self--existence in detachment and yet taking part in all the worldly affairs. The Bhagvad Gita² teaches us that "what is inevitable till we achieve freedom and that when we attain it, we have to work as the instruments of the divine" (Radhakrishnan, 1956: 568).

This is opposed to the philosophy of acquisition as a sequel to industrialism in the west. Val's return to his spiritual home brings also the utter disinterest in worldly affairs and goods, as proved in the way he has, "placed impersonally side by side without precedence, a ruby ring, a tiny golden column of sovereign, and a pile of uncashed cheques under a stone weight" (1984: 229–230). Thus, Val obtains serenity only after the final act of spiritual commitment.

Therefore, Val symbolizes the culture of a nation deeply rooted in a spiritual identity. The Swami also represents the Indian ideals of tolerance and freedom as each individual is free and cannot be controlled. "Then, he will be begging free to go but he will never stay, until he has an equal freedom to return" (1984: 232).

The Swami in both the novels presents the alternative to the modern materialistic way of life, that is, a traditional set of human values. The Swamis are true examples of the free men without bonds and ties. They are good to all and perform their duties in the spirit of *Karma Yoga*³. They teach that another's life is his or her own. The novelist shows how

² *The Bhagavad Gita* is a sacred Hindu scripture, considered among the most important texts in the history of literature and philosophy.

³ *Karma Yoga*: Sanskrit word meaning the yoga of action – to offer every action as worship to God.

though the lessons of Swamis are valuable; it depends on the learners also. They are full of bliss, contentment, hence and seem to physical eyes as extraordinary as spiritual teachers.

Jhabvala's *Heat and Dust* & *A New Dominion*

Ruth Praver Jhabvala's novels also reflected the concept of spirituality in an artistic manner. Her spiritual figures do not follow the process of spiritualism. They were poor Sadhus who moved from place to place like vendors selling their gods. They were dishonest. They did not have the salient features of spiritual world. Though, they pretend to live in a world of spirituality but in reality their feelings and emotions are earthly. Even those who came from Europe as young men and initiated, did not live a sex-free life. One such pseudo spiritual figure in the *Heat and Dust* was Chidananda, who came to India with a spiritual purpose. He was attracted by the Holy Scriptures and decided to visit India. But here he too indulges in materialistic austerities and highly indulges in sex affairs. His spirituality is of no importance for other characters. He moved the narrator perhaps to reach a higher place of spiritual consciousness through the power of sex. In the *Heat and Dust* the sacred shrine of Baba Firdaus and other Hindu shrines represent the world of spiritualism as well.

In *A New Dominion*, Banu Bai and the Swami represent the spiritual world. Although, Banu Bai lived in a spiritual plane she had retained a lively interest in the world and all its passing shows. The three girls from the West, Lee, Margaret and Evie are on a spiritual quest in a new dominion think that the spirituality of Swami will bring succor to their tormented soul and the spirituality of Swami will transform them into new beings and provide a life governed by the unity of mind, body and soul. On the other hand the Swami in reality only talks about spirituality but does not have the spiritual elements in his character. He is worldly, sexual, and materialistic and he wishes to claim the bodies and souls of all his disciples. The three English girls bestow all their affections, their hearts and souls on the Swamiji. In return, the Swamiji seduces them, holds them by his charm and claims them as his possession, corporeal as well as spiritual. Hence the Swami does not reflect the essence of true spirituality and seems an ordinary man.

Spiritual figures of Ruth Praver Jhabvala pretended to be in search of spiritual values, but because they did not know what true spiritual values were; they fastened themselves to harmful elements that helped them deeper down into their disturbed egos. They themselves suffer bad

consequences. All kinds of poisonous influence are released, polluting the air breathed by truly spiritual Indians.

Gita Mehta's *Karma Cola & A River Sutra*

Gita Mehta's *Karma Cola* is a satirical account of the hippies and western star freaks on a spiritual quest in India. The *Karma Cola* communicates us about the materialistic Gurus and their spiritual casualties. Throughout the novel people speak about the Hindu concept of *Karma*⁴. It is being realized through instant death ultimatums. The Hindu concept of *Karma* is a spiritual medicine for the occidentals and their comeback to a world of reality is on the wings of insanity. The novelist points out that *Karma* or *Nirvana* cannot attain psychic transformation. The concept of "Karma" lures the imagination of everyone in the novel. The spiritual Gurus in the *Karma Cola* are shallow, mendicants exploiting the gullible and the knowledgeable alike. The spiritual Gurus offer their disciples three quarters of *Nirvana*⁵ – *Nirvana*, *Karma*, Cosmic energy. The novel represents the concepts of *Karma*, *Nirvana*, *Moksha*⁶ and renunciation. But the spiritual gurus in the novel do not reflect these concepts through their characters. They only know the art of making fool others.

In Gita Mehta's *A River Sutra* there are six stories: *The Monk's*, *The Musician's*, *The Teacher's*, *The Executive's*, *The Courtesan's* and *The Minstrel's*. Almost all characters in different stories converge for one or the other reason near the banks of the river to achieve renunciation and tranquility. It seems that they are highly influenced by the concept of Hinduism. "The *sutra*⁷ that connects all these stories as well as the faith of the people is the river *Narmada* and the principle of love that is visible in all of them"(Chandalia, 2009: 96).

The first story is of a *Jain Muni*, who wanted to seek the ultimate truth in life. He promotes "stability" and protects "life" around him. He reflects the concept of Jainism. He believes in Ahimsa, non-violence and truth. *The Teacher's Story* is about a music teacher, Mohan who comes to the banks of the *Narmada* in search of some "peace" and lives with Tariq Mia. *The Executive Story* is a story of a tormented soul, Nitin

⁴ *Karma(n)*: Sanskrit word meaning action, duty, the law of cause and effect.

⁵ *Nirvana* is the state of being free from sufferings.

⁶ *Moksha* is the liberation of the soul from the materialistic world, the cycle of death and rebirth or reincarnation and all of the sufferings and limitations of the worldly existence. In Hinduism, self-realization is the key to attaining *Moksha*. In Buddhism, it is treated as *Nirvana*; it occurs when the self is extinguished from the cycle of rebirth.

⁷ *Sutra* means a strand that connects things.

Bose, who ultimately takes refuge on the banks of Narmada, as if only that river has given the power to cure him. The story conveys the concept that man suffers from emotional and spiritual limitations but despite these there is a self-realization of achievement.

In *The Musician's Story*, the music teacher brings his daughter to the riverbanks, to meditate and cure her. This story unfolds the concept of humane and compassionate qualities in a man.

The Minstrel's Story is about the Naga Baba who saves a girl from the clutches of a prostitute. In the song of Narmada Prof. Shankar renounced the world to penetrate into the heart of Naga tribal culture, to understand the spirit of the river. Thus, the spiritual Gurus of *A River Sutra* are people who are profound, wise, lovable figures who have realized the truth of life. People like Tariq Mia, Master Mohan and Professor Shankar find the real meaning of life in love. Thus, these stories put forward the divergent concepts of obsession, renunciation, desperation, destruction, desire and death.

Conclusions

In all these selected Indian English fiction the concept of spirituality has been explored boldly. These concepts are mostly related to Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism. The concepts of non-violence, self-realization or self-assertion, penance, renunciation or salvation, love, truth, self-sacrifice, self-discipline and freedom of soul etc. have been reflected in the selected novels. In the selected Indian English fiction, spiritual figures have been found to influence other people. They bring peace and stability to a troubled situation. They love all people, good and bad alike, and pray for their well-being. Some of them are pseudo-spiritual. They only offer their "personality" not their spirituality. They take undue advantages of their asceticism. They exploit the gullible and the knowledgeable alike. So, the main idea behind all these concepts is to highlight goodness in human nature as well the cruelty of human mind towards their fellow beings.

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JESS

LINGUISTICS, STYLISTICS AND TRANSLATION STUDIES

JESS

Semantic change in the age of corpus linguistics

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Abstract:

Semantic change has for some time been ignored but due to the availability of online corpora in general, and the corpora created by Mark Davies in particular, accompanied by build- in software and user friendly instructions, a new era begins for the understanding of human language and language change. But prior to that, a succinct presentation of various types of semantic change in the history of English has been considered of utmost importance. This is what we have aimed at in the presentation.

Keywords: semantic change, corpus linguistics, generalization of meaning, narrowing of meaning, amelioration, pejoration, shift in stylistic level, shift in denotation

The modern reader of English literature often finds it difficult to recognize that words familiar in form may have had different meanings in previous centuries.

The situation become even more complicated when the word changes its form as well. The word *silly* (OE *sælig*), for example, as used in the 13th c in *A Ballad of twelfth day* in the description of the infant Jesus has nothing to do with the meaning it has today:

The kinges weren of fer icomen.

Thet seli child for-to sechen.

The meaning “blessed” then changed to “innocent” in the Renaissance poetry:

Seely shepherds are not witting.

What in art of Love is fitting.

Sidney, *Disprayse of a Courtly Life* (c. 1580)

And in the 17th c it changed its form to the one we are familiar with today. Words can and often do change their meaning over time. Content or lexical words may change their meanings, or acquire additional

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functions. Function words may both change their meaning and or refine their range of grammatical functions.

Many words have changed so much that their original meaning seems quite remote, and it is interesting to use a dictionary to trace the sequence of meanings, and to see how one leads to another. The most important dictionary for research in semantics is undoubtedly the *Oxford English Dictionary* the most comprehensible dictionary of the English language. Not only does it provide valuable information about the etymology of words but it also gives the dates when they were first attested with examples from various texts. The last edition of the OED to be printed in 1989 was the second edition, which was also accompanied by a CD ROM. The latest edition, OED 3, is available online and it is unlikely to appear in print format. The OED publishes revised and new lexical entries online every three months.

Another research resource is the Online Etymological Dictionary (see <http://www.etymonline.com/>) based on OED 2 but also other dictionaries such as Weekley's *An Etymological Dictionary of Modern English*, Klein's *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* etc.

Nowadays, however, the study of semantic change is facilitated by the existence of a number of corpora available online with built-in software and comprehensible instructions.

Of great use are the British National Corpus a 100 million – word general corpus of spoken and written British English between 1980–1993 (see <http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc/>) and the Time Magazine Corpus of American English, a 100 million – word corpus that covers American English between 1923 and 2006, a corpus divided by decades, which allows the user to see changes of the language over time. The frequency of the selected words can be displayed in the form of graphs and the material in the form of concordances can be explored by pressing on the bar graph (see <http://corpus.byu.edu/time>). Both corpora are searchable online due to the work of Mark Davies.

One becomes even more aware of the change in the meaning of words if confronted with texts written in earlier periods that have to be translated into Modern English. Here is one example, a couple of lines taken from “A Colloquy on the Occupations” written by Abbot Aelfric round about the year 1000. Aelfric who was a prolific writer and the author of the first vernacular grammar of Latin in Europe. He also wrote a Glossary and a Colloquy as material meant to help pupils learn a foreign language through role play. That foreign language was Latin and it was written in the form of questions and answers between the teacher and people of various occupations who lived in the Anglo-Saxon society

of his time. The pupils had to memorize these dialogues as the best way of learning a foreign language and by changing roles they would learn a full range of vocabulary and syntactic structures. The Colloquy written in Latin was then translated by an Anglo-Saxon into Old English. The lines below are taken from the passage that describes the occupation of the fisherman:

Ic eom fiscere.

I am a fisherman.

Hwæt begietst þū of þīnum cræfte?

What do you get from your occupation?

Bīleofan ic mē begiete, and scrūd, and fēoh.

I gain food, clothing and money.

In bold you have a modern translation of the Old English sentences. But let's look at the Old English words *cræfte*, *scrūd* and *fēoh*. They look familiar, don't they? That is because we still use them in Present Day English (hence PDE) as *craft*, *shroud* and *fee* but they were not used in the modern translation. The word *craft*, a Common Teutonic word, had the initial meaning "strength, force, power" then there was transfer of meaning via "mental power" to "skill, art" which led then to the meaning of "a profession requiring special skills and knowledge"; nowadays the word *craft* has extended its meanings but the core meaning is that of an occupation or activity requiring manual skill, a narrowing from the skills in the earlier period. The word *craft* was used in the Colloquy for the description of occupations, as a means of earning one's living, occupations that ranged from that of a monk to that of the ploughman where definitely there was no distinction between mental and manual skills involved in the activities or the distinction was not considered important in the society of the time. It is difficult to draw conclusions about the semantics of earlier stages of a language as the surviving texts are few. We know how difficult it is to deal with the semantics of PDE where we still have the native speakers as guides.

Besides, one should be aware that semantics is the most difficult aspect of the language as it is the interface between language and the real world, which is both unpredictable and complex.

The word *craft* is not used in the translation and it was translated by the word *occupation*, a word of French origin seems to cover better the meaning of OE *craft* in PDE namely "a job or profession" without necessarily mentioning the types of skills.

The OE word *scrūd* (PDE *shroud*) had the meaning "a garment, an article of clothing", than a figurative meaning arose "the vesture in which the world or the things of nature are clothed; also, the veil of

flesh” and in the 16thc became restricted to “any piece of cloth for wrapping the dead for the burial”. The OE word can be translated by either *clothes* or *clothing*, the latter being more formal according to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (hence OAED). According to the BNC the word *clothes* is used in works of fiction in PDE while the word *clothing* is more common in magazines and refers to a particular type of clothes. The use of *clothing* could be more appropriate given that we are not translating fiction here.

Things become more complicate with the OE word *fēoh* which had the meaning “cattle, possession, money” (L. *pecūnia* “money”) which according of Bruce Mitchell gives Modern English *fee* “an amount of money that you pay for professional advice or services”, but the OED rejects this hypothesis and considers that the word becomes obsolete and that *fee* comes from the AF *fee*, *fie* (med L *feodum* ultimately of Germanic origin) that entered the language in the 13th c with the meaning “a fief, feudal benefice” and also “the sum which a public officer is authorized to demand as payment for the execution of his official functions” but there seemed to have been a lot of confusion between these two words due to similarity in form.

The word *money* borrowed from OF in the 14th c comes from the name of goddess Moneta (L. *monēta*) in whose temple money was coined. Another word with the same etymology is *mint* with the meaning “a piece of money, coin, money” but starting with 15th c it was restricted to the place money was coined.

As you have seen in the examples above, some PDE words of OE origin had different meanings from the meaning we can detect today. And if in some instances we can find explanations for semantic changes sometimes there is no apparent motivation or sometimes opinions do not always converge (as in the example of *fee*).

Linguists have put forward a number of possible ways of classifying different types of semantic changes but none have been considered satisfactory. We have adopted the classification suggested by C. M. Millward (1989: 109–111) namely: generalization and narrowing, amelioration and pejoration, strengthening and weakening, shift in stylistic level and shift in denotation.

On closer investigation many semantic changes do not fit into these cut-and-dried categories they may belong to several of them at the same time.

1. Generalization or extension of meaning and narrowing

1.1. An example of *generalization of meaning* or *extension* is offered by the word *holiday* which meant in OE “a consecrated day, a religious festival” but today it signifies a day when most people do not go to work or school.

The verb *flicker*, OE *flicorian*, an onomatopoeic word, seems to have been used for birds only meaning “to flutter, to move the wings” while nowadays it is extended to the movement of light and fire (*flickering neon tubes*) and even feelings and emotions (*flickering hopes*). The BNC shows that the verb is in its great majority used in works of fiction either prose or poetry.

Pudding is a ME word of uncertain origin with the original meaning “a kind of sausage boiled and kept till needed” (*black pudding* in PDE) which was extended in the 17th c to other food boiled or steamed in a bag or sack and nowadays it refers mainly to the sweet course following the main course of a meal.

1.2. *Narrowing of meaning.* This is a much more common type of semantic change than generalization due to the thousands of new words the language acquired in its history, far more than it lost. The result of borrowing of new words had to be either many complete synonyms or the limitation or narrowing of the semantic domain of words. And as absolute synonyms are rare in a language, many OE words narrowed their meanings due to loans from other languages.

We have seen this with the word *shroud*, the word entered in competition with OF words such as *garment*, *vestment* as well as other Germanic words such as *clothing* and *clothes*. At the same we do not have to forget that there existed in OE another word *wēod* which also meant “a garment” and which still exists in PDE but with a plural form *weeds* with the meaning “mourning garments” restricted to the phrase *widow’s weeds* (with a low frequency of 9 in the BNC).

The well known proverbial saying “one man’s meat is another man’s poison” would be hard to interpret through the modern meaning of *meat*. The origin of this saying goes back to Lucretius who wrote: “Quod cibus est alii, aliis fuat acre venenum” (What is food to one may be bitter poison to others). The old meaning is still preserved in James Version of the *Bible* (1611) where God says about herbs and trees “to you shall be for meat” (*Genesis* 1: 29).

The restricted meaning of *meat* to “the flesh of animals used for food” from food in general was first attested in the 15th c.

The OE word *hund* (*hound* in PDE) initially the generic word for dog narrowed its meaning to “a dog used for hunting that has a good sense of smell” in the 13th c.

Another OE word *dior* (*deer* in PDE) with the meaning “a beast: usually a quadruped, as distinguished from birds and fishes” a meaning still preserved by its German related word *tier* started narrowing its meaning in OE times to the meaning it still has today that of “a ruminant quadruped, distinguished by the possession of deciduous branching horns or antlers, and by the presence of spots on the young”.

The OE word *fugol* (PDE *fowl*) meant initially “any feathered vertebrate animal, a bird” then it narrowed its meaning in the 16th c to a “domestic hen or rooster, edible birds” its main modern meaning. At the same time the OE word *bridd* (PDE *bird*) with the meaning “a young bird” generalized and included fowl of any age.

The OE verb *steorfan* that becomes PDE *starve* once meant “to die” while nowadays its meaning has narrowed “to die from lack of food or nourishment” and the former meaning was replaced by the verb *die* borrowed from ON in the Middle Ages.

The word *girl* of unknown origin had in ME the meaning “a young person of either sex” narrowed in EMnE to a “young female”.

The same semantic changes affected both native words and loanwords. For example, the word *accident*, word of Latin origin that entered the language in the Middle English had a wide range of meanings from the 14th to the 19th c: “any happening, chance event” etc. that has narrowed to “unfortunate happening” today.

2. Amelioration and pejoration

2.1. Amelioration is a change to a more favourable meaning.

For example, the OE word *cniht* (PDE *knight*) once meant “a boy, a youth” but it was elevated in the age of chivalry to the name of a rank or order.

Another example is provided by the word *nice* which entered the English language in late 13th c from OF (L. *nescius* “ignorant”) and had the meaning “foolish, stupid, senseless”. In the 16th and 17th c it is difficult to say in what sense it was used by different authors. Starting with late 18th c it acquired the meaning “agreeable” used “as a general epithet of approval or commendation” the meaning it retained in PDE.

The word *dizzy* of Germanic origin could be considered as an example of amelioration. In OE it had the meaning “foolish, stupid” but by ME its primary meaning was “having a sensation of whirling or vertigo in the head”. However, the old meaning still survives in PDE in

the expression *a dizzy blonde* (with a frequency of 2 in the BNC) and also in the context “a dizzy swine” (from BNC spoken register).

2.2. Pejoration seems to be much more common than amelioration even if we are not always sure how pejorative a word is. It is usually the context that helps detect pejoration.

The OE word *ceorl* which becomes PDE *churl* meant “peasant, freeman” and then in early ME it had a variety of meanings before it degenerated in its meaning and became a “fellow of rude manners, a villain”. The word *boor* (of later date) which is a synonym in PDE of *churl* seems to have had a similar development from the meaning “a peasant farmer” to “a rude unpleasant person”. The difference between the two terms in PDE lies in the frequency of these two words and their use. According to the BNC the word *churl* has a frequency of 7 and it is used in academic and non academic registers only while *boor* has a frequency of 12 distributed mainly in fiction, newspaper, academic and non academic works. In AmE (according to Time Magazine Corpus) the discrepancy is even greater *churl* has a frequency of 4 and *boor* of 56.

Quite a few adjectives have undergone semantic changes not for linguistic reasons but for psychological and sociological ones.

For example, OE *léwed*, (PDE *lewd*) meant initially “lay, unlearned” then “foolish” and starting with late 14th c “obscene”.

As we have seen the PDE word *silly* is with the initial meaning “happy, blessed” meant in ME “helpless, weak, naïve” and then about late 16th c it acquired the meaning “foolish, lacking in reason or understanding”.

A universal tendency of people to mistrust those who are cleverer than the average has been mentioned in the literature. So adjectives referring to cleverness tend to acquire a negative connotation.

The adjective *clever* mentioned only once in ME became established in the language in the 17th c and the initial meaning was connected with the use of the hands, it meant having “the brain in the hand” and extension to intellect is found in the 18th c. In PDE the meaning is mainly to do with intelligence, and when the use of hands is meant it is mentioned: *clever with your hands* (see BNC). Interestingly, *clever* can be used disapprovingly when it refers to being clever in a way that annoys the other or shows lack of respect (BNC and OALD: *Don't you get clever with me!*) and in the expression *too clever by half* (frequency 2237 in BNC mainly in fiction and spoken registers).

The adjective *cunning* (from OE *cunnan* “to know, to be able to”) not found in OE, meant initially, in 14th c, “learned, skilful, possessing knowledge” extended to “possessing practical knowledge, clever”

became pejorative in Early Modern English (16th c) “skilful in an underhand manner” and it is still used disapprovingly. In PDE it collocates often with other pejorative adjective such as *devious*, *vicious*, *unscrupulous* (in BNC has a frequency of 454 and it is used mainly in fiction).

Artful also meant initially “learned, clever” (17th c) but then in the 18th c it degenerated to “skilful in taking an unfair advantage”. In PDE according to BNC (frequency of 66) it is frequent in magazines and fiction and according to collocations it can be seen as being both favourable and unfavourable e.g. *make-up*, *restaurant*, *postcard*, or *dodger*, *asset-stripper*, *wiles*, *hound*.

PDE adjective *crafty* from OE *cr@ftig* “strong, powerful” but also “clever, skilful” in OE became pejorative in ME. In PDE *crafty* with a frequency of 160 in the BNC is mainly used in the spoken language and collocates often with slang and taboo words (*bugger*, *bleeder*, *sod*).

A synonym of *crafty* is *tricky* an 18th c a word which in AmE is negative when applied to people, but positive when applied to solutions to problems (C. M. Millward, 1989: 180). According to BNC it is mainly used in magazine and spoken registers.

Another adjective used for human behaviour is the adjective *shrewd* which in the 16th c meant “cunning, artful” from the earliest meanings “malignant, wicked” but it became more neutral in Early Modern English. In PDE it has a favourable sense “clever at understanding and making judgements about a situation” (*shrewd politician*, *observer*, *businessman*).

In the Annexe you will be able to see the frequency of the adjectives mentioned above in AmE (taken from Time Magazine Corpus) over the period 1923 and 2006. It is interesting to notice a recent increase in the use of *tricky* and a decrease in the use of *shrewd*.

3. Strengthening and weakening

3.1. Strengthening is a very rare type of semantic change as compared to weakening. One example is offered by the OE verb *wrecan* (PDE *wreak*) which had both a strong and a mild meaning “to avenge” and “to drive away or out” and is used in PDE with the strong meaning of “to do great harm” as in *to wreak havoc* and collocates with *revenge*, *vengeance*, *destruction*, *inhumanity*.

Another example is the ME word *jeopardy* that changed its meaning from “stratagem” to “danger”.

3.2. Weakening, on the contrary, is more common because of the universal tendency to exaggerate. For example, the word *soon* meant in

OE “at once, immediately” but since ME it has been used with the meaning “in a short time from now”.

The OE word *cwellan*, PDE *quell*, meant “to kill, to murder” then weakened its meaning “to extinguish, to suppress” in ME a meaning still retained today.

The PDE verb *pester* probably from F weakened its meaning from “to clog, entangle, embarrass, obstruct the movements of” to “to annoy, to trouble” in the 16th c soon after it was first attested in the language.

The PDE adjective *dreary* acquired its current meaning of a harmless adjective of disapproval “dull, and not interesting” in the 17th c replacing the former meanings “bloody, gory”.

4. Shift in stylistic level

This type of semantic change is related to strengthening and weakening but it still constitutes a category of its own. We could illustrate it with the OE word *scūfan* (PDE *shove*) which meant “to push, to thrust” and was used in dignified contexts (such as the final scene in Beowulf *dracan ēc scufan, wrym ofer weallclif* “moreover, they shoved the dragon, the serpent over the cliff”) while nowadays even if the meaning is the same there is suggestion of a rough, careless, or hasty action. According to BNC the frequency of *shove* in the spoken informal language has exceeded its use in friction. In *shove it* and *shove off* the meaning has degenerated.

Stuff both as a verb and noun has undergone a shift in stylistic level. The verb *stuff* of AF origin was used in serious writing in the 14th c with the meaning “to supply with munitions, provisions” and later came to be used in informal English. The noun *stuff* was used in ME poetry with the meaning “the quilted material worn under the mail, or itself serving in place of armour” and in PDE it is used in colloquial English to denote “any collection of things about which one is not able or willing to particularize”.

Another example is the verb *enamel* a 14th c Anglo–French word which shifted from the language of poetry (*enamelled grass, enamelled green*) to the language of kitchen (*enamelled casseroles, enamelled kettle*).

5. Shift in denotation

Some words have undergone such an extreme shift in meaning that it is not easy to trace the change. It is incredible difficult to try to place ourselves in the minds of speakers of English (be it OE, ME or EMnE) and see life and the world as they saw it.

The verb *dwelling*, for example, had in OE a very different meaning from PDE. It meant “to mislead, to lead into error, to err” while the present day meaning is probably influenced by the ON word *dvelja* meaning “to stay”.

PDE *cloud* comes from OE *clūd* with the meaning “a mass of rock, hill”; the change in meaning is due to metaphorical extension in the 14th c based on the similarity of cumulus clouds and rock masses.

The word *bead* meant originally “prayer”. In the Middle Ages it was customary to repeat prayers over and over while counting them by means of little wooden balls on a rosary. So the meaning of *bead* was shifted to the visible sign of the prayer, by metonymy.

PDE *parliament* meant in ME (OF *parlement* “speaking”) “a talk, a speech, a conversation” and it acquired its present meaning by metonymy. About the 13th c English law and English legal institutions began to take their future form and it was in this century that the word *parliament* made its first appearance.

Most of the examples of semantic changes presented above to which many more could be added are relatively simple as they represent one type of change at a time. But many semantic changes are much more complex.

Here is one example. The PDE word *beam*, OE *bēam*, had the original meaning “a living tree” then it was seemingly extended to anything made of a tree (timber, post, pillar) by metonymy in the 10th c. The meaning was also extended to bars of metal. Then the meaning of the living plant was taken over by another native word, the OE *trēow* (PDE *tree*) and *beam* narrowed its semantic domain. At the same time *tree* lost its meanings “wood, timber”.

As to the meaning “a ray of light” it developed in OE due to a literal translation by Venerable Bede of L. *columna lucis* the “pillar of fire” in the poetical version of Exodus. There has certainly been a deterioration of the stylistic level.

As we could see semantic changes cannot be treated systematically like phonological or syntactic change as they are closely related to the highly unsystematic world of reality. The causes of semantic change are multiple and difficult to detect from a distance of centuries. However, the more we approach in time the easier it is to study these changes as the number of surviving texts increases. OE and ME semantic changes are undoubtedly the most difficult to study.

If, for some time semantic change has been ignored the availability of ever larger online corpora and the rapid development of corpus linguistics software will provide an unprecedented impetus for researchers in this field of semantics.

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<http://www.etymonline.com/>

<http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc/>

<http://corpus.byu.edu/time>

ANNEXE

CLICK ON BARS FOR CONTEXT **CLICK ON COLUMN HEADINGS FOR FREQUENCY IN SUB-SECTION**




Figure 1 TIME MAGAZINE CORPUS _clever

CLICK ON BARS FOR CONTEXT **CLICK ON COLUMN HEADINGS FOR FREQUENCY IN SUB-SECTION**




Figure 2 TIME MAGAZINE CORPUS _cunning

**CLICK ON BARS
FOR CONTEXT**

**CLICK ON COLUMN HEADINGS FOR
FREQUENCY IN SUB-SECTION**

SECTION	1920s	1930s	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
FREQ	18	36	56	71	87	52	76	68	30
PER MIL	2.36	2.84	3.62	4.23	5.41	3.83	6.68	6.98	4.67
SEE ALL YEARS AT ONCE									

Figure 3 TIME MAGAZINE CORPUS _ artful

**CLICK ON BARS
FOR CONTEXT**

**CLICK ON COLUMN HEADINGS FOR
FREQUENCY IN SUB-SECTION**

SECTION	1920s	1930s	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
FREQ	25	56	56	66	34	37	26	21	17
PER MIL	3.27	4.42	3.62	3.93	2.11	2.72	2.29	2.16	2.65
SEE ALL YEARS AT ONCE									

Figure 4 TIME MAGAZINE CORPUS _ crafty

**CLICK ON BARS
FOR CONTEXT**

**CLICK ON COLUMN HEADINGS FOR
FREQUENCY IN SUB-SECTION**




Figure 5 TIME MAGAZINE CORPUS _tricky

**CLICK ON BARS
FOR CONTEXT**

**CLICK ON COLUMN HEADINGS FOR
FREQUENCY IN SUB-SECTION**




Figure 6 TIME MAGAZINE CORPUS_shrewd

Frecvența adjectivelor invariabile în diacronie

Alina Burcă*

The Frequency of Invariable Adjectives in Diachrony

Abstract:

Invariable adjectives are not very common in Romanian language, but they have appeared in first Romanian texts. It is true that, later, some of them became variable, but the appearance of this category of adjectives remains registered.

Our study offers several examples of invariable adjectives from Romanian literary texts, presented according to diachronic criterion, and some examples of invariable adjectives extracted from folklore. All examples have also been debated starting with a theoretical basis.

Keywords: adjective, invariable, diachrony, examples, Romanian literature

Adjectivele invariabile sunt, în cea mai mare parte, neologisme în limba română. Pentru a demonstra acest lucru, vom încerca o analiză diacronică a adjectivelor invariabile, folosindu-ne de o schemă de periodizare a limbii române literare propuse de noi (Burcă, 2008: 29).

În epoca veche, în secolul al XVI-lea, istoriile limbii române (Rosetti, Cazacu, Coteanu, 1965–1969, Diaconescu, 1974–1975, Gheție, 1978, Munteanu, Țâra, 1983, Chivu, Costinescu, Frâncu, Gheție, Roman-Moraru, Teodorescu, 1997) sesizează cazul a trei adjective care apar în diferite texte, folosite întotdeauna ca invariabile, adjective care astăzi nu sunt în categoria invariabilelor. Este vorba despre adjectivele *mare*, *tare* și *pusti*.

Ovid Densusianu (1931–1932: 60–61) observă fenomenul adjectivelor *mare* și *tare*, apărând în diferite contexte, zece, după părerea sa, de fiecare dată nemodificându-și forma, deci în ipostaza unor invariabile (*plângeri mare*, *izvoare mare*). Adjectivul *mare* apare tot

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invariabil și la Dosoftei, în secolele XVII–XVIII. Aceste două adjective și-au urmat „în totul flexiunea de plural, și câtăva vreme au rămas invariabile și ne surprinde întrucâtva acest lucru” (1931: 61).

Explicația pe care o dă lingvistul (1931: 61) acestui fapt de limbă este următoarea: dacă la substantivele masculine terminate în *-e* constatăm pluralul în *-i*, la adjective se menține *-e* la plural, deoarece ideea de plural era suficient exprimată de substantive „adjectivele nefiind în general independente, căci alăturate pe lângă unele substantive, atunci ideea de plural nu are nevoie să fie evidențiată ca la substantive”.

Calificativele *mare* și (*ne*)*tare* apar, deci, ca invariabile în perioada 1532–1640 (Chivu, Costinescu, Frâncu, Gheție, Roman-Moraru, Teodorescu, 1997: 124). După cum susțin autorii tratatului de lingvistică al Academiei, (1997: 125) „pe la 1630–1640 formele variabile sunt curențe în textele din toate regiunile, deși forma invariabilă *mare* se mai menține, cu frecvență redusă, până târziu”.

Cazul adjectivului *pustiu*, cu forma invariabilă *pustii* „nu este tocmai clar” (Densusianu, 1931: 57). În textele din secolul al XVI-lea și mai târziu, întâlnim *loc pustii*, în loc de *pustiu*. Ovid Densusianu încearcă să găsească explicația fonetică pertinentă. Presupunând că acest adjectiv ar proveni de la forma slavă *pustyŋi*, aceasta ar fi putut fi redată prin forma *pustini* și aceasta, prin căderea lui *-n* l-ar fi dat pe *pustii*. În această situație, ar fi fost de așteptat ca această formă să-l fi primit pe *u*, prin analogie cu adjectivul *viu*. Cu toate acestea, „când găsim în texte *pustii*, nu e o eroare, ci ne găsim în fața unui caz special de terminațiune a acestui adjectiv și incontestabil că particularitatea trebuie să fi fost locală” (1931: 58). O altă explicație a acestei transformări fonetice ar putea fi și aceea că forma *pustii* s-ar datora fenomenului de iotacizare.

În perioada 1640–1780 nu pot fi constatate modificări importante pe sistemul morfologic al limbii române literare. Adjectivele, în general, prezintă o mare stabilitate în ceea ce privește flexiunea. Există puține schimbări față de perioada anterioară (1532–1640), iar acestea sunt periferice în sistem, afectând un număr mic de adjective.

Cu referire la problema frecvenței adjectivelor invariabile, formele *mare* și *tare*, apar în unele texte ca variabile. În unele texte nordice, după cum susține tratatul de lingvistică al Academiei (1997: 238), adjectivul *mare* își menține forma unică de singular și plural în *-e*, dar aceasta va fi, treptat, eliminată de forma variabilă cu număr. Totuși, forma invariabilă se menține încă și la G. D. singular (*credința cinei cei mare*, *împotriva taberei cei mare*).

Spre deosebire de adjectivul *mare*, adjectivul *tare* nu mai apare ca invariabil, ci este atestat numai cu forme variabile (*cețăți tari*).

În procesul de modernizare a limbii române literare început în ultimele decenii ale secolului al XVIII-lea, prefacerile cele mai importante au avut loc în domeniul lexicului. Ne aflăm, așadar, în perioada „de tranziție” sau „premodernă” a limbii române moderne. În această perioadă, limba română literară a recurs la împrumutul unor neologisme din mai multe limbi de cultură, care diferă, însă, de la o regiune la alta:

a) la sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea și până la 1820–1830, în Muntenia și Moldova, româna literară a evoluat sub influența dominantă a limbilor neogreacă, franceză, latină, italiană și, mai puțin, rusă (Ursu, 1969: 132). Influența rusă este preponderentă în stilul administrativ al acestor două provincii românești;

b) în aceeași perioadă, în Transilvania, se exercită influența dominantă a limbilor latină, germană, italiană, franceză și, mai puțin, maghiară.

După intervalul 1830–1840 se intensifică influența latino-romanică în toate cele trei provincii românești.

La sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea și în prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea pătrund foarte multe adjective al căror împrumut a fost impus atât de pătrunderea în cultura noastră a unor noțiuni noi, cât și de tendința limbii române literare spre o exprimare mai sintetică. Intelectualii vremii au recurs mai puțin la procedeul derivării pe teren românesc, în favoarea împrumuturilor. Sistemul morfologic românesc a preferat adjectivele cu terminații deosebite după gen, chiar și atunci când în limbile de origine adjectivele respective sunt invariabile.

Un număr restrâns de adjective invariabile pătrund în vocabularul limbii române, în secolul al XIX-lea, acestea fiind introduse de unii latiniști și italieniști, dar aceste forme nu s-au impus. Este cazul adjectivelor invariabile *capitale*, *generale*, *morale*, *naturale*, *formale*, *ilegale*, *liberale*, *locale*, *materiale*, *natale*, *naționale* (*vocea patriotului național* – Caragiale, 1972: 214) *nominale*, *originale*, *universale*, *vegetale*, *vitale* (Ivănescu, 1955: 35, Ursu 1969: 134), în care sufixul latinesc *-is* a devenit *-e*.

Pe lângă aceste adjective invariabile au fost introduse și altele, forme analogice, în *-inte*: *aparinte*, *competinte*, *dependinte*, *influinte*, *potinte*, *precedinte*. Aceste forme au fost create de latiniști după modelul elementelor latine moștenite, însă nici acestea nu s-au impus.

Pe lângă acestea, latiniștii și italieniștii au creat și alte forme în *-ante* și *-ente*: *arogante*, *constante*, *innocente*, *omnipotente*, *pendente*,

predominate, prudente, transparente. Italieniștii au creat câteva adjective cu terminația *-bile*, de tipul: *afabile, blamabile, culpabile, incontestabile, invincibile, mutabile, oribile, penibile, teribile, vizibile*, pe care le promovează înscrierile lor, însă nici acestea nu se impun. Ion Heliade-Rădulescu este un mare promotor al acestor adjective, Tudor Vianu (1954: 54) considerând că „heliadismul alcătuiește un capitol destul de lung dacă nu și foarte fericit al limbii literare române în secolul la XIX-lea”.

Alături de Ion Heliade-Rădulescu, și scriitorii Bogdan Petriceicu-Hasdeu, Gheorghe Asachi și Simion Bărnuțiu au folosit aceste tipuri de adjective în mod excesiv în articole din presa vremii (Mihai, 1963: 216), adjective care au avut, totuși, o existență efemeră, acestea putând fi întâlnite mai des în stilul presei, în stilul juridic și administrativ și, într-o mai mică măsură, în operele scriitorilor.

Toate aceste forme de adjective invariabile nu au rezistat, deși exista în limba română o categorie, mai slab reprezentată, de adjective invariabile terminate în *-e*. Despina Ursu (1969: 135) concluzionează că „în concurența dintre formele respective au învins cele terminate în consoană, pentru că această categorie este mai bine reprezentată în limba română”.

O situație aparte întâlnim în cazul adjectivului *ferice* (<lat. *felicis, -em*), care și-a păstrat etimonul latin doar în limba română, în celelalte limbi romanice adjectivul corespondent fiind derivat de la baze nelatine. Forma acestui adjectiv este reperabilă în stilul beletristic, cu precădere:

Vom visa un vis ferice (Eminescu, *Dorința*, p. 81)

Stilul colocvial apelează la formele *fericit, -ă*, preferabile, mai ales, pentru că sunt variabile (Ciompec, 1962: 132).

În cele ce urmează, vom aduce în atenție și vom discuta mai multe exemple extrase din operele literare românești, urmând o logică diacronică în expunerea acestora. Prezentarea noastră se va opri la exemplele de adjective invariabile din textele beletristice contemporane, dar vom surprinde și prezența acestora în câteva texte din folclorul autohton.

Limba română din secolul al XVI-lea până în secolul al XVIII-lea percepea ca adjective invariabile doar trei adjective, care astăzi sunt variabile: *mare, tare și pustiu* (vezi *supra*). Nu vom mai insista asupra explicației pe care o dau lingviștii asupra acestui fenomen, deoarece am făcut-o deja, dar reținem faptul că practic nu exista o categorie gramaticală aparte a adjectivelor invariabile, ci aceste adjective apăreau în textele vremii neacordate și, datorită lipsei acordului, ele ne parvin astăzi ca adjective invariabile. Vom ilustra faptul acesta lingvistic prin câteva fragmente din textele reprezentative ale epocii în discuție.

Menționăm faptul că încă din această perioadă apare în textele bisericești și adjectivul invariabil *anatema*, nemenționat în studiile literare, acestea neavând drept scop analiza sistematică exclusivistă a adjectivelor invariabile. Adjectivul *anatema* provine din adjectivul grecesc *anathemos* = *fără Dumnezeu, în afara lui Dumnezeu, blestemat*. Acest adjectiv poate fi înlocuit și de sinonimul lui, *proclat*, un adjectiv variabil, însă.

Adjectivul *anatema* apare în *Pravila* lui Coresi, tipărită, probabil, între 1560–1562, lucrul acesta nefiind datat cu certitudine: *Iară acela ce mănâncă sânge prijenit să se leapede de besearecă și de blagoslovenie să se lase. Și, de va muri, să nu se îngroape și **anatema** să fie* (Gheție, 1982: 223). Coresi folosește și sinonimul variabil **proclat**: *Iară cine va ajuna sâmbăta sau dumeneca sau va face metanii, să fie **proclat***. (Gheție, 1982: 227).

Sensul sinonimului *proclat* nu este la fel de puternic, de dur, căci el apare și în contexte în care omul declarat *proclat* nu era considerat neapărat despărțit de Dumnezeu, ci blestemat: *Cela ce bagă apă în vin, de-l vinde, să fie **proclat**. Cine bagă apă în lapte, de-l va vinde, să fie **proclat*** (Gheție, 1982: 228).

În *Cartea carea să cheamă răspunsul împotriva Catihismului calvinesc*, a mitropolitului Varlaam, tipărită în 1645, întâlnim de mai multe ori adjectivul *anatema*, aceasta și datorită caracterului apologetic al lucrării redactate de către Varlaam, o carte de apărare a credinței creștin-ortodoxe, și datorită, implicit, tonului folosit de către mitropolit: *S-ar fi cine-ar fi și vă va învăța altă credință, măcară s-are fi înger din ceriu, să nu-l creadeți, ce să-i dziceți **anatema!** și să vă lepădați și să vă depărtați de unul ca acela!* (187). Varlaam face trimitere la textul Bibliei, în care apostolul Pavel, scriindu-le galatenilor, le spunea: *Sânt unii de vă spementadză pre voi și vor să strămbeadze bunăvestirea lui Hristos. Ce săvai și eu, săvai înger din ceriu de va vesti voao mai într-alt chip de cum am vestit voao, **anatema** să fie! Cum am și mai dzis și iară mai dzic: că de va neștine vesti voao mai într-alt chip de cum ați luat, **anatema** să fie!* (187).

Adjectivul *mare* apare neflexionat, deci invariabil în *Psaltirea în versuri* a mitropolitului Dosoftei, tipărită la Uniev în 1673. Vom exemplifica acest fapt lingvistic prin câteva fragmente extrase din acest text bisericesc, de o mare valoare artistică, de altfel, pentru literatura română veche. În *Psalomul lui David 46* găsim scris:

*Pre vârvuri de munte
S-aud glasuri multe
De bucline **mare***

Cu naltă strigare. (Dosofoței, *Psaltirea în versuri*, p. 102–103)

În *Psalomul lui David 9* găsim:

Perit-au cu sunet veștile mare,

Și Domnul cu vecii custă pre-așezare. (Dosofoței, *Psaltirea în versuri*, p. 30)

Aceeași situație o întâlnim și la cronicarul moldovean Miron Costin, în cronică sa *Letopiseșul Țării Moldovei de la Aaron vodă încoace: Și tot într-acela an lăcustele neaudzite vacurilor, care toate semnele în loc bătrânii și astronomii în Țara Leșască a mare răutăți că sintu acestor țări...* (Costin, *Letopiseșul Țării Moldovei*, p. 171); dar și în cronică lui Ion Neculce: *Și turcii arunca și cumbarale de cele mare* (Neculce, *Letopiseșul Țării Moldovei*, p. 228).

Un caz interesant este și cel al adjectivului variabil *curat*, care apare folosit și cu sinonimele *mereu* și *prisne*, adjective invariabile. Această situație o întâlnim în *Palia de la Orăștie* și a fost sesizată de către Florica Dimitrescu în studiul *Observații asupra artei cuvântului în Palia de la Orăștie* (cf. *Palia de la Orăștie. 1582–1982*, 152–190), în care sunt trecute doar diverse serii sinonimice, studiul urmărind cu precădere, rolul pe care îl are *Palia de la Orăștie* în îmbogățirea vocabularului limbii române. În dreptul seriilor sinonimice adjectivale găsim și seria *mereu = curat = prisne*. Astfel, în textul *Paliei*, găsim: *Și tot supt doo stâlpure un bumb era și așa șase stâlpure ieșiia dentr-îns, cu bumbii și cu florile depreună și tot acest lucru dentreg și mereu aur era.* (*Palia de la Orăștie*, p. 306)

Tot în același text găsim:

Fă și scaunul meserătăției, den curat aur, de-al treilea cot în lung, de-al doilea în lat să fie. Și fă doi heruvimi de-ntreg și prisne de aur. (p. 261);

Fă și sfeașnic den curat și prisne de aur... (p. 263);

Și pre îmbe capetele scaunului milostiei feace doi heruvimi den prisne de aur. (p. 305).

Și în romanul *Istoria ieroglifică* al marelui cărturar al vremii, Dimitrie Cantemir, putem găsi câteva adjective invariabile:

Într-adevăr ieste că eu poruncă ca aceasta și aievea pozvolenie de la mai-marii miei nu am. (Cantemir, *Istoria ieroglifică*, p. 64);

... că urechea astupată leacu îi ieste ca cu ce ar fi astupată să să scoată, iară căriia organul audzirii ieste betejit și de tot surdu, nici leacul pre lesne, nici trăsnetul tunului... (Cantemir, *Istoria ieroglifică*, p. 65–66).

Putem observa că adjectivele invariabile nu constituiau o problemă importantă pentru limba română veche, numărul lor fiind foarte restrâns.

În răstimpul secolelor al XVIII-lea și al XIX-lea, limba română suferă numeroase transformări, aceasta parcurgând perioada premodernă și cea modernă. Acum se pun bazele limbii române literare. Vocabularul limbii române se îmbogățește și, deci, vom avea o creștere numerică și a adjectivelor invariabile. Este vorba despre adjectivele terminate în *-ale*, *-inte*, *-ante*, *-ente* și *-bile*. O contribuție remarcabilă la îmbogățirea lexicului românesc a avut-o Ion Heliade-Rădulescu, deși în *Gramatica* sa, tipărită la Sibiu în 1828, nici nu se discută despre clasa adjectivelor invariabile, deci, în mentalitatea vremii, nu exista această clasă de cuvinte invariabile. Nici în *Gramateca limbei române* a lui Timotei Cipariu nu apare noțiunea de *invariabil* ci doar de „adjective care se schimbă în terminațiunile lor, ca și substantivele” (Cipariu, 1992: 177).

În *Repede aruncătură de ochi asupra limbei și începutului rumânilor* apare adjectivul *cutare*: ... *își bate capul să dovedească că noi ne tragem din cutare sau din cutare neam...* (Heliade-Rădulescu, 1972: 213).

Trecând mai apoi în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea, la *veselul Alecsandri*, vom găsi adjectivul invariabil *ferice*, moștenit din limba latină și pe care îl vom întâlni și la Mihai Eminescu. În poezia *Presimțire* din 1861, Alecsandri își întreabă propriul suflet:

*Spune-mi, inimă ferice,
Pentru ce tresari cu fală? (Alecsandri, Presimțire, p. 560)*
Același adjectiv apare și în alte texte ale lui Alecsandri:
*La Veneția mult iubită,
Rai ferice, neuitat... (Dorul de mare, p. 545);
Cădea-va zidul și tu, ferice,
Vei fi unită cu a ta sor (Moldova în 1857, p. 534);
Într-acest minut amar,
Dorul meu în cer s-o suie
Și, ferice, s-o depuie
Pe al Domnului altar! (Ce gândești, o! Margarită, p. 454).*

Observăm o predilecție a lui Vasile Alecsandri pentru forma latină *ferice*, preluată, mai apoi, de Eminescu, cel care îl va descrie pe Alecsandri apelând tocmai la acest adjectiv: *veșnic tânăr și ferice* (Eminescu, *Epigonii*, p. 24).

Contemporan cu Vasile Alecsandri, Costache Negruzzi apelează în proza scurtă adunată sub titlurile *Amintiri din junețe* și *Negru pe alb. Scrisori la un prieten* la adjective împrumutate din limba franceză sau italiană și nealchiate, ele apărând ca niște invariabile, de tipul:

în camera unde intră, pe un crevat cu perdele ponceau, șădea o fetișoară... (Negruzzi, *Zoe*, p. 13);

Mai în urmă era arămașul încungiurat de lăutari ce juca din vioare aerul **mitico** (Negruzzi, Zoe, p. 21);

Niște căsuți de modă **bourgeoise** – de ne este iertat a împrumuta această zicere de la francezi... (Negruzzi, *Au mai pățit-o și alții*, p. 46).

În alt loc găsim o expresie din limba latină: *Într-o zi; viind de la școală, l-am găsit cu o mare carte **in-folio** dinainte.* (Negruzzi, *Cum am învățat românește*, p. 5).

Adjectivul **roz** apare aici acordat:

... îi tinse un bilet scris pe o hârtie **roză** (Negruzzi, Zoe, p. 16);

în loc să dea pe cel verde Zoei, i-a dat pe cel **roz** (Negruzzi, Zoe, p. 17);

zărise o capelă **roză** împănășată ca o pasere de paradis (Negruzzi, *O alergare de cai*, p. 26).

Specific pentru secolul al XIX-lea pare să fie latinescul **ferice**, deoarece îl mai întâlnim și în poezia lui Dimitrie Bolintineanu:

*E oare mai **ferice** aici cel ce trăiește*

decât în Oriente? (Bolintineanu, *Conrad*, p. 288).

Fiind perioada în care se simte puternic influența limbii italiene asupra limbii române, și Bolintineanu apelase la împrumuturi din această limbă: *Natura-i tot aceea: frumoasă, **seductive**.* (Bolintineanu, *Conrad*, p. 290).

Tot perioadei secolului al XIX-lea îi aparține și romanul *Ciocoi vechi și noi* al lui Nicolae Filimon. Din limba acestei opere literare putem observa influența limbii grecești asupra lexicului românesc. În ce ne privește, am extras câteva exemple de adjective invariabile, chiar dacă nu sunt de origine greacă:

... am înțeleș, milostiva mea, și sunt **gata** a suferi și mai mari pedepse decât acestea... (Filimon, *Ciocoi vechi și noi*, p. 44);

al tău prea doritor părinte, **treți**-logofăt Ghinea Păturică ot Bucov sud Saac (Filimon, *Ciocoi vechi și noi*, p. 37);

... făcu să cază în mânilor lui pitacul domnesc prin care îl numea **vel-cămăraș**. (Filimon, *Ciocoi vechi și noi*, p. 12);

arhon grămățice, ia acest pitac domnesc și te du de-l dă în mâna lui **vel-vistier!** (Filimon, *Ciocoi vechi și noi*, p. 113).

Creația literară a lui Grigore Alexandrescu ne oferă câteva exemple de adjective invariabile, atât în *Fabule*, cât și în *Memorialul de călătorie*. Vom întâlni adjectivele invariabile provenite din adverbe *așa* și *asemenea*, la fel ca în creația populară, cu aceeași valoare de superlativ conferită contextului în care apar:

cum se poate

Așa nerușinare? (Alexandrescu, *Corbii și barza*, p. 203);

Dar eu gândesc că în țara noastră

Se află așa dregător (Catârul cu clopoței, p. 212);

O asemenea opinie din partea consilierilor în judecata cărora am multă încredere făcu să-mi cază hârtia din mână. (Memorial de călătorie, p. 219);

să demascăm pe acei care inventez asemenea calomnii... (Memorial de călătorie, p. 221);

Aceste cuvinte semănau zise ca să ne îndemne și pe noi la asemenea faptă. (Cozia, p. 234).

Pe lângă acestea, mai întâlnim: *Câine sadea îmi zice, iar nu domnia-voastră. (Câinele și cățelul, p. 164).*

Adjectivul *deșert* apare cu forma învechită *deșarte*, neacordată: *Și că nu au mândrie, nici capriții deșarte (Câinele și cățelul, p. 164).*

Este de netăgăduit faptul că Mihai Eminescu a reinventat mirajul poeziei și a pus bazele limbii române literare moderne, pornind de la limba populară. Folosind o imagine plastică deosebită și apelând la un adjectiv invariabil, avem în fața ochilor noștri o îmbrățișare frenetică a Cezarei: *Ca o lipitoare sau ca o boa constrictor în forma unui înger căzut, ea ținu capul lui cel frumos în brațe... (Eminescu, Cezara, p. 217).*

Pietrele prețioase și culorile sunt prezente în toate decorurile fantastice, năucitoare, edenice ale prozei lui Eminescu, fapt care i-au determinat pe simbolisți să-l considere un precursor al lor. Culoarea *roz* apare frecvent în decoruri, dar adjectivul *roz* nu este invariabil aici, deci el apare acordat:

Deodată peste fereștile înalte căzură lungi perdele roze... (Eminescu, Cezara, p. 193);

Când ne deșteptam din somn aurora celor doi sori, în haine roze, culegea mărgăritarele de argint... (Eminescu, Cezara, p. 170).

Adjectivul invariabil *roz* nu apare doar acordat, variabil, ca în proza eminesciană, ci și invariabil în unele versuri:

Abia candela cea tristă cu reflectul ei roz-alb

Blând o rază mai aruncă ce peste-a lui față trece. (Eminescu, Înger și demon, p. 37).

Alteori, același adjectiv compus apare scris într-un singur cuvânt: *O auroră-l împle cu aeru-i rozalb (Eminescu, Povestea magului călător în stele, p. 336).* Este clar faptul că acest adjectiv nu intrase încă în norma limbii literare corecte ca un invariabil, așa cum apare el astăzi (cf. *DOOM*, 2005, *Gramatica limbii române*, 2005: 152), cu toate că în uzanța cotidiană, acest adjectiv este perceput tot ca variabil.

Alteori, adjectivelor care denumesc culori le sunt alăturate adjective neologice, de pildă împrumuturi din limba franceză: *Mama intră în casa de tors, era îmbrăcată într-o rochie moarè neagră...* (p. 284).

Ca și în poezia lui Vasile Alecsandri, și în lirica eminesciană vom întâlni foarte frecvent adjectivul latin *ferice*:

de-a lui maluri sunt unite câmpii verzi și țări ferice (Eminescu, *Egiptul*, p. 31);

*Da! Da! Aș fi ferice de-aș fi încă odată
în patria-mi iubită, în locul meu natal...* (Eminescu, *Din străinătate*, p. 7).

Acest adjectiv poate apărea și ca un substantiv, prin procedeul conversiunii:

*în arderea și amestecul hidos
al gândurilor unui neferice
e frumusețea.* (Eminescu, *Odin și poetul*, p. 262).

Adjectivul pe care îl întâlneam frecvent în textele bisericești ale secolelor al XVI-lea – al XVIII-lea *anatema*, apare și la Eminescu, ba chiar cu ortografie grecească: *Anathema sit! Să-l scuipe oricare motan de treabă...* (Eminescu, *Cugetările sărmanului Dionis*, p. 36).

Spre sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea și primii ani ai secolului XX, în plină manifestare a simbolismului, opera lui Alexandru Macedonski ne oferă câteva mostre de adjective invariabile. Bineînțeles că nu vor lipsi adjectivele nume de culori, prezența acestora fiind obligatorie într-un text simbolist:

S-a coborât pe flori roz-albe și pe pădurile albastre. (Macedonski, *Noaptea de mai*, p. 39);

Bagdadul! cer galben și roz ce palpită (Macedonski, *Noaptea de decembrie*, p. 64).

Observăm că aici adjectivul *roz* apare doar ca invariabil, așa cum este și astăzi în normele limbii literare.

Și proza lui Macedonski, deși mai puțin cunoscută, este de o valoare și o bogăție indiscutabile. Vom găsi și aici adjective invariabile, așa ca în povestirea *Între cotețe*: *Nu zău, cuminte se născuse și cuminte avea să moară! în casa lui, și în patul lui, între găștele și puicele lui, ca un om cinstit, ca un om cumsecade, de ispravă până la sfârșit.* (Macedonski, *Între cotețe*, p. 138).

În crearea atmosferei din poeziile sale, George Coșbuc recurge la o varietate de procedee stilistice, iar pe plan lingvistic chiar și la crearea unor cuvinte noi, doar pentru a realiza rimele dorite. Este și cazul adjectivului invariabil *întrulpi*:

*De-ai fi văzut cum au jucat
Copilele de împărat,*

Frumoase toate și întrulpi,

Cu ochi șireți ca cei de vulpi... (Coșbuc, *Nunta Zamfirei*, p. 24).

Perioada interbelică este cea mai prolifică etapă din istoria romanului românesc. Acum ia naștere romanul românesc modern și este suficient doar să amintim numele scriitorilor Camil Petrescu, Hortensia Papadat-Bengescu sau George Călinescu, pentru a numi epoca de aur a romanului românesc.

Camil Petrescu, teoretician al anticalofilismului în literatura română, va apela la numeroase adjective, cu precădere neologice, pentru a realiza numeroase scene de introspecție sau descrieri diverse. Am extras câteva adjective invariabile, lămuritoare pentru cercetarea noastră:

... farfurioarele cu friptură și din paharele groase, aburoase, cu vin roz. (Petrescu, *Ultima noapte de dragoste, întâia noapte de război*, p. 202);

În batalionul nostru de oameni cumsecade și necăjiți, cum ne erau toți ofițerii... (Petrescu, *Ultima noapte...*, p. 205);

Întârzim mereu, căci știm că se fac pregătiri anume. (Petrescu, *Ultima noapte...*, p. 244).

Spre deosebire de adjectivul *roz*, care este folosit ca invariabil, adjectivul *violet* este acordat: *o imensă catedrală de piatră violetă.* (Petrescu, *Ultima noapte...*, p. 201).

Adjectivul invariabil *bine* provenit din adverb îl descrie elocvent pe tânărul Ștefan Gheorghidiu: *Știam că la universitate trec printre studenții bine.* (Petrescu, *Ultima noapte...*, p. 104).

Același adjectiv invariabil provenit din adverb prin conversiune, apare foarte frecvent în romanele Hortensiei Papadat-Bengescu:

De la poarta mare, Ada văzuse un străin bine... (Papadat-Bengescu, *Concert din muzică de Bach*, p. 219);

Trecea pe lângă toți, fără să vadă parcă pe nimeni și toți se uitau lung după domnul acela bine. (Papadat-Bengescu, *Concert din muzică de Bach*, p. 322).

Scriitoarea reprezintă un capitol aparte în literatura română în ceea ce privește limba eroilor săi. Ne referim la acele dezacorduri gramaticale datorate faptului că Hortensia Papadat-Bengescu folosea curent limba franceză. Ca atare, vom avea foarte multe expresii preluate din limba franceză și, în ceea ce ne privește, multe adjective neacordate, preluate din această limbă, care ne apar ca niște invariabile:

dezmierda prelung și respectuos cei doi cai jumătate sânge, care, grație unor îngrijiri deosebite, erau strălucitori ca un saten laqué! (*Fecioarele despletite*, p. 10);

Din parfait-ul **glacé** își tăiase o felie așa de mare... (Fecioarele despletite, p. 13);

... acoperind numai urechile cu două stufuri crețe, cu o rochie dreaptă de mătase **gris**... (Fecioarele despletite, p. 134);

Păru tăcerea afirmativă a unui personajiu sobru și corect, extrem de corect în pijamaua de duvetină **marron**... (Concert din muzică de Bach, p. 201);

În adevăr, era chiar Mika-Lé, în formă de soră-secretară cu aere **posé** și cu o mapă mare pe genunchi. (Concert din muzică de Bach, p. 208);

Dar e un tânăr **charmant** și tout à fait du monde... (Concert din muzică de Bach, p. 267);

Ada urmărea atent pasul elastic al murgului, se uită cu o privire **louche**... (Concert din muzică de Bach, p. 193);

Era o ocazie ca Elena să arate că a uitat, să fie **chic**. (Concert din muzică de Bach, p. 122);

Ada îl târa la toate ședințele sportive de antrenament, găbind că e mai **chic** decât să asiste la meciurile oficiale. (Concert din muzică de Bach, p. 194).

Întâlnim, de asemenea, și adjectivul invariabil *gata*, ca în exemplul: Și așa și almintrelea tot o să fim **gata**! (Concert din muzică de Bach, p. 304).

Acest adjectiv îl întâlnim și la Marin Preda:

omul și copiii sunt gata.... (Preda, *Moromeții*, p. 325).

Același adjectiv invariabil, provenit din limba franceză, *șic*, dar ortografiat ca în limba de proveniență, îl găsim și la George Călinescu:

Ah, și cum aș vrea să am o trăsură luxoasă cu doi cai frumoși! Această este foarte **chic**! (Călinescu, *Enigma Otiliei*, p. 29);

Pascalopol... este un bărbat **chic**. (Călinescu, *Enigma Otiliei*, p. 61).

Pe lângă acesta, întâlnim și adjectivul *maron*:

avea o fereastră care da în geamlâc, acoperită cu o mare cortină de pluș **maron**. (Călinescu, *Enigma Otiliei*, p. 22);

Câteva fotolii scunde și mici de pluș **maron**, un scrin de nuc... (Călinescu, *Enigma Otiliei*, p. 22).

Ajungând și în literatura contemporană, adjectivul *șic* apare și în proza lui Marin Sorescu: poate chiar te-ai îndrăgostit de mine... de hoitul meu... ca să fie și mai **șic** toată povestea! (Sorescu, *Trei dinți din față*, p. 249). Alături de el, găsim un alt adjectiv fost adverb, *câș*: Da, această secție nou înființată și cam **câș** devenise rentabilă (Sorescu, *Trei dinți din față*, p. 251). Într-un alt loc avem un alt adjectiv invariabil, mai puțin întâlnit: ... care te duce cu gândul mai degrabă la acei căței

pufi, pe care-i vezi uneori stând pe balcon... (Sorescu, *Trei dinți din față*, p. 257).

Analizând fragmente epice și lirice din literatura populară română observăm că adjectivele invariabile au o frecvență foarte redusă. Limba textelor populare este limba omului simplu din popor, graiul viu, constituit în cea mai mare parte din cuvinte aparținătoare vocabularului de bază al limbii române. Adjectivele invariabile sunt, în cea mai mare parte, neologisme și ca atare ele nu sunt preferate de omul simplu din popor. Într-un fragment de povești și legende culese din Bistrița-Năsăud apare adjectivul invariabil *roz*, prezența lui fiind justificată datorită faptului că acest adjectiv este unul uzual, denumind o culoare: *Cân o fost dimin' iafa, care haine roz li-o avut mai scumpe cu halea s-o îmbrăcat să să ducă la bal.* (Antologie 1983: 181). În alt loc găsim același adjectiv, dar, de data aceasta, într-un fragment liric:

Frunză verde de cireș,

Vă trimit și eu un vers;

Frunză roz de rozmarin,

Vi-l trimit să mă închin. (Folclor din Transilvania, p. 114).

Adverbul *așa* devenit adjectiv invariabil în prezența unui substantiv este prezent, în general, în baladele populare, conferind textului valoare superlativă:

C-așa lucrătură

Și ferecătură

Mi-e de-nvățătură. (folclor, *Meșterul Manole*, p. 71);

Cu faima și nume,

Așa mănăstire

Chip de pomenire (folclor, *Meșterul Manole*, p. 73).

În final, dorim să subliniem faptul că adjectivele invariabile au o frecvență destul de redusă, comparativ cu frecvența adjectivelor variabile, net superioară cantitativ, dar nu trebuie neglijat nici faptul că vorbitorii flexionează în mod greșit câteva adjective, conform flexiunii variabilelor.

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SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL STUDIES

JESS

Social Mimetic Practice Development in Higher Education

Eva Monica Szekely*

Abstract:

In Higher Education, the positive pedagogical significance of globalization signifies recognizing the expanse of the educative borough, founded on the value of the pluralism, beyond the national frames, in order to establish some authentic relations of communication between cultures/nations, arts and different humanities curricula. Our evaluation methods, philosophies and instruments of Literacy in higher education will promote relationships between modern vs. postmodern models of analogous systems (society and literature; society and movies; literature and film) so that to put in relevance connections between intercultural and moral communication (Z. Bauman, A. McIntyre) in order to continue Piaget's issues on the one hand. On the other hand, in order to construct identity vs. otherness, our aim is to argue some connections between society, history and literature in order to be one "citizen of the world" who is understanding the opportunities and the openness towards personal evolution that these interdisciplinary and intercultural spaces offer us, putting forward not only the diversity and difference, but also the identity.

Keywords: learning social mimetic practice, narrative story of himself, educational and analogous models

1. Education and postmodern world

We are awaited by a Tower of Babel or by a community of different cultures forming a kind of "coalition of players" according to C. L. Strauss – ready not only to live together indifferently and peacefully, but to communicate and learn innovatively together. Our intention is to argue the importance of the strategies of the intercultural education and of the transfer of conflicts between generations in the field of the culture

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by (re)reading some archetypes in the Romanian and universal literature, like the otherness.

In the past years there has been a growing interest for the relationship between education, moral philosophy, books and film within both analytic and European philosophical traditions. At the same time, interconnections between literature and film studies as a discipline have always raised philosophical questions. In a way, image is the most popular concept lately, even more interesting than the concept of text itself. Our intention is to speak about text and image and we will also refer to a possible re-reading and understanding model based on the constructivist and holistic value of the image in some conditions: this value must be taught, the advantages and the disadvantages must be negotiated because we are assailed by images in many situations every day.

In this respect, the syllabus and the new alternative text-books have a special chapter called: Literature and other arts (picture, cinema and film, performance, TV etc.). In spite of the fact that television is the most important rival of reading, as the studies show, it is very important to continue to educate active imagination for making an appropriate interpretation of image, and not only assisting to how they assail and dominate us.

Starting from comparative modern *vs.* postmodern philosophical traditions, this paper will explore issues surrounding relationships between texts – books and images in visual literacy in regard to theory and praxis. Perspectives are sought from those engaged in the fields of education, visual arts, literature, philosophy, psychology and theology on issues related to the interconnections between mimesis and intertextuality (upon Jacques Derrida's philosophy of deconstruction), between visual literacy and cultural identity.

Educational objectives:

Our interdisciplinary paper seeks to examine and propose responses to the following questions:

- How do connections between the mimetic faculty and the semiotic faculty work as the nature that culture uses to create the second nature?
- How do the connections between our higher cognitive functions and our non/cognitive functions work during interactions between Otherness and alteration while we construct Identity?
- How do social standards transform opposed to individual and social/literary values?
- What kind of attitude do singular individualities have towards universal standards and values?

- How do they induce innovation and creativity?

A. MacIntyre (1998) used to express the eternal disagreement which gave the impression that we are living in a culture in which there is no rational possibility of arriving to a moral consensus. In contemporary world, the meeting is, most of the times, in fact, a “false meeting”, “a sterile accident” in the life of the parents (Bauman, 2000), so that it’s almost impossible to accept an authentic communication. In this way a person’s identity is a surmounting of one’s own capacity and looking for diversity; a pluralist education/the importance of the intercultural education: teach them to care for the conservation of diversity (which is the most eloquent expression of the riches of the human spirit), and, very important, to teach them the active tolerance”.

2. The models (books and movies) and the patterns in debates

In my paper I will attempt to mitigate this claim and distinguish two ways in which literature can act on its readers. First, by making them imagine propositions that form the cognitive components of certain (quasi) emotional states: me imagining the death of Virginia Woolf (from the film *The Hours* directed by Stephen Daldry, after the book *The Hours* by Michael Cunningham, inspired by Virginia Woolf’s *Mrs Dalloway*) is a component of my sadness at her death. In this respect, literature is not capable of non-cognitive affect. However, there are two further ways in which literature can engender affect: by describing situations in which the affect is itself non-cognitive (psychic pain), or directly through the use of formal devices such as metre. Examples will be given in which the techniques used in raising non-cognitive affect in literature are compared to the same episodes in “films of the book”.

First, we wish to create **educational situations** for interpreting elements and main characters of literature *vs.* film *vs.* life in both educational ways: on one hand as modelling by mimesis (the ability to copy, imitate, make models, explore differences) and on the other hand, as social semiosis, the ability to yield into some main characters of books and/or film and become Other through re/creation and use of creative aptitudes.

Finally, through **brainstorming and debate**, we will argue that features of the film medium and particular cinematic techniques reliably elicit non-cognitive affects and intensify emotional states through non-cognitive as therapy and cultural alternative strategy to construct Otherness. Recently, Philosophy of Mind has argued that the standard claim that emotions involve cognitions ignores a phenomenon in which states of the world act on us directly without mediation of our higher

cognitive functions. We will go on arguing that non-cognitive affects influence thought and attention and, in some cases, encourage the acceptance of certain types of value. Based on these arguments, we will conclude that film directly influences affective states without the mediation of cognition in a way that is not possible for literature.

3. Mimetic social practices and the creativity of students

Nature creates **similarities**. One needs only to think about mimicry. The highest capacity for producing similarities, however, is the man's. His **gift of seeing resemblances** is nothing other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to become and behave like something else. Perhaps there is none of his higher functions in which his mimetic faculty does not play a decisive role. (Benjamin, 1986). The term **mimesis** is derived from the Greek *mimesis*, meaning to imitate. The OED defines mimesis as “a figure of speech, whereby the words or actions of another are imitated” and “**the deliberate imitation** of the behaviour of one group of people by another **as a factor in social change**” (*Oxford English Dictionary Online* “Mimesis”). Mimicry is defined as “the action, practice, or art of mimicking or closely imitating... the manner, gesture, speech, or mode of actions and persons, or the superficial characteristics of a thing” (*Oxford English Dictionary Online* “Mimicry”). Both terms are generally used to denote the imitation or representation of nature, especially in aesthetics (primarily literary and artistic media). Michael Taussig describes **the mimetic faculty** as “the nature that culture uses to create a second nature, the faculty to copy, imitate, make models, explore difference, yield into and become Other. The wonder of mimesis lies in the copy drawing on the character and power of the original, to the point whereby the representation may even assume that character and that power” (Taussig, 1993: xiii). In Benjamin's *On the Mimetic Faculty*, he postulates that the mimetic faculty is obvious in all of man's “higher functions” and that its history can be defined both phylogenetic and ontogenetically. Children's behaviour is a prime example of the manner in which mimetic behaviour is not restricted to man imitating man – in which the “child plays at being not only a shopkeeper or teacher but also a windmill and a train” (Benjamin, 1986: 333).

Our educational aims want to show that aesthetic mimesis assimilates social reality without the subordination of nature so that the subject disappears in the work of art and the artwork allows reconciliation with the nature. **Socialization** and **rationality** suppress the “natural” behaviour of man, and art provides a “refuge for mimetic behaviour” (Kelly, 1998: 236). We will use the concept of mimesis in

relation to texts created by J. Derrida – which are non-disposable doubles that always stand in relation to what has preceded them. Texts are deemed “non-disposable” and “double” in that they always refer to something that has preceded them and are thus “never the origin, never inner, never outer, but always doubled” (*Ibidem*). The mimetic text (which always begins as a double) lacks an original model and its inherent intertextuality demands deconstruction. “*Difference* is the principle of mimesis, a productive freedom, not the elimination of ambiguity; mimesis contributes to the profusion of images, words, thoughts, theories, and actions, without itself becoming tangible” (Kelly, 1998: 237). Mimesis thus resists theory and constructs a world of illusion, appearances, aesthetics, and images in which existing worlds are bound, changed, and re-interpreted. Images are a part of our material existence, but also mimetically bind our experience of reality to subjectivity and connote a “sensuous experience that is beyond reference to reality”.

Social mimetic practices through literature and film:

- Help to study and to understand the processes of self-transformation and social adaptation and integration;
- the concept of social mimesis that I will propose, serves to describe a recurrent strategy in some groups of inadaptable people represented by very famous writers (Virginia Woolf) and actresses who won Oscar Prizes for her interpretation (Nicole Kidman and Meryl Streep).

4. Cognitive vs. non-cognitive affective responses to literature and film

Interdisciplinary interconnections between literature and film studies as a discipline have always raised philosophical questions. In a way, image is the most popular concept lately, even more interesting than the concept of text itself. Our intention is to speak about the symbol’s comprehension and interpretation between notion/word and image. We will refer also to a possible moral reflection model based on the constructivist and intertextual values of questions of ethics and religion, which imply intercultural understanding competence in fact and non/cognitive affective responses to literature and film. In some conditions, emphasis will be laid on:

- How do the connections between our higher cognitive functions and our non/cognitive functions work during interactions between Otherness and Alterity while we construct Identity?

- How do social standards transform opposed to individual and social/literary values?
- What kind of attitude do singular individualities have towards universal standards and values?
- How do they induce innovation and creativity through the process of discovering religious dimension of our life?

Our models used through the educational situations were:

- The book, *Mrs Dalloway*, Virginia Woolf (England, Richmond, 1923)
- The book, *The Hours*, Michael Cunningham (1998)
- The film, *The Hours* directed by Stephen Daldry (2004)

Cross-curricular themes of debate were:

- Identity vs. Self, feminism vs. masculinity and mimetic teaching as behavioural strategies
- relationship between literature/book/film and the main characters as a model of life
- The Other's identity – getting to know the OTHER – learning to know the other – how is the OTHER?
- What does the relationship between the I and the OTHER mean?
 - Does it help “ME”?
 - How can You have a relationship with the OTHER?
 - What is the result of this relationship?
 - How can we keep our Uniqueness uncontaminated?
 - Taking notes orients to the acquisition of information necessary for **understanding** social, cultural and/or literary phenomena and for
 - **Intellectual debates** on literary or non-literary themes; women in three different time of 20th century/the values and the attitudes are different and depend on context: time, space, culture, sex, education etc.

5. **Work-shop and debating** start from the following opinions:

C. L. Strauss: “What expects us is either a Tower of Babel, or a community made up of different cultures – a kind of «coalition of players» – willing not only to cohabit indifferently and peacefully, but to communicate and to learn together in an innovative way”

C. G. Jung: to teach people to become conscious of their own cultural roots- the concept of the archetype- the interdisciplinary bases of morality;

To communicate in an authentic way: to understand the otherness, to break loose of the stereotypes when judging the other, to tolerate “the stranger” whom he should acknowledge as his own other face or as his

(a part) “shadow”/the different character of the Other. We will create pedagogical situations to compare three different women whose lives were influenced decisively by the same book, *Mrs Dalloway*, written by Virginia Woolf, through three different contexts/parts of word, in three different times:

IDENTITY/SELF – How is the Other related to me?

<i>ID/self</i> “My life has been stolen from me...” (<i>Mrs Dalloway</i>) vs. <i>Who am I?</i>		
<p>Virginia Woolf England, Richmond, 1923 She is writing a book She is sick, she hears voices, She is unsociable, she is not living how she wants: in the middle of an active life, in London</p> <p style="text-align: center;">She was drawn herself/suicide</p>	<p>Laura Brown England, Richmond, 1953</p> <p>She is reading the book, but without deeply understanding it, she is one unfulfilled woman</p> <p>She left her family, especially her child</p>	<p>Clarissa Vaughn New York, 1999</p> <p>She is living the book, in New York, in the middle of one active social life</p> <p>She divides her life between all her dear people: her daughter, her girlfriend whom is living together with, her AIDS sick friend, who, finally, commits suicide</p>

Behavioural strategies will develop relationships between the educational mimesis and social mimesis to indicate all the behavioural strategies involved in new education which allows to overcome the stereotype associated to identity & alterity;

- **Mimesis:** I suggest, is a process that involves four steps of the self- and the other-understanding experience: reading a book and seeing the film; criticizing the main characters face to face with him/self and discovering similarities and differences;

- **Semiosis** – perception of stereotype and mutual comprehension; performance of mimesis as a result of pedagogy of mind-transformation and integration.

The contemporary moral paradigm (Z. Bauman): becoming responsible/the responsibility for difference	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The paradigm of modernity • Centred on moral responsibility, rules and laws; • Mechanist conceptions on the human being; • the cancellation of the quotidian act of axiological connotations; • The accent on the action; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The paradigm of post modernity • Gravitates towards the antique paradigm, centred on excellence: sincerity, righteousness, courage, active tolerance; • The exceeding of the self; • A new attitude: the valuing of the quotidian contexts; • The accent on excellence/the inner goods detached in a triple context: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> • 1. of practice; • 2. of the narrative history of the self; • 3. of tradition.

The pedagogical presumptions correlated with pedagogical expectations are: what the student cannot learn through his own experience about the human/moral nature he can learn through others people's or literary character's experiences in the course of the narrations, so that, the teenage, mostly, is the time of historical and of human character studies through tales/ethnic dilemmas. In order to reach a generalization on what the moral notions imply, first the young man/girl has to achieve a repertory of impressions, representations that are always associated to an experienced emotion and not a perception. Second, an affective state already experienced by the subject will be garnered memo-technically just like the mental image that it accompanies, only through the experienced emotion of which the intellect becomes aware as of a significance of the representations. Finally, the teachers are unjust regarding teenage, considering it to be an

unappreciative age; in fact all the difficulties related to education at this age have their source in the pedagogic inability.” (J. J. Rousseau)

4. Conclusions. Suggestions for the teachers in order to model mental construction of identity

How the mimetic and semiotic educational discourse will become available in nowadays didactics of languages? Our answer is through a combination of philosophy of moral discourse: to be *vs.* to have (Bauman, 2000: 93): morality means more than putting ourselves “shoulder to shoulder”, one with the other, while dissolved in a collective “us”; morality means to be “for” the Other, whom I have in front of me, without being preoccupied by reciprocity, namely his movement towards me; morality does not subsist over the proximity of the relationship, namely that state of perceiving the Other as different and at the same time “as a fellow being close both physically and psychically”.

M. Foucault: not even one way of thinking can claim an absolute “truth” besides the game of discourse; all the social and political forms of thought are thus comprised in the game of knowledge and power” (Foucault, 2002: 47) and from these considerations, the educational implication is the necessity to promote the pluralism and to educate opinion(s).

In this respect, “Teacher, few words; but learn to choose the places, the time, the people and then teach all the lessons through examples and be sure of their effect.” (J. J. Rousseau)

In order to do that, some suggestions for the students/teachers (in the future):

- be a model of an animated teacher of interaction and circular moral communication, “spokesman of the group’s unconsciousness and of the effects of the undiscovered senses that the group liberates”, unblocking the conflicts under the guidance of a leader;
- in order to arouse the motivation, give up being a good “specialist”, being more like a generalist who offers guiding marks, frame of reference to those who do not possess them yet and supports them through this in creating their own imaginary world that appears, until a certain point, as a “substitute of the cultural world”;
- be a character that not only arouses but also “wakens”: like people who are present, who are there and have their own opinion being political wakening of the world;

- through the pedagogy of the imaginary (coextensive to the one of the unconscious) and the cultivation of the wonder, help the moral communication to avoid a new “war of the simulations”.

In Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, mimesis (once a dominant practice) becomes a repressed presence in Western history in which one yields to nature (as opposed to the impulse of Enlightenment science which seeks to dominate nature) to the extent that the subject loses itself and sinks into the surrounding world. They argue that, in Western history, mimesis has been transformed by Enlightenment science from a dominant presence into a distorted, repressed, and hidden force. Artworks can “provide modernity with a possibility to revise or neutralize the domination of nature” (Kelly, 1998: 236).

Admitting that the imagination allows “the understanding at all levels”, meaning the double valence of the imaginary that result from its extraordinary therapeutic and educative force, we could conclude that he makes possible the communication between the unconscious impulses and the exterior world and makes possible the just/right choice according to some social values and attitudes.

Such a model of mimetic behaviour is ambiguous in that “imitation might designate the production of a thing like copy, but on the other hand, it might also refer to the activity of a subject which models *itself* according and/or un-according to a given prototype” (Spurius, 1984: 34). The manner in which mimesis is viewed as a correlative behaviour in which a subject actively engages in “making *oneself* similar to an Other” dissociates mimesis from its definition as mere imitation (Spurius, 1984: 34) and associate them with semiotic practice of interpretation and creativity.

APPENDICS > Workshop/Research

**Guidelines for the pedagogy of mental construction of identity
through mimesis/mutual comprehension**

The models - texts, movies/characters, worlds and identities

Mimetic social values and attitudes

Date.....

Group/

Students.....

...

E-mail..... Telephone.....

Objectives:

- How do social standards transform opposed to individual and social/literary values?
- What kind of attitude do singular individualities have towards universal standards and values?
- How do they induce innovation and creativity?

1. Read carefully the lists in the table below

Personal values	Social values	Attitudes	Institutions
1. self-control	1. wealth	1. Admiration	1. Army
2. good manners	2. carrier	2. Animosity	2. Church
3. Consumption	3. honour	3. Conflict	3. banks
4. faith	4. civic spirit	4. Conforming	4. Family
(religious)	5. Cooperation	5. Contesting	5. Government
5. entertainment	6. Creativity	6. Cooperation	6. Justice
6. desire to work	7. Culture	7. Curiosity	7. NGO-s
7. love	8. Education	8. Courage	8. Parliament
8. happiness	9. diligence	9. Contempt	9. Political
9. generosity	10. confidence	10. Positive	parties
10. imagination	11. Patriotism	thinking	10.Police
11. independence	12. Prestige	11. Indifference	11.Press
12. freedom	13. Property	12. Initiative	12.Presidency
13. loyalty	14. Respect	13. Taking part	13. School
14. honesty	towards	14. Envy	14.....
15. order	institutions	15. Laziness	15.....
16. pleasure	15. social ability	16. Politeness	
17. friendship	16. Solidarity	17. Hostility	
18. patience	17. Intercultural	18. Revolt	
19. Responsibility	behaviour	19. Seriousness	

20. Respect	18. Multilanguage	20. Superficiality	
21. Health	19.	21. Terribilism	
22. Sincerity	20.	22.	
23. Economical spirit	21.	23.	
24. Aspiring to the ideal			
25. Tolerance			
26.			

2.1. Give between 3-5 values and attitudes to the following characters: Virginia, Laura and Clarissa from the novel *Hours* by Michael Cunningham and the movie *The Hours* directed by Stephen Daldry.

2.2. Describe attitudes towards the above characters, trying to explain in the first place the differences between them, then them and you.

3. What kind of social attitudes and values characterize your generation? Pick from the list above and enumerate.

No	Personal values	Social values	Attitudes
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			

4. Associate “P”(Positive) and/or “N” (Negative) with the possibilities and limitations of the postmodern world:

<p>.....We are the middle generation, life is (like) on a plane, slowly we understand and we revolt, we experience honesty and sincerity each of us can be hero, with his/her own legend, there is no need for sacrifice favourite nonverbal language is dance/sex/meditation/embrace/..... (choose)</p>	<p>.....and we are very angry, we live in the illusion of safety, allows interesting things to happen some people’s lies reflect mine, everybody has a drug they need we are all sacrificed/we self-destruct (choose) we have jobs we want/hate (choose) the world is full of martyrs/ masters/innocent people (choose)</p>
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<p>..... we could die any moment some people's tragedy is that they don't die inspire full doses of panic everything is dispensable the condom is an accessory of our generationthere are numerous options there are multiple possibilities for opening group communication therapy there are no longer frontiers in space we experiment complexity and intensity The world is full of wounds, illness is a natural state each one saves oneself everything is possible, almost everything is allowed we don't have the Big War, only the War in our hearts there is nothing new to do/to create</p>	<p>.....sex has taken the place of religion Love/God/Man is dead (choose) sex has become a sport self-improving is (like) masturbating you can love intensely for one day everything keeps us awake if we fall asleep we are gone the world is like a theatre of self-destruction the body languages are being revalue I can have three things in one you can be another person, too allows you no to be perfect anymore every one of us is a (re)creator we buy a lot of silly things we don't need we lack ideals and origin the whole world seems like an asylum </p>
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Evaluate from the point of view of quantity. Make a short commentary establishing parallelism between modernism and postmodernism. Use the above mentioned works/movies and their perspective regarding (the change of) relationships between reason's antinomies: good/bad, knowledge/affectivity, individual/society, duality/third person included, femininity/masculinity etc.

5. Which social attitudes and values characterize you? Pick form the list above and enumerate 3 or 4:

No	Personal values	Social values	Attitudes
1.			
2.			

6. Pick one/two/three character(s) from the books/movies mentioned above which were/are/could be (cross the ones that do not fit) life ideals for you mentioning their frequency (sometimes, seldom, very rarely, often, always....) and your motives for it:
- a..... /was /is/could be...../ because.....
- b. /was/is/could be...../ because.....
- c. /was/is/could be...../ because.....
7. From my colleagues in the same year/group I identify myself/fell close to (choose by underlining!!!)..... and..... and..... because we have in common the following:

Personal values	Social values	Attitudes
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		

8. From my colleagues in the same year/group I feel indifferent/fascinated by/I admire:
-//.....
-///.....//.....
- Because..... Give two arguments.

We have in common	Differentiates us

9. Fill in the table below regarding the problem/solution of the characters vs. your solution:

Characters/ voices	Cause(s)/Problem	Their solution	My/Our solution
Virginia			
Laura			
Clarissa			

Interpret two lines of your choice. Include, if possible, the characters in a certain type (fit in vs. misfit, ill vs. healthy, normal vs. abnormal, social vs. unsocial, conscious vs. unconscious).

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JESS

Politicizing Method: Critical Theory and its Others

Prakash Kona*

Abstract:

The object of this essay is to problematize the notion of method from a critical, hermeneutical perspective that opens the doors to the so-called “others” of history. Unless method is redefined to be inclusive of the margins, it stands dangerously isolated wallowing in its isolation. The hermeneutics of method is about theory in a state of perpetual evolution as much as it is a revolution built into the notion of method. I raise questions and suggest possible answers which end up being another set of questions. The point where the other is able to define itself as a self can be understood based on parameters of the context in which the statement is made. In a manifest refusal to define method I make it possible to arrive at that space of “openness” which leaves the other with the historic choice of redefining the world.

Keywords: hermeneutics, method, Postmodernism, Marxism, others

In the *City of God* Saint Augustine says that: “Of all the visible things, the universe is the greatest; of all the invisible realities, the greatest is God. That the world exists we can see, we believe in the existence of God” (1958: 98). In his preface to *The Order of Things* Foucault describes order as “A ‘system of elements’... at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression” (1994: xx). The city that Saint Augustine talks about is an invisible order whose visible manifestation would be the world. Foucault claims that “... in every culture, between

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the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, ... the pure experience of order and of its modes of being' (1994: xxi).

Saint Augustine's construction of the city of God is an instance of the pure experience of order. The purity of the experience ironically is a reflection on the language of the experience that mediates between the "ordering codes" and "reflections upon order". The mediation is not a given, i.e. a natural *there*, but a systematically produced discourse or a language fully conscious of its own power to control and manipulate the order through a combination of violence and indoctrination. In short, there is a method at work that makes the experience of the order meaningful while simultaneously acting as the basis of the "system of elements".

That is a visible universe and an invisible God – and a method that takes upon itself the task of translating the language of one into the other. The language of man takes the form of prayer as an expression of faith. The language of God takes the form of silence that can be heard even when the lips of the speaker are concealed, a formless silence that is implied in the presence of the universe and above all a silence that can only be understood in terms of a myth as Barthes defines it: a "system of communication... a message... a mode of signification, a form" (1993: 109). This is the paradigm behind the order of things. A city of things that is at once silent in its alienated and repressed state while clearly understood by the chosen dwellers of the city that perpetuate the order as well as the means indispensable for the maintenance of order.

The city can only be methodically understood and methodology is the study of the city. Is the city invented or is it an outcome of a process of evolution from a society of mothers into a patriarchal order? Norman Brown asks the question: "What then is a city? A city reflects the new masculine aggressive psychology of revolt against the female principles of dependence and nature... In the new space of the city, which is always a sacred space, man succeeds for the first time in constructing a new life which is wholly superfluous, and wholly sacred. A city by definition divorced from primary food production, and therefore by definition superfluous; its whole economy is based on the economic surplus" (1959: 281–82). The city is a space of sublimation, a space of the "desexualization of sexual energy by its redirection toward new objects... desexualization means disembodiment. New objects must substitute for the human body, and there is no sublimation without the projection of the human body into things; the dehumanization of man is his alienation of his body" (Brown, 1959: 281).

The city is where the body is lost; the body that is intermittently looking for ways to recreate the lost body. It is a historic moment when the soul is born; the soul that takes upon itself the burden of finding the lost body. The soul with its history of sublimation can only reproduce itself. It can only create more souls wearing the mask of a body. Contrary to the stereotype that cities are soulless, the city is the space where the soul recognizes its soulfulness. Charlie Chaplin brilliantly named his movie *City Lights*; the lights that radiate the soul of the city. The architecture of a city is opposed to that of every other space simply by virtue of its lights. Sublimation is a story of light, the ultimate metaphor that darkness has eternally been searching for. The experience of the order is the experience of light. Once this light has been accepted, life is normal without a trace of madness. At the end of George Orwell's *1984*, Winston Smith experiences the light of reason. He is back to his normalcy. The visible universe finally realizes the invisible God:

He was back in the Ministry of Love, with everything forgiven, his soul white as snow. He was in the public dock, confessing everything, implicating everybody. He was walking down the white-tiled corridor, with the feeling of walking in sunlight, and an armed guard at his back. The long hoped-for bullet was entering his brain. He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.

The city is the home of Big Brother where he is loved in his own terms, where love is not a complex activity happening between individuals, but strikingly simple as nature itself is in de Sade's *Philosophy of the Bedroom*; as Dolmance puts it: "Nature never inspires other movements in mankind's soul, other sentiments than those which ought to prove useful in some sort, good for something; nothing is more an egoist than Nature; then let us be egoists too, if we wish to live in harmony with her dictates" (1991: 286). It is a triumph of a certain discourse of nature that, according to de Sade, a hypocritical social order is pitted against. What de Sade refers to as *nature* is ironically the sublimated city of the body taken to its logical extremes, the soul that on the road to excess discovers the palace of wisdom. The city discloses the infinite manifestations or avatars of Big Brother who *naturally* transcends any discourse of construction. An understanding of the

hermeneutics of method involves a possible deconstruction of the essential Big Brother.

What is Big Brother? Is he an image, a phenomenon, the essence of things, the beingness of beings or two signs put together to form a conventional phrase? To question the status of Big Brother is to ask two concomitant questions: what is method and what is language? Both these questions can only be understood within the order of things. Only the language of order can explain the meaning of Big Brother, method and language. This might presume that order is a monolithic structure that disallows any form of distortion. Winston Smith's tears are meaningful in this context. There is no reason to believe that Orwell is not being ironic in constructing this mystical moment of understanding where Big Brother actually shows his real face to Winston Smith. It is possible that Winston Smith's tears are a new form of deception to resist Big Brother, a strategy of the weak to encounter the strong. At the back of his mind, Winston Smith is occupied with formulating an alternate system of signs, a different method and language to disrupt the existing conventions based on authority. The face of Big Brother needs to be defaced. It is the faces of the others that need to come on stage. These other faces were always there. Only that they did not belong to the city.

An unenlightened face or an unsublimated face, a face that spoke but was never understood within the parameters of the given languages heavily preoccupied with containing the movement of things. A *hermeneutics of method is a disclosure of the possibilities of these other faces existing in the margins of order thus bringing out the textual character of a book*. It is constantly stripping the faces of the book in order to allow other faces to come into light. In doing so it brings out the multi-facial character of the book which is what a text is all about. The faces of the text have long been repressed and alienated within the book. A slogan for a textual reading of the book would be: "Deconstruct the face of Big Brother". Release the faces that had nothing to do with things and therefore are nothing.

The hermeneutics of nothing: re-interpreting the silent and invisible other; this is one of the possible titles for this essay. In an institution, meaning is given and one is expected to understand "nothing". Meaning is acquired rather than produced. If aura is something that belonged to presence and according to Walter Benjamin is lost in the age of mechanical reproduction, it would not be wrong to say that the institution is grounded in a theory of epistemology that provides an aura to the word; an aura with an air of presentability empowering certain meanings while disempowering others; the aura that systematically packages the word, institutes the word.

The word is respectable, devoid of a veil at the altar of the institution and literally understood by an anonymous listener attempting to decode the signals of the text virtually produced in the institution. One learns to acknowledge the faces of the city where the passage of time is experienced in convulsive spasms that make you see nothing for the moment. What you see is as Peter Marcuse titles his essay *Not Chaos, but Walls*, where the city

... appears chaotic and is fragmented, but underneath the chaos there are orders; the fragmentation is not random. It is divided... While the quarters are hierarchical in the power and wealth of their residents, all are dependent on forces beyond their separate control. Only a restructuring of the underlying dynamics of urban life, a restructuring that needs be local, but also national, and indeed international, can change the increasingly undemocratic pattern of urban life. (1995: 244–245)

The chaos of time is ordered within the walls of the city rather than a disoriented, spontaneous outburst of fervor that could seriously endanger the existing divisions based on class, race or gender. A hermeneutics of the city lends itself to a reconstruction of a discourse of time that is not externally determined by the order or contained within the walls of the city, but a *conversation* that in the words of Gadamer is not conducted because then it would not be a genuine conversation:

We say that we “conduct” a conversation, but the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine conversation is never the one we wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation... No one knows in advance what will “come out” of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was ill fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it – i.e., that it allows something to “emerge” which henceforth exists. (1989: 383)

The spirit of conversation is trapped within the walls of the city. The chaos is an appearance of a radically uncontrolled conversation on the verge of deteriorating into anarchy. The anarchy is a seeming disruption of what Emile Durkheim describes as the collective conscience. The chaos on the streets of cities is a crime which as Durkheim puts it, “... is criminal because it shocks the *conscience collective*. We do not condemn it because it is a crime; but it is a crime because we condemn it” (123–124). A conversation that deviates from established norms runs

the risk of being condemned as criminal. Yet, the conversation with a spirit of its own cannot but help threatening the norms. It is a language that stands apart from the best intentions of the users of the language; a language within a language. In the Paris of 1871, the city liberated the spirit of conversation from its traditional walls in a very simple manner. As Kropotkin points out:

On March 18, 1871, the people of Paris rose against a despised and detested government, and proclaimed the city independent free, belonging to itself. This overthrow of the central power took place without the usual stage effects of revolution, without the firing of guns, without the shedding of blood upon barricades... The government evaporated like a pond of stagnant water in a spring breeze, and on the nineteenth the great city of Paris found herself free from the impurity which had defiled her, with the loss of scarcely a drop of her children's blood.

The moment the spirit of the conversation attempted to preserve the old walls, it had no choice but to fail. The language within the language was ignored. Big Brother came back with a vengeance. His face was restored. The walls of the city once again succeeded in preserving the order of things. Was the overthrow of the Paris Commune the death of a hermeneutics that would allow the free flow of multiple meanings in multiple directions? Kropotkin sees hope in which:

The communes of the next revolution will not only break down the state and substitute free federation for parliamentary rule; they will part with parliamentary rule within the commune itself. They will trust the free organization of food supply and production to free groups of workers which will federate with like groups in other cities and villages not through the medium of a communal parliament but directly, to accomplish their aim. They will be anarchist within the commune as they will be anarchist outside it and only thus will they avoid the horrors of defeat, the furies of reaction.

Conversations have their own methods, their own logic that transgresses the meanings of things, in short, a hermeneutics that does not belong, nor can be possessed, but is actively questioning and pointing out the contradictions in the statements that go to make public policy, the loopholes in the structures that enforce the statements, and a language that betrays its own lack of innocence while assuming the guise of neutrality; the invisible reality of the face of Big Brother; the visible reality of things; a city in the shape of a composition with harmony intrinsic to the one experiencing the purity of the music. Not to forget a hermeneutics that being marginal to the elements of the

composition could simply lead to the breakdown of the composition; a hermeneutics of decomposition. Saint Augustine foresaw the decomposition, hence the importance of faith in the order; a faith beyond question.

Is the faith that takes the form of the religious incompatible with an alternate hermeneutics that gives theory a critical edge in understanding the order? I am with John Caputo who in his *Radical Hermeneutics* sees religion as one of the important bases for a radical hermeneutics rooted in the idea of suffering:

The genealogy of religion in suffering means that the affirmation of God is implicated in the affirmation of life and the protest against suffering... Religion accordingly, is fundamentally a defiant gesture... It does not arise negatively, from a rejection, but affirmatively, from an affirmation of life... In this framework, the very idea of "God" means He who stands always and necessarily on the side of those who suffer, He who intervenes on behalf of the sufferer... This is why religion, on this conception, is politically subversive, with a subversion which cuts across the ideologies of right and left. (1987: 280)

In the act of affirming life with the help of a God that recognizes the value of suffering and the sufferer, religion brings one face to face with the abyss. This abyss is what is deep within the walls of the sublime city. It is the slime, the offshoot, the downtown, the ghetto, the slum, the political unconscious, the basement upon which rest the superstructures of the state and religion. An alternate hermeneutics is a slime hermeneutics that undermines the conscious use of method to analyze the subject and instead lets the subject create his own methods to understand his subjectivity that reflects the desires of individuals and the conditions of groups. This kind of a hermeneutics by its very nature is religious. While it has the visionary element taken from mysticism it has the fervor of one devoted to an image.

Religion is displaced from the institution and made responsible for the sufferings of the world that would include oppression, war and man-made famines among other things. It is a celebration of the universe that is the greatest among visible things and the sign God who is the greatest among the invisibles. The celebration is without a purpose. That precisely is the point of the celebration – a holiday from reason. A carnivalesque atmosphere has shaken the core of the city. The downtown is on the move. The city of God makes way for the city of a person. Earth displaces heaven. A new metaphysics has come into being

– a metaphysics of situations, that is relentlessly political in its articulation of the other.

More than anything else a method is a poetical/political attitude to the text rather than a mere tool of research. The role of ethics in the context of a hermeneutics of method is essentially grounded in alternate ways of thinking. What connects writing to an ethical life is that the discussion with regard to an “ethical life” does not transcend the given situation. It follows that an ethics of writing is always already as situational as a writing of ethics. As Wittgenstein points out in one of his conversations to Bouwsma: “How is an ethical principle identified?... A principle is ethical by virtue of its surroundings. What surroundings? You could imagine ‘surroundings’ where one was justified and enjoined upon to enjoy sufferings, the sufferings of the wicked, for instance. At any rate there are limits surely to what is an ‘ethical’ principle” (5–6). What Wittgenstein’s statement does is to preclude a science of ethics or an objective definition of ethics. The basis of the statement is whether anything can at all be rendered objectively in such a manner as to be useful in maintaining, for the purposes of day-to-day life, the extraordinarily intense fragility of meaning.

Can an intellectual discussion of ethics be possible at all if separated from practical living? Can one speak of ethics in terms of a discourse, i.e. is there an intellectual formula for an ethical life? To reply in the affirmative that there is an intellectual formula would mean that: i) there is a life that has nothing to do with ethics as represented in intellectual terms; ii) there is an *intellectual* language that is free of ethics per se; a language outside a cultural context if one identifies ethics to a large extent with a way of life; iii) there is the implication that a non-situational ethics is possible within an intellectual formula based on the agreement that ethics permeates culture; iv) there is a notion of intellectualism that brings out the alienated character of the discourse itself.

If meaning is important in order to arrive at a definition of ethics then it must be recognized that meaning cannot be bounded in a concept. As Derrida puts it, “We have no concept, only an impression, a series of impressions associated with a word... We only have an impression, an insistent impression through the unstable feeling of a shifting figure, of a schema, or of an in-finite or indefinite process” (1996: 29). The importance of a method in this context is that it sustains meaning while at the same time recognizing the transgressional character of writing. Meaning supposedly means something. Two plus two for all practical purposes *means* four just as ten million people are

on the brink of famine in Africa means the same. The assumptions behind two plus two are open to endless proliferation of discourses, signs, languages, senses or arguments. Why therefore sustain meaning? Why not let it *be* if that's what it must be anyway? To prevent the possibility of elitism that wears the garb of a relativist discourse; to prevent the discourse from dangerously isolating itself from real issues concerning the real lives of real men and real women in an all-too-real world.

A postmodern discourse that relies on an endless regression of words is at heart a transcendental discourse. In a short essay "Why Theory?" Jean Baudrillard comes up with the notion that "The status of theory could not be anything but a challenge to the real... For the real itself is without doubt only a challenge to theory... Theory must operate on time at the cost of a deliberate distortion of present reality" (1996: 98–99). This so-called distortion of present reality is theory at its apolitical best. It is theory for theory's sake. Terry Eagleton is right in entitling his book *The Illusions of Postmodernism*. As he points out: "For all its vaunted openness to the Other, postmodernism can be quite as exclusive and censorious as the orthodoxies it opposes. It is a thoroughly orthodox heterodoxy, which like any imaginary form of identity needs its bogeymen and straw targets to stay in business" (1997: 26).

Chomsky in a talk on postmodernism went to the extent of calling the postmodern stance a form of pseudo-scientific posturing. What Chomsky most likely implies by posturing is the refusal to accept the reality of the situation by denying the real itself as a form of simulation because the denial serves the pragmatic purpose of preserving the status quo. Such a form of posturing lends itself to an elitist discourse. As Chomsky says, "There are more important things to do, in my opinion, than to inquire into the traits of elite intellectuals engaged in various careerist and other pursuits in their narrow and (to me, at least) pretty uninteresting circles". There are two ways of reading Chomsky's phrase "posturing". One is a posturing that is necessary to deconstruct the order of things. The other is a posturing that is simply posturing for the sake of posturing; the moral dimension of posturing being hypocrisy.

The postmodernism that Baudrillard speaks of is a brand of simulation or dissimulation that is meant to evade social responsibility in the face of social and political realities. A postmodernist of the Baudrillard variety is a sham elitist as opposed to the real elitist. An instance of the real elitist is the colonizer backed by the cannon; I would call it canonical posturing where the colonizer believed in his own

superiority and that of his language and literature. The sham elitism of a certain school of postmodernism is a form of posturing made possible by the cannon, a brain-child of the cannon, and therefore serving the interests of a racist, classist and sexist paradigm under the pretense of repudiating it. The sham elitist is not essentially different from the real elitist. Both are the same people with different disguises. Ultimately both preserve the cannon.

What Baudrillard calls an “enlightenment project” is a mystery to me. Is the French Revolution the outcome of an enlightenment project? What about Rousseau and Voltaire? What is reason and what are the problems associated with reason? It would not be unreasonable to ask what essentially makes reason a discourse of order while reason itself contains within it elements of anti-reason. To simply question the reasons behind any given structure can itself be the impetus for radical social change. An argument based on reason might form the basis for disintegrating traditional structures of authority. This, in effect, far from denigrating reason shows the limitation of the postmodern critique of reason or the so-called enlightenment project. Which version of enlightenment are we talking about? Which version of postmodernism is critiquing which version of enlightenment? Is postmodernism nothing but a discourse of complicated words? Old wine in new bottles? The face of the cannon with the mask of deconstruction?

While the cannon was an offshoot of a colonial system, postmodernism is an outcome of global capitalism and a neocolonialist system that continues to thrive on resources and labor from third world countries. Jameson is right in pointing out that “The theory of the postmodern, indeed, is predicated on (or rather indeed, heuristically, confirmed by) a more fundamental periodizing hypothesis about the nature of capitalism itself as a system and a mode of production” (1989: 67). Baudrillard confirms what Jameson says when he (Baudrillard) claims that: “The very will to live, fragmented, disappointed, signified, is condemned to repeat itself and repeatedly abolish itself in a succession of objects. In this context all attempts to ‘moderate’ consumption or to devise a grid of needs capable of normalizing it attest to nothing but a naive or grotesque moralism” (*The System*, 204).

What Baudrillard refers to as “grotesque moralism” or an apolitical postmodernism, i.e. a version of postmodernism that overlooks its true canonical face is an Oedipal longing for security, a security that is rejected in the name of a fragmented meaning; a security that is at once institutional and political, even in its recognition of the political as a mere sign flowing down the drain of signifiers. A postmodern order of things rejects the presuppositions of a dialectical analysis based on the

Marxist premise that food, shelter and clothing constitute the basis of any position irrespective of where it stems from. Engels in his graveside speech of Marx points out that

Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history: the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.; that therefore the production of the immediate material means, and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given epoch, form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, art, and even the ideas on religion, of the people concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which they must, therefore, be explained, instead of vice versa, as had hitherto been the case.

As Brecht says in one of his poems: “Amongst the highly placed/ It is considered low to talk about food./ The fact is: they have/ Already eaten” (1976: 286). The politics of method critically examines the world-view of those who have already eaten and consider it low to talk about food. The city is in the hands of the anarchists who will seek to redeem the houses of the city by making space for the streets. The margins will trespass the sanctified region of a monolithic center. A politics of writing will emerge at this very point when criticism becomes a weapon in the hands of alternate groups simultaneously identifying and deconstructing those very identities that act as prison-houses to dispersed meaning. The overgrowth of ideology is cut down in order to recover the fundamental principle that food, shelter and clothing is the basis of a method that hermeneutically undermines the cloak of ideology pretending to be natural and beyond question.

In *Against Method*, Paul Feyerabend makes the point that “there is only *one* principle that can be defended under *all* circumstances and in *all* stages of human development. It is the principle: *anything goes*” (1984: 28). Every analysis is situated even while attempting to deny its situationality. While a politics of writing acknowledges the situationality of analysis, an ethics of writing clarifies the meanings of words in a given context. Without transcending the system of language, an ethics poses alternatives that arise from the borders of a discourse. This makes a hard and fast demarcation of politics from ethics at best superficial. A dubiously neutral word such as “development” for instance demands a political-ethical scrutiny. Is development a question, an issue, a paradigm, a policy, a problem or a day-dream? Any method

of inquiry that aims to understand development should simultaneously act as an inquiry into the nature of the method itself.

To discover the nature of method is to define the need for a method prior to which is the need to have a definition in the first place. A definition conceals the method it employs in the act of defining. If I must define a term such as *market* or *development*, in effect I employ a certain methodology that is in-built in the use of the term. Language in the way we use it is methodical in its a priori requirement of a definition. Every word is thus both a definition as well as a method. If I am talking about a “dog”, I define it as a four-legged creature belonging to the animal species. What I define as a ‘dog,’ is how I define it; a definition is interlocked with method in the way words are used to talk about something. Going by the assumption that language requires definition, and the tools of defining are concealed in the act of definition, a context ought to produce its own methods; a method cannot be used to produce a context. From the perspective of ethnographic and literary research, every context produces its own language to talk about itself.

The search for a method, apart from the requirement of a definition, is the possibility of a meta-language to talk about the language of a given context. This implies that there are two different levels of language employed here: one is the language of the context and the other is the language of the method. These two languages are however not separated from one another. The language of the context is how the language of the method has undertaken to define the context. In the word “language” is the method representing the methods used to understand diverse contexts. The basis of method *as* language is the recognition that language *is* metaphysics; if language can be personified as a one-armed man hanging to a cliff below which is the open, groundlessness or flux of metaphysics. This confirms the tremendous fear with which we hold on to words, the fear of the nothing that stands outside the text.

Bazarov in Turgenev’s *Fathers and Sons* makes a point when he says: “What a lot a word can do! He’s found one; he said ‘crisis’ and is comforted. It’s an astounding thing how human beings have faith in words. You tell a man, for instance, that he’s a fool, and even if you don’t thrash him he’ll be miserable; call him a clever fellow, and he’ll be delighted even if you go off without paying him”. An ethics of writing both needs and does not need words because even the very discussion of words might have nothing to do with the most underprivileged sections of humanity who function as Gayatri Spivak named one of her books *In Other Worlds*.

In other words, an ethics of writing in the place of theory demands a system based on values. Ignazio Silone, the one-time member of the Italian Communist Party, while explaining the reasons for his eventual withdrawal from the Communist Party makes a distinction between theory and values. In an interesting passage he says: “The distinction between theories and values is not sufficiently recognized, but it is fundamental. On a group of theories one can found a school; but on a group of values one can found a culture, a civilization, a new way of living together among men” (Crossman, 1983: 114). Politics gives a theoretical basis to writing and ethics provides the necessary values to sustain theory in a meaningful way. The city must go on. It has no one theory or intellectual formula to back it. It is based on a value. The value being that the city must change its contours and stop being the city – the policeman and the prostitute – in one and the same image. This image is not in our consciousness. It is our consciousness. To change the image would mean an alteration in our consciousness.

As Sartre points out in his *Imagination*, “There are not, and never could be, images *in* consciousness. Rather, an image is *a certain type of consciousness*. An image is an act, not some thing. An image is a consciousness *of* some thing” (1972: 146). The postmodern image of the city of visible things is backed by an invisible ideology that sustains the image of a body and fetishifies youth in the way it disconnects the body from its consciousness of being an image. The method behind an ethics of writing that connects these imagined bodies is a new way of living based on values that would aim at a radical transformation of the existing order of things.

In an attempt to pursue the line of thought that existentialism and Marxism is a marriage of true minds, Sartre in his *Search for a Method* came up with the idea of the progressive-regressive method which involves “... neither a particular talent, nor a special faculty of intuition; this knowing is simply the dialectical movement which explains the act by its terminal signification in terms of its starting conditions” (1968: 153).

That the majority of the world’s poor live in Africa, Asia and Latin America is a given statement. This given can form the basis of a narrative which either undermines the given as natural or seeks to question ways of understanding the given. In the choice of my values, I understand this given. If I subscribe to the value that poverty is connected to injustice; that injustice is not a natural fact but contrary to it a very political one; that it can be changed to make place for a more just society then my research into the question of third world poverty

will manifest my presence as a historical being and my work as a frame of reference to my historicity. *While I produce history I am reproduced in the very history that I seek to produce.* To carry Sartre's argument further, if a value is understood as lived theory, taking the point of view that theory is the role consciously assumed by resistance in the language game of challenging power, it follows that the choices one makes are fundamental to one's being-in-the-world.

However, transcending the limits of the dialectic which aim at problematizing oppositions, the other cannot be recognized except through the language of metaphysics. The other produces his otherness only when the speaking self comes to a halt. There is an African proverb that only when lions have historians will hunters cease being heroes. Even the noblest of choices to pursue research with the least amount of prejudice and a consistent acknowledgement of the prejudices cannot change the fact that lions must write their own histories. This is not to reverse the dialectic; where the slave speaks to the master; but where the 'slave' speaks to other 'slaves' and creates a different text. The text is essentially metaphysical because it is not there except in the translations that the self at all points makes of the other. This is not a longing for pure presence or a return to a past where only the one existed, but rather a period of discovery for the other attempting another narrative.

Feynman has a point when he says that the principle of science is that: "If there is an exception to any rule, and if it can be proved by observation, that rule is wrong" (1998: 16). The observation is almost too obvious for the proof to be necessary. There is a whole school of thought called postmodernism/ post-structuralism/ post-colonialism; the origin and the destination of the message is in the same place – the institution – that would include the hierarchical structures of the university, the publishing houses and the corporate sector breathing down the neck of the institution. It makes no *difference* to the others at the margins. The other is an exception who while writing his exceptionality exposes the rule as being naked and empty of any possibility of changing the world rather than interpreting it as Marx famously put it.

Evans-Pritchard says that an anthropologist must learn the language of the natives, communicate freely as one of them, and "study the whole of social life" (1972: 80). The point I wish to contest is the very idea of trying to *be* one of them in order to write about them. Another point is the question of what the research means to the natives. How does it free them from a situation where they are studied rather than them articulating their selves? Most anthropological research is only a bundle of political observations, political in its disclosure of the identity of the

self. To question the basis of a method is to recognize the strategic spaces where the self is dislocated from the other.

The politics of method becomes the space/ zone where ethnography is married to literature. The instability of the written word forms an ethical basis to research, ultimately leading to political activism that challenges the status quo that uses the research to perpetuate itself. The advantage in a method is that the researcher confesses his lack. He is not enough of the *man* that he seems to be after all. His signature of being a man throws his manhood in a realm of signs where he is what he is not. If the city has taken away the body and presented us in its place with the soul, then Octavio Paz is right in viewing in the “alliance of poetry and rebellion... the return of the sign *body*: the incarnation of images, the return of the human figure, radiant and radiating symbols” (1974: 139).

The marriage of method with hermeneutics discloses the madness of reason. I do not think, therefore I am. The text articulates the story of her pleasure, the body in a dialectical play with its imagined otherness, the poetry of being in the shape of a water-jug that Heidegger visualizes as the basis of ontology, the seeds of meaning scattered in all directions thus confounding the name of the author, the dark night of the soul, the soluble fish, music – the food of love, the machine that can think, the subaltern who can speak, diwali – the Hindu festival of lights commemorating the victory of good over evil, the lotus pierced by a ray of light, pen and paper, computer, rice, curry, you and me.

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The Rational and Non-rational in the Conception of the Art Work

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Abstract:

The paper brings into discussion the problem of rational and non-rational factors in the process of artistic creation. It presents two antagonistic positions: the contribution of intellectual effort, the intuitive and discursive reason. The conclusion is that, in the process of artistic creation, inspiration and conscious work-out are complementary.

Keywords: art work, artistic creation, inspiration, rational, genius

It is neither simple nor comfortable to approach the complex and delicate subject of artistic creation; because it cannot be explained as one solves a mathematical exercise, the mysterious alchemy that produces the uniqueness named *work of art*.

The creation is not a simple notion, to which one can work exactly. Though it is defined by the impact of novelty, it does not mean only this. Indeed, each creation implies novelty, but this is not mutually true. The concept of novelty itself is arguable, because there are different types of novelty, qualitatively variable.

If for us the association between the concept of *artist* and that of *creator* is natural, in older times we see that things were different and that the association is very recent. For example, in ancient Greece, the concepts of “creation” and “creator” implied a special freedom, as the concepts of art and that of artist were subjected to laws and regulations. An exception was made in the case of poetry, which was not considered art because it was inspired by the muses. Equally, in the Middle Ages the artists were considered producers and the term “creation” was reserved only for God’s creations. Nevertheless, everything changed in

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the modern times. Renaissance artists tried to use different words, but not yet that of “creation”. M. Ficino said that the artist reflected his work of art; Leonardo asserted that he composed forms that were not found in nature and Michelangelo stated that the artist was accomplishing his vision rather than imitating nature. In the 18th century, the concept of creation begins to emerge more often in art theory, combined with the concept of imagination. In the next century, art recovered from the aversion of being called creation during the prior centuries. Not only that it assumed the term of creation, but it was the only notion having this meaning. Thus, late, against odds and with hard work, the concept of creation emerged in the whole European culture.

Along with the avant-garde from the first half of the 20th century and postmodernist theories, the concept of *art*, *genius* and *work of art* were subjected to a continuous assault and, although many times shattered, they remain up-to-date and surrounded by a more or less shiny aura. Separated from the divine character or invested with attributes that raised it to the status of a whole world, accessible only to initiates, the art remains an enigma, and the artist is seen as a man somehow similar to others like him, yet different in some defining aspects. There are different types of artists, some nonconformist, others exalted, some rational, some even eccentric, others modest and well-behaved, some physically and psychically devoured by their own genius, others balanced and harmonious. What connects all these people, so that we see them as artists, as creators of something that cannot be achieved by anyone? On this matter there were studies achieved by aestheticians, psychologists, sociologists and even artists themselves. The answers proposed are many times contradictory and, instead of clearing the issue, they just dazzle more and more. It is obvious that there is no unique recipe for accomplishing a work of art, the “ingredient” is diverse, there is nothing quantitative, but something we miss. Just this “something” is very hard to underline because there is no consistency and clear shapes, but it is like light and wind that distinguish a true painting from kitsch or a symphony from an ordinary song. Any work of art has its secret, something ineffable that seems difficult to express by the reason which judges and tries to reduce the unknown to the familiar. The idea that creation is associated with a minority of people, accepted by some, rejected by others, has always existed and will probably be around for some time. According to some opinions, artists have a different psychic structure, mysterious, difficult to comprehend and understand, they have a gift of unknown origin and reason. Artists have been and still are admired, envied but also not understood or even

despised, especially by practical people or those appreciating clarity, precision, coherence and afraid of emotions and feelings.

It is interesting to see how people tried to explain the creation process from old times until today. In spite of the multitude of explanations and assumptions of “solving the problem”, we can only assert the prolonged and present interest in the creation process.

Authentic artistic creation requires a gifted individuality or even a genius. In no other human activity domain one speculates more on the theme of talent and genius – considered *natura naturans* of the creation – as in the case of artistic creation. But every time an aesthetic theory uses the concept of genius, there are certain issues involved. The genius becomes a mysterious power which produces original forms, and artists seem not to be able to explain what they are doing. Overcoming all that is against it, the genius finds new ways to express, abandoning old or copied artistic formulae.

There are many explanatory ways, each of them addressing a certain aspect of the artistic creation, building a theory around it. Psychologists try to explain genius or talent starting from the psychological structure of the artist and sociologists seek to show a sociological conditioning for art. Art psychoanalysis speaks about the sublimation of artistic pulsion, about diverting the libido towards spiritual activities. According to this theory, the dream, the neurosis, philosophy and art are forms of sublimation for the hang-up instincts, ways to free unconscious conflicts, unaccomplished desires or discontents. Freud, who psychoanalyzed Leonardo da Vinci by studying his paintings, found in the folds of Virgin Mary’s dress from Louvre an obsessional vulture, unconsciously drawn. Leonardo’s genius would be explained, according to Freud, by a form of sublimation, namely intellectual curiosity.

According to Adler, artistic talent is a sort of compensatory product for organ deficiencies. There are a number of painters with ocular deficiency, also musicians like Mozart or Beethoven that have had hearing problems. What psychoanalysis failed to explain, as shown by Tudor Vianu, is why in some persons the liberation takes the form of neurosis and in others the form of artistic activity and why when neurosis coexists with genius, the sublimation is expressed in both ways.

There are many speculations and even scientific studies relating the disease, especially psychical, to genius. A lot of ink was used to describe madness with Hölderlin, Lenau, Nietzsche, Eminescu, Van Gogh or Maupassant. People talked about the despair and suicide of Gogol, Schumann, Modigliani, about Flaubert’s and Dostoyevsky’s epilepsy, about Verlaine’s and E.A. Poe’s alcoholism, the opium

addiction of Coleridge and Baudelaire. Many artists have suffered from diverse physical and psychical problems, but to associate genius with degeneration is exaggerated, because there are more ill people without genius, but also genial personalities with enviable health and longevity. Still, artists are usually extremely impressionable people, hypersensitive, with active imagination and they are also affected by everything that usually happens to people around them. There are situations they cannot overcome, not every conflict inside them is solved, intense feelings and the cerebral overload destabilize them. Even though, they are capable of intense and prolonged activity, have impressive energy and an extraordinary power of work.

The existentialist theory opposes to the psycho-analytic one, which makes creativity look like a neurotic feature, sustaining, on the contrary, that this is the result of a maximum emotional sanity. The ones sustaining the associationist-psychological theory see in creativity a process of transforming associative elements into new combinations, and those of the creativity transfer reduce it to being a moment of learning. The configurational theory (Gestaltist) explains creativity as being something linked to imagination, having no relation to reason or logic. The historical and sociological explanations see the artist as the human belonging to a social class and to an environment and living in a certain historical era. This explanation is also insufficient because “we will not explain Rembrandt’s genius starting from Holland in his time, because, after all, the last of the small Hollander artists reflects as well his era, but they are not Rembrandt” (Vergez; Huisman, 1990: 316).

During the Antique Greek era, Plato, who was a poet and felt the muse’s touch before writing philosophy, scared about the idea that when somebody writes poems he seems not to be himself, considered the poets to be irrational. Being possessed by muses and receiving the divine gift of poetry through them, the poets are a kind of ideologues, the chosen ones, a kind of puppets whose rational abilities are affected. The poet’s knowledge, as Plato asserts, is inferior to the rational philosopher’s one, because art is just a copy of the reality and does not make the way towards truth accessible for us. Because, in its turn, the sensitive world is just a copy of the intelligible one, resulting thus that art is nothing more but a copy of the copy: “The tragedies’ maker is an imitator; he is estranged with three degrees from the law and truth, as are all the others imitators” (*Republica*, 597.e). Plato’s idea leads to the shaping of the illusionist theory, which asserts that art creates nonentities, cheats and invents. The art’s essence is illusion, and that is why sculptors and painters are alike jugglers.

Aristotle, that grew up in Plato's school, but not in the Platonic philosophical spirit, defines art as *mimesis* and says that it does not have anything in common with truth or falseness, because these notions belong to the more accessible side of the land of knowledge, not to creation.

Understood as a divine possession since the Antique Greece, inspiration becoming the name for that *something*, that explains obscurely and confusedly enough the artistic creation. In the privileged moment of inspiration, as many say, a true miracle takes place. The work of art to be written or to be elaborated is given in the artists' conscience, sometimes entirely, sometimes as an essential idea. That is why there is nothing surprising if words and expressions like *illogical*, *irrational*, *intuition*, *ecstatic drunkenness* often abound in the language of art. All these notions are themselves quite unclear; therefore, their use in explaining the artistic creation makes it become even more mysterious.

Liviu Rusu asserts that the ferment of the work of art is the lack of balance. The creative genius is characterized by "a dissymmetry of the inner life", by a state of tension which rises from a troubled equilibrium, the lack of peace from the inner conflicts. It does not let himself be consumed by this lack of harmony, mobilizing certain forces inside him, which make him create and introduce a kind of order inside the disorder.

Numerous theoreticians talk about the artistic creational process, a fact supposing the recognition of an era or a phase which the artist covers when he creates. It is believed that there is a preparation phase first, in which the artist gathers experiences and knowledge. Next, there is an incubation phase in which the experiences float within the unconscious and which is for the artist "a very restless phase, full of frustrations, often accompanied by powerful inferiority complexes" (Landau, 1979: 69). In Tudor Vianu's opinion, what the author gathers in the preparation phase "are similar materials and energies" (Vianu, 1968: 257). There is, as the author asserts, an "unexpressed" preparation, diffuse, which comes from the impressions of the first childhood, on which the artist's life experience overlaps. In this long process, some features of the artistic structure can be improved, the talent can develop. There is "an express preparation", which begins to develop after the inspirational moment and which "interlocks rather with the moment of the execution and makes a first example about the way in which the various phases of creation interrelate" (*Ibidem*, 259).

The climactic phase is when inspiration appears. This comes unexpectedly, in a context or in conditions which seem not to have any

link with what the creator racks his brains with, with the work of art he wants to create. This illuminating moment, together with the supreme pressure, the shock, is “the one in which the idea of the work of art comes into mind and it’s characterized by certain spontaneity” (Rusu, 1989: 158). It seems to be something almost magic, as the creator has the impression that all he will reveal in a sensitive form came spontaneously, invaded him, issuing from outside, from god knows what and whom, or from his interiority.

There are dramatic descriptions of the inspirational state, felt in the whole body as shaking, exaltations, and enthusiasm.

Henri Delacroix, a famous researcher in the psychology of art, but also in that of mysticism, considers that the psychological notes of inspiration are “intermittence, disproportion, and the compelling power. It is revealed as having the features of inspiration all that raptures the flow of conscience and the sequence of methodical thinking, all that results without seeming to immediately depend on what precedes it” (Delacroix, 1983: 177). Inspiration is the result of a processing which takes place within the artist’s personality, being something he is not aware of, but which lives with him, and develops within him. It is prepared for a conscious labour, but no matter how productive it would be, he alone cannot explain the creation of a work of art. Delacroix compares the artist with the mystic. Both are oriented “in the same time towards the interior and the exterior, to the obscure contemplation and the clear image of the work to be done” (*Ibidem*: 168). The preliminary condition of the artistic creation would be a kind of undifferentiated aesthetic state, in which a certain orientation and the inspiration or the revelation appears afterwards. In the moment of inspiration, either artistic or mystical, an increase in sensitivity occurs, certain organic sensations and crises of enthusiasm, since inspiration “means equilibrium rupture, and readjustment, new systematization. Life’s rhythm stops. A new rhythm is born. A series of mental operations is interrupted, something new takes action”. Why does inspiration come and what determines it? This is a question with various answers given as well by the artists and by the ones who, even if not artists, try their best to understand them. A very largely adopted idea asserts that inspiration or artistic intuition is the primordial element from which the work of art is born then, becoming unitary and individual: “The flash from which originates the work of art is called inspiration or creativeness, perceived as the starting point of the work of art. What is caught in this instant is that global, undifferentiated character, which tends to formal articulation and organization and does not let the artist have a rest till the aim is not accomplished and the work of art reaches its perfectness” (Sedlmayer,

1991: 113). It was noticed that there are some resemblances between the creative state of inspiration and the dreaming state. There are authors which say that they dreamt the content of their work of art. It is said about Tartini that he composed *The Devil's Sonata* in his dream, about Coleridge that he had written *Khubla Khan* in his sleep, and Wagner's *Rhine's Gold* prelude was given to him in a state of dreaming. He tells that, coming back home, he lay down on a sofa trying to sleep: "But I did not succeed into falling asleep and felt only how I was drifting into a state of sleep, during which it seemed to me that I was sinking in a fast water flow. The water purling took soon a musical shape. It was the mi flat major sound, resounding and floating in continuous arpeggios. Later, these arpeggios changed into more accelerated shapes, but the mi flat major tone was not modified and its persistence seemed to give a deep significance to the liquid I had sunk in. All of a sudden I had the feeling that the waves covered me as in a waterfall and, frightened, I woke up. I immediately realized that I dreamt the motive from *Rhine's Gold* as I was having it in me, without succeeding to put it into shape up to that moment" (Vianu, 1968: 261).

In the privileged moment of inspiration, something pretty unclear happens. Liviu Rusu thinks that inspiration "is nothing more than a transitional stage inside a process begun at the deepest sides of the soul", a stage in which "chaotic fuss of the inside gets into the artist's consciousness as an idea" (Rusu, 1989: 158). He is also the one to distinguish, having as a criterion the elaboration of images, between "the inspiration-play" and "the inspiration-effort". In the first form – the inspiration-play, the creators are under the impression that it comes from the outside of their body and feel themselves somehow depersonalized. As an example, Alfred de Vigny said "I do not create a book, it creates itself. It ages and grows in my head as a fruit" (de Vigny, 1983: 71). Goethe asserts he does not make the poems, the poems create him, but Lamartine says he is not the one to think, but the ideas are the ones to think him. Also famous is the description of inspiration done by Nietzsche, as being "something that shakes us and troubles us to the deepest corner of our being. You listen and do not research, take without asking who the one to offer is. Like a lightning, the thinking suddenly breaks out, with an absolute necessity, unhesitatingly or without any calls. It is a delight which fastens and slows down our steps without our will; it is an ecstasy which snatches us from ourselves, leaving our perception under thousands of delicate thrills, making us fully vibrate, up to the tip of our toes. It is a plenitude of happiness, in which the extreme pain and fear are not felt as a

contrast, but as integrant and indispensable parts, as a necessary tone inside this ocean of light” (Vianu, 1968: 263). The second type of inspiration requires an ulterior elaboration, the development of the ideas or images given in the moment of enlightenment. Named the “lucidity ascetic” or “rationalist poets’ patron”, Paul Valéry acknowledged that “if Gods give us graciously the first line, all we have to do is to shape the second one, which has to be in consonance with the other and not to be undignified of his older sibling of a supernatural origin” (Valéry, 1969: 69).

As for the content of inspiration according to different kinds of art, some musicians say that full songs appear in their conscience, some writers see their characters, while some artists see their schematic figures. But there are also poets inspired by a song or colours, musicians hearing a symphony of colours which they transpose as a musical harmony and painters inspired by poetries or by a musical fragment.

After the inspirational phase, the conscious elaboration comes next, clarifying and organizing the material received through inspiration. It is all about work, abnegation, about times of satisfaction and discontent, an entire personality mobilizing, but also times of interruption and relapse. When the artist is in the process of creation, he does not have only moments of enlightenment, but also blockages, lack of inspiration and lost time. The inspiration prepares itself and ends through work, stagnation, but also crises. The enthusiasm present in the inspirational moment is replaced by the creative anxiety. The work of art is after all the result of many successive inspirations, completed by a conscious elaboration and with an effort of will. Some inspirations must be abandoned when they do not match the initial one, which “acts both as a magnet and as a sieve” (Sedlmayer, 1991: 114).

There are also creators who say they do their work of art consciously and rationally. Everything is thought thoroughly, even the way of making an impression, and even the originality is used, in order to dazzle both the public and the critics. It is about a work resembling the researcher’s one, because it needs a previous idea in which the following creation is planned precisely, as well as the ways by means of which the idea will be accomplished. In order to do this, Alain said that “the supreme law of the human invention is that nothing is invented without work” (Vergez, 1990: 317). In the same way, E.A. Poe wrote about his poem, *The Raven*, that none of it is due to chance or intuition, but took shape, step by step, with the precision of a mathematical problem (Poe, 1910: 57). Gauguin, while admiring Emile Bernard’s paintings, said he discovered reason, intentionality, intellectual and systematic construction in these. Another renowned painter, Seurat, was

famous as a rational spirit who had carefully studied modern spectral analysis and practiced a kind of art based on reason. Unlike these artists, Van Gogh was relying on sensations and perceived art as a total and immediate expression of his being. Caspar David Friedrich, the inventor of the tragic landscape in paintings, said that “Art’s only source is our heart, the language of a pure and sincere soul. A painting that does not come from the heart can only be a vane juggle. Any authentic work of art is conceived in a holy hour, born in a blessed hour; an interior push creates it, sometimes without the artist’s knowledge” (Honour, 1983: 242).

The ratio between the spontaneous and the deliberate in artistic creation has a different tone in the oriental aesthetic thinking than in the European one. For example, the Chinese painter is required to be humble, profound, to keep his soul pure and the naturalness of his talent. The ease in execution of a work of art is appreciated, but also the knowledge and fulfilment of rules, practicing a great variety of styles to construct a personal style. If in the West the role of reason in the process of creation is acknowledged, in China of much greater importance are the reflections about human nature and spiritual life. Much more comprehensive than spontaneity or genius is the ease, because it descends from the harmony of the artist with the universal spirit. To be able to paint, the Chinese artist has to harmonize with the Universe by practicing meditation and focus. Only in this manner he can capture the *ch’i* or the spirit that sums up the presence of Dao in painting. But, “if the *ch’i* is lost, no matter the resemblance, embellishment, craftsmanship, even genius participated in the work; it still cannot be saved, as being powerless” (Rowley, 1982: 82). The Chinese painter has to identify himself with what he paints. The words of master Su Dung Po are relevant in this respect: “To be able to paint a bamboo it’s necessary to have grown it up within you first. Only then, by taking the brush and concentrating the sight, the vision appears before your eyes. The vision should be swiftly caught with the brush, because it can disappear as quickly as the rabbit when the hunter comes” (Cheng, 1983: 62).

Creating a work of art requires a total participation of the artist, with both body and soul. The emotions and feelings experienced by the artist, his general knowledge, his professional training, the relations with others, all these hall-mark more or less when he creates. The inspiration and reflection, in different proportions from one artist to another, are a part of art substance. Producing a work of art is a process in which irrational elements interfere with rational ones. If the inspiration is the

essential moment of artistic creation, the reason has a deeper role in the stage of execution, when discernment, reflection and the choice of expression means and technical aspects are necessary.

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The characteristics of modern religiosity and the responsibility of contemporary theologian

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Abstract:

The interpretation presented by us defines the complex dimension of the responsibilities of the contemporary social theologian. He, the contemporary theologian, has to express his pragmatism by the availability to acknowledge and to understand the challenges of the world he is living in, as well as his responsibility by finding of right answers to all these challenges. The theologian's presence and purpose in the contemporary society have to be useful, constructive and generator of hope and confidence in the future.

And this, in the current situation, in which the faith and the religious community represent, for the contemporary believer, an important sanctuary of hope and confidence, and the religious tradition is seen as a constant source of teaching, of authority and moral experience. The religious phenomenon is expressing itself in various ways, from the most conservatives ones, characterizing the institutionalized religious tradition to the most flexible and innovative ways of manifestation.

Keywords: tradition, community of faith, religious marketing, social theology, contemporary religious

Tradition and community of faith

The theme that I am proposing today, to you, for debate is related to: The characteristics of contemporary religiosity and the responsibility of the contemporary theologian. I am doing that in the broader context of tonight debate's theme regarding the relation between tradition and the community of faith.

Sociologically speaking, both tradition and community have a common denominator, namely the fact that represents, each on its side,

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a set, an assembly of complex values, relations and social practices which might be met in different fields, in the economic, political or scientific life, as well as in the religious one.

Tradition implies the existence of a referential past which becomes the norm of a symbolic behavior and which confers cohesion and power to the moral or religious community, generating different behavioral links, very tight ones, between its members. These could be expressed by a strong “solidarity relation between the group’s members, as well as by a series of relations characterized by a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional profoundness, moral commitment, social cohesion and continuity in time”. The term tradition was used and analyzed closely by Emile Durkheim, French philosopher and sociologist, which in 1912 published a very interesting paper called: *The elementary forms of religious life*. In this research paper, Durkheim underlined the importance of tradition for the cohesion and for the authority of a community.

What we would like to do further is to try to find answers to the next questions: How should be understood the evolution of the contemporary society from the perspective of the religious life and of the tradition? Which are the characteristics of the contemporary religiosity?

Beyond all of these, we have also tried to find out what it should be the responsibility of the contemporary theologian facing all these challenges of modernity? The missionary social theologian has to know in deep the contemporary society, as well as the mechanisms that are structuring its evolution and forms of expression.

In order to discover comprehensive answers, is necessary to understand, first, which are the modern forms of expression of the religiosity in the contemporary society. In this context, we have to take into consideration, *especially the logic of the relations between the religion and the modernity*.

The logic of the relations between religion and modernity

In order to be able to understand the causes which are influencing the contemporary religiosity, in a structural manner, as well as the way in which the society is influenced by the religious phenomenon, is necessary to closely analyze and to understand in a causal manner, the logic of the interdependent and conditional relations between the religion and the contemporary society. Between religion and modernity existed, from the very beginning of their socio-historical coexistence, in early 1900, an antinomy which opposed them. The Marxism’s ideas and, later, the communism’s ones had strengthened this manner of “considering religion as an obsolete social phenomenon, incompatible

with the societies engaged on the way of social and economic progress”. In a predictable development of the industrialized society, the modernity would have led to the disappearance of the religious or, at least, to a significant downsize of its influence in the society. These *relations between modernity and religion*, to which we could add the secularization paradigm, could have been understood “in the logic of a zero sum game: the more modernity advances, the more religion are regressing”.

Despite all of these pessimistic forecasts, J.P.Willaime, a well-known French contemporary sociologist, contradicts the above-mentioned linear interpretation, considering that the downsizing of the social influence of religion doesn't necessarily mean the disappearance of religion, but only a relative downsizing of its authority in the society, under the influence of the socio-historical factors. In an obvious manner, considered Willaime, religion does not disappear from society or from the modern human being's concerns, no matter what is the influence or the development of modernity, but is reconfiguring itself, based on different rules than the traditional ones known in the present. But the development of new and interesting forms of religious *reconfiguring* in the modernity is occurring in parallel with the *downsizing of the power and of the social influence of the religion*, confronted with the specificities of the modernity, namely: functional differentiation, globalization, individualization, rationalization, secularization and pluralism.

The contemporary religious is, no longer, expressing itself only in its pure traditional form, but we could notice the emergence, in a competitive manner, of different types of religiosity that could be called “secular religiosities”. The secular religiosity is a “hybrid” type, to be found between belief and atheism, defining thus, in an explicative manner, the relations between the modernity and the religious tradition. This spread of the religious in the secularism could be noticed, especially, in the belief's way of expression within the modern human being behavior in the absence of an ecclesiastic membership. Grace Davie, a well-known English sociologist, is talking about “believing without belonging”, a phenomenon that, inevitably, leads to the weakening of the traditional religious institutions and, implicitly, to the blooming of new forms of religiosity with strong elements of individuality. The process of individualize the belief determines a subjective perception of the religious, the follower becoming very mobile regarding its membership and its religious perception. The religious' subjectivity is expressing, as Willaime said, after the principle

“do it yourself”, which generates a kind of autonomy of the believer which is creating on his own a system of beliefs, in a way, obviously, utilitarian-syncretistic.

The variety of the forms of expression of the religious feeling, in the modern society, knows an impressive development. Starting with the classical ones, traditional, institutionalized, and coming to the syncretistic ones, with subtle and pragmatic approaches of the belief, called “religion at your own choice” or religion à la carte, we can notice a real expression of the relations between religion and modernity in the contemporary society.

Tradition and hyper-modernity

Starting from the traditional approach and coming to the most complicated forms of interpretation and of forwarding the religious concepts today, we manage to understand the complexity of forms that the contemporary religious expression encompasses. This new reality, which characterized the contemporary societies, highlights the diversity of the religious manifestation expressions and opens new ways of understanding the mutations, which the modern religious phenomenon is undergoing. Looking closer the contemporary society, we could differentiate, in the light of the elements characterized the European situation for example, a series of specificities that are influencing behaviorally speaking, the religious life dynamic, such as:

- The erosion of institutionalized religion;
- The diminishing of the religious practice;
- The crisis of clerical servants recruitment, especially within the historical, traditional Churches (as the Roman-Catholic Church);
- The downsizing of the direct political influence of the Churches;
- The diminishing of the belief in a personal God;
- The autonomous expression of an ethical, personal conscience, in relation with the ethical provisions of the religious institutions;
- The individualization and the subject of the belief

Referring to an easy noticeable aspect of the contemporary society, we are able to identify an increased presence of many new religious movements, which did not exist 50 years ago, for example. Concerned about this religious renewal, Jean Paul Willaime identifies a series of characteristics belonging to the contemporary new religious movements, such as:

- The hyper-modernity of the missionary methods: the new religious movements are using the experience and the practice of the modern communication means, advertising, relation with media, modern technology and management of public relations etc.

- Pragmatism: the follower of new religious movements is not relating himself to a set of dogmas and holy traditions, but is invited to experience a form of wisdom that will grant him a wellbeing feeling or, at least, a relaxation one.

- The secularization of religious authority: the institutional authority within the new religious movements is not exerted by an assembly of distinctive persons, considered to be the bearers of a sacred tradition, it is transferred directly to the followers, who are able to self-impose the faith “it is less a clerical religion than one of profanes”.

- The earthly finality: often, the new religious movements, does not invoke, in the sermons, a connection with the imaginary heavenly world, the finality of their religious actions being placed in this world, the earthly one.

- Emotional communion: the central element of the activity of the new religious movements is focused on emotions’ manifestation.

- The fluidity of the religious message: the new religious movements have a fluid character regarding the internationalization.

The expansion of the new religious movements in the contemporary societies is favored both by objective elements, specific to the religious manifestation within society: secularization, pluralism and individualization, and by a series of subjective factors, such as: the moral and cultural specificity of a nation, linguistic similarities, different socio-economic conjectural factors, which are supporting the fast propagation of the new religious ideas etc. It is obvious that the contemporary media means represent one of the factors and some analysts considers that these, especially the television, become independent producers of religious ideas, as a consequence of creating a modern mentality based on emotion and immediate sensation.

Another subjective factor which favors the fast spreading of new form of religiosity is the religious literature (devotional literature) which abundantly supplies the Romanian literature market with books about mass psychology, practices of Eastern meditation, yoga, horoscope-astrological advises, bio-energy, bio-resonance etc.

The diversity of the religious phenomenon, the regress of the historic Churches (in Romania’s case, of the Orthodox Church, of the Roman-Catholic and Greek-Catholic Churches, as well of the Protestant ones), the emergence of the new faiths outside of the traditional institutional organized religions, and the development of a competitive religious market, give a more and more complex perspective of the religious modernity. Taking into consideration all these aspects of religious manifestation, Willaime considers that we are in a phase of

religious modernity, which he defines as being a modernity of disappointment, of the lack of utopias, a modernity becoming a strong self-critical.

Pluralism and religious competition

By offering an appropriate legal framework, the contemporary modern societies favor the development of real strategies for the religious competition between different religious actors, institutionally defined. Even if, often, this competition is seen in a subjective-pessimistic manner, being assimilated to an aggressive religious proselytism by the traditional competitors, which own the monopoly of the relations with the State, nevertheless, in the context of the religious pluralism, *the competition supplies an evident religious vitality with counter-secularization effects*. A specificity related to the notion of social modernity, especially as a functional characteristic of the democratic modern society, is the religious pluralism and the entrance of religion in the competitive logic of the free market. The religious pluralism represents an important component of the contemporary society.

The religious pluralism defines multi-religious structure of the modern democratic societies. The term *pluralism* is characteristic, especially, for the political sciences and appeared in the '60s. It is used in order to describe the functioning of the American democracy. Used in the sociological researches of the religious phenomenon, the term religious pluralism is expressing an essential attribute of the functioning of the contemporary democratic societies, being an important indicator, along with the political, cultural or economic pluralism.

According to the religious pluralism, the religious power, within a society, more exactly in the framework of the relation between the State and the Church, does not belong to one single Church or religion. The existence of the religious pluralism entails the fact that the religious power is distributed within different competitors groups, according to certain criteria of historical existence, of cultural-spiritual visibility and of numerical representativeness. None of the religious groups is not in the possession of the absolute monopoly of the relation with the State, but each has enough influence, and by consequence, enough religious power, to achieve its legitimate goals.

Consequently, in order to be able to talk about the *existence of the religious pluralism*, we should be able to talk about *religious competition*. And in order to avoid the transformation of the religious competition in an open conflict, it is necessary to have in place an adequate legal framework which provides the necessary provisions for a

functional competition. In such a framework, we could *define the religious pluralism as a form of expressing the culture of dialogue and the mutual respect between the religious actors. In the religious sociology' researches, the religion competition and the religious pluralism represent an important source of religious vitality of the society.*

The most used expression in these researches is the one of free market religious pluralism. Starting from this concept, we could develop a relevant analyze and a complete lecture about the *contemporary religious marketing*, understood as a competitive form of the free expression of the religious pluralism.

The contemporary theologian-realism and responsibility

In the light of the previous analyzed aspects, which are defining for the complex manner of the religious manifestation and of its form of expression in the contemporary society, as well as taking into account the closed analyses of the religious life in our country, in the last 15 years, we will try to identify the challenges that the contemporary theologian should face, as well as the answers or the responsibilities that he should assume within society.

We will subordinate, deliberately, the scientific objectivism to the theological subjectivism, because we consider that the public, the students of theology, is interested in having not only a neutral radiography of the contemporary Romanian socio-religious realities, but in having a clear identification of the necessary demarches to be done.

In the logic of the *social theology's* responsibilities, which the Churches and the Cults in Romania had to articulate in the context of increasing social needs of the contemporary Romanian society, as well as of the international one, the personality of the contemporary theologian, independent of his religion or belief, acquire a more and more demanding social dimension and importance.

The development of the common European space – the European Union, the unprecedented technological, financial and human freedom of movement, as well as the consequences, still not sufficiently assessed, of the world financial crises, represent also elements that should be considered in a comprehensive analysis. What do we understand by the term contemporary theologian? What are the responsibilities and the challenges that the future will pose to the theologian? What is are the role and the place of the theologian in the today society? These are questions that will help me to introduce and to

explain to you the following analyze, regarding the theologian of our time.

The contemporary theologian

I consider that the term – contemporary theologian – has a certain conflict charge, because I noticed that in Romania, many of the today theologians (allow me to exaggerate) are not contemporaries. Or to say it in a different way: the theologian of our time, and I am referring to the general meaning of the term theologian, without adding any belief or religious' specificity , no matter if he is orthodox, catholic, protestant, reformed, is Islamic or any other identity – is not responding in an appropriate manner to the contemporary society's challenges. To be contemporary – does not means *only* to live today-but to undertake a permanent intellectual and emotional effort to understand what is going on around you, it means to be in a consensus with your time! In this logic he has to express his *pragmatism* through the availability to acknowledge the challenges of the world he is living in and the *responsibility* to find the right answers to all these challenges. Therefore, the contemporary social theologian has to demonstrate, first of all, *pragmatism and responsibility*.

The historic time – creates the theological time and the socio-historic dimension postulates the socio-theological dimension. The theologian has to understand the world he is living in and has to interpret it through the beauty and the wisdom of the revealed treasure of Christianity.

In a positive manner we could identify *the contemporary theologian as being*:


- Pragmatic, politician, diplomat, architect, missionary, manufacturer, soldier, doctor, judge, social worker etc.

In a negative manner we could identify the *contemporary theologian as being*:

- Hypocrite, Pharisee, mediocre-superficial, retailer-speculator etc.

I am telling you all of these in order to emphasize the great influence that the society and the present time are exerting on the dimension and on the quality of being theologian. In the view of highlighting the complexity of these influences for the theologian's life, I have identified *a scheme* that could help us to understand easier the meaning of the *contemporary theologian*:

G.1. Graphic representation of the social influences that affect the contemporary theologian -2011



G.1. Source: direct examination of the socio-religious realities – Dr. Laurențiu D. TĂNAȘE, 2011

One can notice that we placed in the middle of our analysis the modern theologian. Although he is dedicating his worship to God, however, the theologian, responsible citizen of the society without pretending to belong to a privileged category, receives a lot of influences that he has *to balance* in order to make *his pastoral-*

missionary work, constructive for the society and not conflict or a source of social inequities.

We draw in our scheme the two defining dimensions of the life and of the activity of the missionary theologian: *the Church and the Society*. We place them in opposite seats because they have opposite expressions, both in terms of their relation with time (the Church postulates eternity, while the society postulates profane, which is temporary) and of their existential means (the Church feeds and protects the believer through the Holy services and prayers, but also through the revealed word while the society offers different existential means such as monthly salary, health insurance, different forms of social protection, etc.) Without going too much into details, I would like to comment each of the influences that are conditioning the contemporary theologian's life and activity.

The Church: The pastoral-missionary work is the main responsibility of the theologian. It must be done with faith and conviction, inner qualities that the theologian has to transmit, also, to the others. If his belief is not strong enough, he won't be able to transmit a convincing feeling to the believers that he is guiding. Religious service often means sacrifice and humbleness. If the theologian doesn't know how to exercise the self-renunciation and humbleness, when necessary, then he won't be able to pretend these from his followers. Nothing could be worse for a Church or a Cult than a false, hypocrite theologian, or even more dramatic, such kind of missionary. Sooner or later, he will become a big disappointment for his community of believers, which not only that will leave him, but will be tempted to leave the Church to which they are belonging to. Performing servicing in Christ's Church is an extremely complex task and demands special qualities, from the using of revealed word and of Holy Scriptures wisdom or of academic theology to the conduct of the necessary repairs of the worship house, to supply social assistance to vulnerable persons or to perform a protocol representation within the communities. Seriousness, punctuality, laboriousness, generosity, dedication, politeness or patience represents just a few qualities that the today theologian should have, in his quality of servant of the Christ's Church.

The Society: The contemporary theologian is not performing, metaphorically speaking, his duty in an abstract or in an aseptic environment. No! He is performing his duty within the society, and the Church with all her divine-human dimension represents a social institution amid other social institutions. Both the Church and the promoters of faith are individuals-part of a society characterized by a certain socio-historical and cultural development stage. The cultural,

historical, economic and political characteristics of the society has to be very well-acknowledged by the theologian, because they are conditioning and establishing the limits of the missionary and pastoral activity. When we define the contemporary society it is necessary to avoid an observation limited only to the Romanian society, but we have to take into account, all the time, the social reality of the European Union. We consider that, in the near future, the benchmark will be the common European society. Such an evaluation will allow us to better understand the message of Christian universalism, especially in the context of a globalized world.

The Profession: Before being a mission of serving before God, the theologian and the missionary responsibility is often seen as a profession for which you have to achieve a sustainable humanistic education, in the theological confessional schools. Being married, the theologian ensures through his job a monthly income for his family. As in any profession, in order to be better paid, the employed should prove great qualities, competitive ones, which allow him to be promoted, in time, in the administrative hierarchy of his Church, or why not, to have a bigger and a more attractive community of believers. The monthly salary should allow him to pay the health and the social insurances, as well as other current spending like those for housing, car or the last bank loan for personal needs. Therefore, the theologian-missionary duty becomes equally a missionary sacrifice and also a socio-professional obligation. The infringement of external specificity of a profession (the respect for the working hours, the availability for public relations or the financial discipline and transparency) will determine, for certain, a severe criticism from the community.

The Morality: The quality of being a theologian is not something that last only during the working hours or during some special days of the week or of the year. To be a theologian means to have, all the time, an adequate behavior and a flawless morality. It is completely wrong to see a vulgar behavior of a theologian and to try to excuse him, saying that: “he is a man, too!”. To be responsible for an exemplary Christian morality should not be translate through a successful exercise of a split personality, in public; it is not either a cheap role played for an occasional audience, but it has to be an inner feature of the theologian and to be part of his continuous education. An educated and well-mannered theologian will always be able to have a flawless morality. The moral compromises are the heaviest tests for a theologian. They should be firmly and convincingly rejected. A theologian which is moral compromised stops being a Christian model for the persons around him.

He should stop performing religious services before he starts to badly influence other people, otherwise his authority will be questioned. A theologian should not forget that the only way to live is the one that he is promoting for the others. Personal example could often be the most convincing argument from the pastoral missionary point of view.

The humanistic approach: A theologian of our time could not be either hostile or exclusivist with his fellows based on ethnic, religious or other minority criteria. His fellow should be any human being which shares the spirit of Christ. The theologian's permanent behavior should be friendly and tolerant; a humanist approach, not a forced one, but appropriated through the theological education. We live in a world in which the development stage of the society is characterized by structural criteria such as pluralism, for us being of interest now, the religious pluralism. The lack of understanding and acceptance of the religious pluralism, as part of the modern society, it means the rejection of contemporary religious diversity, and this rejection of religious diversity, inevitably leads to pathological forms of religious fundamentalism and to confrontation. To understand and to accept the contemporary religious diversity and, subsequently, the religious pluralism, means to prove the existence of a real culture of dialogue and civilization. And to be capable to have a dialogue with somebody belonging to a different confession that yours is a proof of a profound humanistic approach. The art of dialogue will allow, to a responsible theologian, to mediate even in the case of most complex conflicts. The humanist approach is the quality that should be the dominant one in the activity of the theologians in the contemporary society.

Except the aspects that we already presented and which are part of the public presence of the contemporary theologian, we have identified also, a series of other social influences, of the private nature.

The family: For a theologian, the family life represents a big challenge, for the reason that, due to the diversity of the persons and personalities who are part of it, is out of the immediate control of the theologian. Each member of the family has a different behavior, but will contribute to or will alter the image of the theologian in the society. More than that, family represents the factor with the biggest impact and direct influence on the theologian's activity. A wife, who loves expensive clothes, jewels or who likes to go regularly to spa centres, represents an even bigger concern for the theologian. He will be forced to ensure, except for the financial means needed for all of these, the good functioning of the family life, taking care, also, of the tasks neglected or abandoned by his partner. Sometimes even the wife's

insistence to go on vacation might represent a source of stress for the theologian and not only from financial point of view.

A *child* has to attend the school, then the faculty and, later, he even might start a doctorate. It became something normal for many theologians to ensure for their children to possibility to attend a school in an international language, not in the Romanian one, and to study in an American or in a European University. As the scholarships granted by the state are limited in number, we could easily understand the significant financial pressure that such a demarche puts on the family's budget, especially when we talk about a family with more than one child. Even more, we need to have in mind the needs of the older or even ill parents or in-laws who need to have the medicines ensured or even the food. It is not enough for the older members of the family to receive from the younger ones some additional amount of money to their pension, in order to be able to cover their expenses, often insignificant ones, but the most important thing for older persons is to receive the attention of their children, thus not having the feeling of being abandoned. So, the missionary activity could be strongly influenced and conditioned by the other members of the family.

The modern tendencies and selfishness: As any human being of our time, the theologian also lives under the assault of modernity and of the aggressive advertising campaigns. Many of the nowadays' theologians are using their economies or are making significant bank loans in order to buy a car produced in an Western country or a bigger house. Others, more entrepreneurs, intend to buy also a boat or a small yacht or just a trendy home – cinema system. Shouldn't we take into account also these tendencies of social consumer modernism when we analyze the social influences on the life and activity of a theologian?

The informational explosion: We've left deliberately, at the end of our analysis, the aspects related to the informational explosion, because we believe that these should be well understood, remembered and acknowledged by you, the theologians of our time, starting even from you student period. I consider that this represents the most important challenge of our time for the theologian. The contemporary theologian is not any longer the exclusive owner of information or the supreme one, often not even in field of theology. There are so many modern alternative means of information, both for children and for adults (scientific or religious TV channels, a wide range of religious book or just, the common World Wide Web, where you are able to find any information you need, from any field, the religious one included). Can we imagine, under these circumstances, what huge amount of

information should the theology analyze and learn all the time in order to have the capacity to write preaches and useful advises for the modern believers?! What kind of preparation are the theological schools promoting for the future theologians?

This should be the key question that we, the teachers of theology, responsible for the future of our students and, in the meantime, for the future of the Christ's Church, should bear in mind all the time. The contemporary theologian won't be able to engage in an intellectual competition without a proper preparation, even an encyclopedic one, which could enable them to understand and explained through faith's truths, all the scientifically challenges in the fields of archaeology or of religion (The Apocrypha Gospels- the Judas' Gospel, the Jesus' burial place, the Holy Grail, etc.). To be correctly and continuously informed represents essential requirements of the contemporary theologian's life.

The lecture was presented during the debates on the theme: *The Relation between Tradition and the Community of Faith*, organized by The Centre for Intercultural and Inter-confessional Studies (CSII) of the University "Aurel Vlaicu", Arad – Faculty of Didactic Pentecostal Theology, November 30, 2011.

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Partition of India a Bitter Irony: Probe into Manohar Malgonkar's and Salman Rushdie's Selected Fictions

Nirmalya Bhattacharyya*

Abstract:

Partition of the Indian subcontinent created such a history, which is unforgettable for many reasons. Whether the decision of partition was right or wrong is a debatable issue, but no one can debate with the fact that this partition caused a devastating violence and an unforgettable record whose memory is yet so fresh that the people of the Indian subcontinent are still carrying the burden of it. It is quite true that partition is the determining factor in forming the destiny of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Being so relevant as a literary theme, partition has been serving as an important source for many Indian writings. Due to its circumscribed readership, Indian English fictions have been able to bring out the grim phase of partition and its after-effect in a very effective way. The communal riot, the disarray of human life, the notion of secularism and the overall consequences of the partition is a vital theme of the many postcolonial Indian English fictions. The paper will try to find out the irony of partition and its impact on the society by focusing on two fictions – Manohar Malgonkar's *A Bend in the Ganges* (1964) and Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* (1980).

Keywords: communal riot, irony, partition, post-colonialism, secularism

Introduction

Partition of colonial India created two nations, India and Pakistan, keeping the human values and identity of the people at stake. The “refugee special” trains then marked the history of these two nations. Eternal human values were then supplemented by cruel communal feelings and religious identity that overpowered all other ways of being and relating to each other. Though Punjab in the North-west and Bengal

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in the East were affected mainly by this partition, it had a sturdy impact on the sociopolitical environment. The partition of India was the result of several years of political planning or a strong game plan between the then leaders of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim league and the British Government (Hasan Mushirul, 2001). This political scheming of partition resulted in a bloodbath on both sides of the border, which shattered all human values. Partition resulted in communal riots as over ten million ordinary people – Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims – were dislocated from their homes and became refugees, at least a million were killed in retaliatory violence undertaken by members of all three communities while thousands of women were abducted, raped, and, in many instances, forced to commit suicide to preserve the ‘honor’ of their communities (Gopal, 2009: 69).

The enormous loss of property, the number of persons beaten, injured, tortured, raped, abducted and otherwise physically assaulted can be measured approximately, but the emotional pain of partition from home, family, nears and dears and friends is by its nature immeasurable and more tormenting than the physical trauma. Partition is actually a trauma for people of the subcontinent from which they have not been able to recover fully yet. In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention that the irony of history writing is predominantly directed towards nationalism and independence and has therefore never been able to bring forth the trauma of the partition in its narrative. The history writing which is prone to nationalist narratives tells the story of the causes and happenings that brought our independence. Similarly, some of the earlier writings about partition predominantly written in Hindi, Urdu and other Indian local languages focus much on scenes of bloodshed to evoke a feeling of disgust in the reader, for all they seem to portray are the demented hatred between the Hindus and the Muslims at that time in India (Bhalla Alok, 1999). The same is also true in the context of Indian English Novel writing.

In handling the partition theme, the Indian English novels have shown a gradual change. Initially these novels portrayed the crude reality and facts of partition, but gradually the Indian English fiction writers went on to show the irony of the partition; along with this, they also concentrated on the after-effect of partition. Manohar Malgonkar’s *A Bend in the Ganges* (1964) and Salman Rushdie’s *Midnight’s Children* (1980) clearly deviates from the conventional representation of the partition theme in the Indian English novels.

Manohar Malgonkar's *A Bend in the Ganges* (1964) – A Critic to the Events of Partition

Partition stories have been very popular in Indian literary arena. It has been highlighted frequently in many of the Indian English fictions. However, the way Khushwant Singh has introduced the same violence and the deformed shape of the society in his novel *Train to Pakistan* is somewhat unparallel in Indian English fictions history. Therefore, it is obvious that the attention the novel *Train to Pakistan* has received among the readers, as well as among the critics is more than Manohar Malgonkar's *A Bend in the Ganges*. Manohar Malgonkar's *A Bend in the Ganges* is more of a critical study of Indian partition than a heartbreaking narrative of the situation. In fact, Manohar Malgonkar is almost underestimated as a novelist in Indian English literary arena. It is quite true of Malgonkar that "branded as an entertainer and storyteller, the deeper qualities of his fiction have been neglected or unperceived by many. There are only two full-length studies on his fiction by academic critics, namely G.S. Amur and James Y. Dayananda. N.S. Pradhan takes up only one of the novels – *A Bend in the Ganges* – for a detailed analysis. H.M. Williams too does not make a sustained study of Malgonkar's fiction" (Padmanabhan, 2002).

Among his all other works, *A Bend in the Ganges* is the most popular and appreciated novel. The novel "is racy, packed with events, has frequent surprises and twists in the plot and a liberal dose of love and romance, not to mention its representation of an action-packed history. Yet, the novel is no cheap-thrill best-seller, but actually a work of deep political introspection, and arguably one of the best novels that Malgonkar ever wrote" (Rituparna, 2010: 48). The novel *A Bend in the Ganges* is more of a political documentation starting from the Non-cooperation movement to the Partition. The content of the novel moves around this time and the political incidents that took place during that period form the core of this fiction. Throughout the novel, Malgonkar is more concerned with the reason of the partition and, therefore, the historical events highlighted in the novel are not mere documentation of the history but rather a search to find 'why' the partition took place. Malgonkar not only concentrated on the national events that influenced the Indian political activities, but also concentrated on international events that also made their mark on Indian future political course of action. The depiction of the First World War is done in the novel to the search of the reason of the partition in a border perspective.

Malgonkar tried to address two major questions in the novel: first of all, can Hindu and Muslim really get united or stay together; secondly,

is non-violence really a practicable form of demonstration or political activity? These two questions are worked out, and the documentation of the times is embodied through the narrative strategy of the “employment of double-heroes who represent two opposing political ideologies – revolutionary terrorism and non-violence, respectively. These protagonists are Debi Dayal, the committed revolutionary terrorist, and Gian Talwar, the professed follower of Gandhi (but who sways with every wind and unscrupulously uses other people for his own purposes) and they are both directly involved in political action” (Rituparna, 2010: 49). These two characters are used to broach an important issue: out of these two ideologies which ideology people of this country should adopt for the existence of the nation and the existence of the two communities.

Along with the issue of ideology conflict, Malgonkar has tried in his novel to address a very complex issue of Indian social structure. Though, Hindus and Muslims have lived together for years after years, they do not share the same social dynamics and therefore they have always maintained a distance in the society. Malgonkar has tried to address this inner current of Indian society, which is also a defining factor in the partition of this country. Though, the British government has operated fully in dividing the two countries, Malgonkar has tried to point out the fact that there is inner lacuna within our society which has made it easier for the British to separate this nation. In alignment with this opinion, the narrator of the novel says: “Religious differences among the races of India were the root cause of the country’s slavery, and the British had learnt to take the fullest advantage of these differences, playing the Hindus against the Muslims and the Sikhs against both” (Malgonkar, 1964: 56).

In Chapter 8 of the novel, we can see the terrorist group “Freedom Fighters” (of which Debi is an active member) for the first time; and find Debi’s leader, Shafi Usman, categorically declaring: “The only saving grace of the Nationalist movement is gone, it is no longer united, no longer secular” (Malgonkar, 1964: 78). This particularly indicates that the novel tries to point out to the very fact that the Hindus and the Muslims were no way united and therefore partition may have occurred. It was in 1929 that Debi had begun to have doubts about the unity of these two communities. When all his boys eagerly volunteer for a new assignment, the burning of a plane stranded in the military aerodrome in Duriabad, he feels a “[...] surge of pride [...] and for the first time that evening he wondered how long it could be maintained. [...] How long would it be before the flames of communal hatred caught up with them?” (Malgonkar, 1964: 86). Towards the end of the 1920s, a new fissure had been created between the Hindus and the Muslims following

the Congress and the League's final parting after the publication of the Nehru report in 1928 (Hasan, 1979: 26). In the novel, Shafi's leader, Hafiz, is shown writing to him from Bombay complaining about the callousness of the Hindus towards the Muslims, suggesting that they should reorient their activities. This question of differences between the Hindus and the Muslims and the undercurrent of distrust and hatred between these two communities has been represented with utmost care and efficiency in the novel.

Starting with the commencement of the Gandhian era of freedom struggle, the novel goes on to represent the events thereafter as they took place and ends with the depiction of the Punjab riots which was the result of Partition politics. Therefore, it is an action pact novel which ultimately tries to explore, through the depiction of historical incidents, as "why" the partition has taken place. With the dual hero narrative style and by the depictions of historical incidents where the protagonists are actively present, Malgonkar "shows his protagonists as directly involved in each of the events enumerated above, in some way or the other. Their lives are driven by these stupendous happenings which just carry them along" (Malgonkar, 1964: 92). At the very beginning of the novel, it is shown that, being convicted, both Debi and Gian are deported to the Andamans by the British. Their lives, though moved in the same direction, follow a very different route after this incident. While Gian is a favorite with the officials in the Cellular Jail, Debi becomes the hero of the convicts because of his pride and uncompromising attitude even in the face of torture. Debi becomes the spokesperson of the convicts and deals with the Japanese colonel Yamaki on their behalf. After that, with the help of Yamaki, Debi joins the Japanese Indian army, and goes to Rangoon. However, following the British evacuation there, he lands in Assam and gets a job as an assistant stockman of the Silent Hill tea garden. At the end of the war and after a period of intense restlessness, he leaves Assam and comes down to Calcutta to meet his former terrorist friend Bose. Gian, as he was never concerned about the fate of his country, escapes from the island and reaches Madras, and with a calculated strategy gets a job in Bombay.

Therefore, the novel shows how both the protagonists live through the same historical events differently. As Malgonkar has drawn them, Debi Dayal is a committed revolutionary while Gian (somewhat uneasily) accepts Gandhi's philosophy. Through them, Malgonkar focuses on certain key issues that lay at the heart of the ideological clash between Gandhi's non-violence followers and the revolutionary terrorists of the day. *A Bend in the Ganges* records the transformation of

Revolutionary Terrorism into Fundamentalism and shows how a historic non-violent struggle against an imperial power ironically gave way to unprecedented communal violence and savagery. Debi at one point asks Bose a very pertinent question: “Do you think the Congress movement has been just as much of a failure as ours?” to which Bose replies, “It is an even greater failure” (Malgonkar, 1964: 300)

A careful reading of *A Bend in the Ganges* points out to the authors’ search for the “whys” of the Partition. As a critic of the incidents happened around him, Malgonkar was less interested in the happening of the incidents because of the partitions than in examining the fault and follies that were the reason of such incidents. The novel thus looks into the insight of partition and penetrates to the uneasy ‘transformation of a colonized country into a sovereign state, the difficult passage from the familiar shackles of bondage to the disturbing challenges of freedom’ (Padmanabhan, 2002: 110).

Rushdie’s *Midnight’s Children* (1980) – A Bitter Irony on Partition

Salman Rushdie’s Booker Prize winning novel *Midnight’s Children* was the first major Indian fiction that earned worldwide recognition. *Midnight’s Children* was undoubtedly the first Indian English fiction that put the Indian English novel on the world literary canon and paved the way for the future generation novelists to extend their literary work to the international reader. The global readership of the novel is immense and it earned tremendous appreciation. Malcolm Bradbury, the chairman of the judges of the prize commented on the novel as ‘a genuine contribution to fiction, a brilliant experimental novel that is also a very funny book’ (Bradbury, 1994). In fact, this novel is “a national history, a fable, an epic, a coming-of-age story, and a political Bildungsroman, or a novel of political education. *Midnight’s Children* also exploits a range of literary and cultural resources from allegory, satire, and surrealism to Hindi cinema, Hindu mythology, science fiction, detective novels, American ‘westerns’, political slogans, and advertising jingles” (Gopal, 2009: 91).

The importance of the novel as a partition text is not because of its narration of the historical events but because of its highlighting the situation of post-partition. As William Walsh says, “[...] a novel unprecedented in scope and manner in the history of the Indian novel in English as it deals with the theme of Partition in a very unique manner. For, of virtually all the Indian English novels that deal with the Partition, *Midnight’s Children* is the only novel that takes within its ambit both the Partition of 1947 which divided the subcontinent into a

secular India and a Muslim Pakistan, as well as the later division of the two wings of Islamic Pakistan into two separate nations, Pakistan and Bangladesh, in 1971” (1990: 122).

The narrative of the novel begins long before the birth of the protagonist Saleem Sinai. It gradually moves towards the history of modern India with Saleem’s grandfather Aadam Aziz’s life history after his return to Kashmir from Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century; then it goes on to narrate the tragic flight of Saleem’s businessman father, Ahmed Sinai, in the independent “secular” India and later in Pakistan; and at the end the novel shows the birth of Ahmed Sinai’s son, Aadam, who represents the promise of a more realistic generation than the earlier ones. Interestingly, these three generations show the entire history of the Indian subcontinent starting from the Jallianwalabagh massacre of 1919 to the Emergency of 1977. It is quite interesting to note that Rushdie himself was not interested in considering the novel as a partition novel. In an interview Rushdie said: “Khushwant Singh’s *Train to Pakistan* is about the only good book on that theme. *Midnight’s Children* uses the partition somewhat at a distance because the action is in Bombay” (Michael R. (ed.), 2000). But a critical study of the novel shows that the novel is at least in two ways related to partition. First of all *Midnight’s Children* not only deals with the partitions of India but also goes on to narrate the partition of Pakistan into Bangladesh; and secondly, the characters of the novel live in all three partitioned states – India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

There are two chapters in Book I of *Midnight’s Children* that deal with the event of the Partition, the chapter entitled *Methwold’s Estate* which is the prelude to the end of Book I, and “Tick, Tock”, the very last chapter of the first book. Methwold in the novel is a reluctantly departing colonial who sells his estate in Bombay to a select group of the city’s Indian elite (one of whom is Saleem’s father Ahmed) before finally leaving India’s shores. Both Methwold and the selling of his property are significant, for Methwold sells his estate (consisting of four identical houses built in European style and named after the royal palaces of Europe) on two conditions. These conditions, which display his reluctance to let go his erstwhile holdings, were that, firstly, the houses should be purchased with every last thing still in them and that their “entire contents” were to be retained by the “new owners”; and secondly, that “the actual transfer should not take place until midnight on August 15” (Rushdie, 1980: 95). The transfer of assets at Methwold’s estate is thus both a metaphor and a parody of the political transfer of power that was happening in India at that time. Apart from

this incident, Methwold himself is significant to the novel as he is the biological father of Saleem. This particular incident is more significant of all other incidents as it draws a bitter irony to the birth of the nation itself. As Saleem, the “chosen child of midnight”, turns out to be an Anglo-Indian, the illegitimate child of Methwold, it also shows the faith of the country who is a product of British rule, a country who will also bear the identity of its colonizer willingly or unwillingly. Rushdie seems to be arguing that the new state that came into being on 15 August 1947 was Indian in its color, composition and make-up, but its pedigree was unmistakably British (Roy, 2010: 93).

Through his novel *Midnight's Children* Rushdie has questioned the very idea of India. According to Rushdie, though India came into existence by the effort of a “collective will”, the life of its citizens as a whole did not move in the same direction. As a “secular” democratic country, it was expected of India to show equal treatment to every one of its citizen. But as Rushdie showed it in the novel, the country delivered totally different treatment to its Muslim population at the beginning years of independence. Rushdie depicted the fate of India's Muslims through the fortunes of the Sinai family in the novel, by showing how they and their relatives shifted from one city to another on the subcontinent in search of stability and a life full of fortune. In this regard, it is quite important to remember that Rushdie's own family had suffered a similar fate in 1947. After the publication of the novel Rushdie himself said: “My own family, like so many of Muslim origin, was cut in half by partition. My parents opted to stay in Bombay, and so did my two uncles and their families, but my aunts and their families went to West Pakistan, as it was called until 1971 [...]. We were lucky, escaping the worst of the bloodletting, but our lives were defined and shaped by the frontier separating us” (Rushdie, 2003: 176). The novel thus shows the disintegration and peculiar predicament of the Muslim community on the subcontinent for whom neither the Independence, nor the Partition managed to deliver the promised goods. Indeed, the course of events as set out in *Midnight's Children* clearly shows that between the “secularism” of independent India and the stifling of all civic freedoms in Islamic Pakistan, the Muslims of the subcontinent had very little to choose from.

“The single-most outstanding feature of Rushdie's representation of the Partition in *Midnight's Children* is neither the delineation of the magic moment of ‘the midnight hour’ of 15 August 1947, nor the many and varying experiences of the Sinai family in Bombay and Karachi in the first two decades of the newly created nations' existence. It is rather the depiction of the genocide that preceded the Bangladesh War of

Independence. In fact, it is the depiction of this second partition of the subcontinent in *Midnight's Children* that needs special focus as it throws up a number of vital questions regarding some of the fundamental issues that were at stake in 1947, and which were (as the history of the new nation states were to prove) in no way resolved by dividing the subcontinent on the basis of religion. It is the third part of *Midnight's Children* that deals with this second division of the subcontinent" (Roy, 2010: 101). As Book II of the novel sums up the Indo-Pak War of 1965, the Book III begins with the 1971 war of East and West Pakistan. The first war according to Saleem was aimed at annihilating his family, and the second war to reunite him with his friends and his old life.

Only three chapters deal with the representation of the Bangladesh War: *The Buddha*, *In the Sunderbans* and *Sam and the Tiger*, respectively. However, it is basically the first and third chapters that deal with the war or, more specifically, with the political development in Pakistan in a single year, between December 1970 when Mujib-ur-Rahman's Awami League swept the country's polls, and December 1971 when Bangladesh came into being. What happens in the five intervening years between 1965 and 1970 – both in Pakistan and in Saleem's life – is summarized in a few paragraphs at the beginning of this section. In Rushdie's depiction, the war itself is ironic and ambiguous since it is a war defined by utter confusion as all the parties involved – Pakistan's West wing, East wing and India – are all shown to be highly confused as to their aims and objectives. In a fundamental way, the Bangladesh chapters in *Midnight's Children* question the very idea of a pan-Indian/ pan-Islamic identity. The Bangladesh War of Independence was replete with surprises; and in *Midnight's Children*, Rushdie does manage to convey the dramatic way in which it unfolded right from the start to the finish. We are told how, in March 1971, West wing forces; with the help of crack troops (of which Saleem's "cutia" unit is a part) wreak havoc on unsuspecting civilians in Dacca. However, by December 1971 (i.e. within nine months), the course of the war changes dramatically, and this time, it is the Mukti Bahini volunteers who terrorize West wing officials and soldiers alike in the East wing. Within a short while, in fact, things are shown to speed up even more in the novel, so that it would all be over in three short weeks. What would remain is a devastated Pakistan – having sustained losses of half of her navy, a third of her army, a fourth of her air force, and, after her general (Tiger Niazi) surrendered (Niazi, Lt-Gen.(R)A.A.K., *The*

Betrayal of East Pakistan, USA, Oxford University Press, 1998), half of her population as well.

The chapters that deal with the Bangladesh war show people's decimation of their own brethren, which is the most piteous of all. The brutality of the Bangladesh war is depicted here realistically, which points out to the irony of the partition, as the partition brought a war, which is not a war against an external enemy but a war with one's own people. It is an acknowledgement of the enormity of the error of the partition and manifests the irony of the intended purpose of partition.

Conclusions

There are differences regarding the reasons that lead to the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Instead of differences in opinion regarding the theories behind partition it is an indubitable truth that the Partition of the Indian subcontinent, apart from being tragic, was also profoundly ironic as none of the three major players got what they wanted. Shearing off eastern Punjab and western Bengal (including Calcutta), Jinnah only got the "maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten" (Bose; Jalal, 2004: 160) Pakistan which he had rejected out of hand in 1944 and then again in 1946. For the Congress, the final release from the British Empire came "only by compromising on the two main principles of the Indian nationalist creed since the late 1920s – unity and full independence" (Bose; Jalal, 2004: 162).

For not only was India partitioned when she finally gained her freedom (entailing a total reversal of all that the Indian National Congress had stood for), but her leaders also accepted 'Dominion Status' rather than the full independence to which they had been committed since the adoption of the 'Purna Swaraj' resolution at Lahore in 1929' (Roy, 2010: 17–18). After so many years, the legacy of 1947 emerges larger than ever before on the psyche of the people of the subcontinent. Partition is actually a trauma for people of the subcontinent from which they have not been able to recover fully yet. The notions behind the partition have also exposed the irony in a bitter way. One of such notions is obviously the "two nations" theory. The historians and the politicians related to Pakistan argue in favour of the "two nations" theory and believe that the Pakistani nation is an inevitable outcome of the desire of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent to establish their identity and to remain a distinctive community, being separated from the Hindu community. The passionate articulation of this theory can be traced in Aitzaz Ahsan's *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan* (Ahsan, 1996).

This very notion of “two nations” theory got shattered in the 1971 war and by the partition of Pakistan into Bangladesh. Novelists like Rushdie have therefore aptly pointed out towards the irony of the partition by depicting the tragedy of Bangladesh war. On the other hand, the politicians and historians belonging to the main stream Indian nationalism accuse British policy for separating the Hindus and Muslims in the name of separate countries which will all also tear apart the bond between these two communities. According to the followers of this perspective, the partition of the Indian subcontinent was a result of the “divide and rule” policy of the British by which they wanted to separate the Hindus and Muslims forever. However, this idea of accusing the British is also been put into question by novelists like Malgonkar, which takes us to the bitter truth of partition and the scarcity of reasons behind the partition. Moreover, in *Midnight’s Children* Rushdie has sternly criticized the notion of secular Indian and communal Pakistan by depicting the state of the Muslims in these two countries. Whatever the reason may be, the partition of India will always serve as an irony to the faith of the nation. The Indian English fictions have depicted various aspects of India’s partition, but novels like *Bend in the Ganges* and *Midnight’s Children* will share a different position for presenting the ironies of the Indian’s partition.

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REVIEW ARTICLES

JESS

Privirea și cuvântul

Dumitru Mărcuș*

Prezentul literar macedonean este deschis către zonele configurate de tradiție, de experiențele estetice moderne și postmoderne, diferențiate și expresive. Într-un cuvânt, emulație și tensiune creatoare. În spațiul cultural traversat de poezia lumii (Struga – capitala mondială a poeziei, an de an, în august), de proza confirmată de un recent premiu european (Goce Smilevski cu romanul *Sora lui Sigmund Freud*), de dramaturgia și arta regizorală (Goran Stefanovski), cartea își are locul, distincția, recunoașterea și prețuirea cuvenite.

Cartea străină – semn al literaturilor consacrate, scriitorii – reperi ale dialogului și arta traducerii – semn al polivalenței codului lingvistic sunt, la un loc, indiciile actualității. În modelul cultural macedonean întâlnim asimilată, la un anumit nivel, experiența postmodernismului, mai cu seamă că, în dramaturgie, curentul astfel numit, dar fără o explicitare teoretică, are o carieră bine definită. Același model este caracterizat astăzi printr-o dimensiune pregnantă a vizualului; al celui cotidian, al celui plastic, al celui filmic sau livresc. Ochiul caută, percepe, reține și recompune atribuind sensuri imaginilor ce i se oferă. Există și o prezență a monumentalității, o nevoie de a regăsi tradițiile identitare, fixată în peisajul cotidian prin corporalitatea statuiilor, exprimând o istorie legitimantă.

1. Mircea Cărtărescu, *Nostalgia* – experiență a posmodernismului românesc.

Editura *Ikona* – Skopje, a cărei strategie culturală este situată în prim-planul modelului cultural macedonean actual, a optat în anul 2012 pentru o prezență românească de prestigiu în acest ansamblu atât de

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dinamic și divers (lansarea cărții a avut loc în data de 20 aprilie). Parcă auzim cuvintele lui Mircea Cărtărescu analizând proza românească a anilor '80. „Observația noilor medii sociale nu era posibilă cu mijloacele prozei anilor '60 sau '70. Și acest lucru nu înseamnă doar că fiecare realitate cere o anumită abordare stilistică (ceea ce ar duce la un fel de subordonare a literaturii față de real): reversul este la fel de adevărat: realitatea, care nu există ca atare este construită, devenind *realitate semnificativă artistică*, printr-o acțiune textuală” (*Postmodernismul românesc*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1999, p. 409).

În literatura macedoneană – sumar considerată – experiența postmodernistă este prezentă, căutările hiperrealiste (Gilles Lipovetski) se situează în peisaj, dar precizarea teoretică amintită mai sus, se deschide spre public invitându-l la o receptare nuanțată.

Nostalgia, sau îngemănarea nuvelor, *Ruletistul*, *Mendebilul*, *Gemenii*, *REM* și *Arhitectul* propune tocmai o astfel de realitate; construită și semnificativă artistică. Traducerea scriitorului macedonean Ermis Lafazanovski se întemeiază pe regăsirea trăirilor legate de o perioadă a vieții sale petrecută în România (vezi interviul). Avem deci enunțat criteriul opțiunii traducătorului și, implicit, sunt sugerate și modalitățile de realizare a transpoziției. În exegeza românească s-a făcut observația că, deși diferite, nuvelele prezintă o unitate. Argumentele următoare vor pune în evidență această unitate subliniind și modul în care Mircea Cărtărescu împlinește prin text viziunea sa asupra realului. În această perspectivă s-a situat și traducătorul având conștiința viziunii autorului și realizând prin eforturi considerabile o traducere remarcabilă.

Pentru Mircea Cărtărescu principiile postmodernismului standard sunt repere care trebuie convertite într-o viziune proprie prin practica textuală. Și iată elementele care demonstrează tocmai personalizarea principiilor și implicit dimensiunea axiologică a textului lui Cărtărescu.

(a) Nuvelele cuprind o accentuată latură biografică: „Stau cu pătura pe mine la masa de scris și totuși mi-e oribil de frig” (*Ruletistul*); „... ca în cazul meu, destinul copiilor care se jucau pe atunci în spatele blocului meu de pe Ștefan cel Mare... Blocul are 8 etaje... Blocul se află în stadiul de finisare” (*Mendebilul*); „... acum când ne plimbam pe traseele noastre de pe Pitar Moș, Bulevard, Piața Cosmonauților”; „O garsonieră minusculă spre marginea Capitalei... Bloc de garsoniere confort trei” (*REM*); „Nu am putut să termin de corectat tezele pentru că brusc îmi erupeau pe luciul creierului imagini palide, imagini care mă chinuie și când îi ascult pe elevi” (*Mendebilul*).

(b) Realismul nuvelor este dat de descrierea interioarelor, a exterioarelor, a obiectelor (liste întregi) semnificând lumea obiectuală și

variantea *kitsch* a *existenței* (termen propriu lui Mircea Cărtărescu), a tipologiilor și a atmosferei. Realismul sordidului, al cenușiului, dar și *kitsch*-ul sunt duse până la un hiperrealism. Din atât de bogatele trimiteri la diversitatea operelor literare și artistice se pot reține exemple pentru acest vector al scriiturii.

(c) Visul este unul din termenii relației, realitate–halucinație–vis la care autorul ajunge fără o „rupere de nivel”, ci în mod natural, potrivit reprezentării în care textul și realul se contopesc: „Visez enorm, colorat în demență, am în vis senzații pe care nu le încerc niciodată în realitate” (*Mendebilul*). Și, imediat, sunt enumerate două prezențe constitutive literaturii: **scriitorul**, care pierde „cu fiecare vis povestit un **cititor**”. Autorul *Nostalgiei*, diferit de alte experiențe postmoderniste românești, nu face neapărat din cititor un personaj al scrierilor sale. Mai mult, el, autorul, este un cititor; „citeam în primul rând poezie” (*Gemenii*) și „fiecare lectură era pentru mine o nouă viață. Am fost pe rând, cu toată ființa mea, Camus, Kafka, Sartre, Celine, Bacovia, Voronca, Rimbaud și Valery”. Livrescul este atotputernic; comparațiile, rând pe rând, sunt în fapt trimiteri la creații celebre, muzicale, plastice, cinematografice, literare. Aceste trăsături individualizante sunt, din perspectiva traducerii, nu atât dificultăți de ordin lexical, ci de redare a atmosferei, a cromaticii și a senzațiilor percepute ca fiind atât de bogate în nuanțe. Simțul limbii și percepția plastică a textului cărtărescian au făcut ca în traducere, aspectele amintite să-și păstreze expresivitatea prin munca aplicată a lui Ermis Lafazanovski.

(d) Jocul, caracterizat printr-un cumul de atribute (funcție elementară a vieții omenești, impuls liber, rațiune în sensul că instituie reguli ș.a.) și prin sincretismul artelor, este prezent în proza postmodernistă sub forme multiple: jocuri ale copiilor (tradiționale sau imaginate), jocuri de societate, jocuri de limbaj realizate prin text și prezente în text. Ideea lui Mallarmé de a realiza *Cartea (Le Livre)* printr-un joc în care sunt distribuite elementele expresive, de la caracteristicile tipografice la împrumuturi din artele vizuale și sonore în scopul perceperii textului cu toate simțurile, nu este străină nici lui Cărtărescu. Doar că acesta include jocul în contexte situaționale dramatice și ascunde întotdeauna o simbolică stimulată de senzații și configurată de narațiune cumulativ, până la hiperbolizare. Exemplare sunt descrierile din *Ruletistul*, *Mendebilul* și în bună parte *REM*, iar hiperbola mașinii (Dacia 1300) înzestrată cu claxoane mereu mai expresive – traducerea nu „scapă” subtextul și ironia – până la sunetele celebrei melodii a formației Rolling Stones, *Satisfaction*, se dilată la scară cosmică, producând armonii cu sintetizatorul Mishiba până la

explozia solară. Ermis Lafazanovski, urmând traiectul de idei, surprinde subtilitățile încheind nuvela cu varianta macedoneană a propoziției; „O galaxie tânără se rotea acum, zvâcnind și pulsând pe locul celei vechi”. Și sensul românesc arată o lume nouă care s-a născut, translația vorbind despre același aspect printr-o echivalență inspirată. În arta ca joc, jocul poate fi definit ca o „sete de generalitate” (Wittgenstein), pentru că există ceva comun jocurilor ceea ce îndreptățește folosirea noțiunii de „joc”. Nuvelele cărtăresciene, ca și de altfel, în grade diferite, opera sa de până acum, cuprind elementele care permit o astfel de generalizare. Dacă punem în relație ideea că arta este expresie, iar opera de artă este expresie completă, jocul apare ca element expresiv al acestei completitudini. Originalitatea lui Mircea Cărtărescu este dată, printre altele, și de modul în care știe ca autor să așeze jocul în structura semnificațiilor întregului. Acest aspect este mai dificil pentru traducător, nevoit să recurgă la perifraze sau la digresiuni, să le concentreze pentru a putea susține ritmul narațiunii. Exemplu: titlul *Ruletistul* nu a putut fi tradus în sensul de identitate obiectivă ca și în limba română, ci a fost nevoie de parafrază: *Omul căruia îi plăcea ruleta rusească*.

(e) Portretul este o modalitate a literaturii postmoderne prin care sunt introduse în cuprinsul secvențelor narrative elemente generatoare de sensuri. Cel puțin trei sunt modalitățile în care portretul nu mai funcționează ca element de identitate (fizică și psihică) a personajului, ci dobândește o funcție polisemantică. Primul element folosit de autor care multiplică sensul este **deformarea** trăsăturilor: „... o figură posomorâtă, o față triunghiulară cu gât lung, gălbui și slab, o piele uscată și părul stacojiu. Ochi de maimuță amărâtă, asimetrici, mi se pare că inegali ca mărime”. Reflexul chipului în oglinda deformantă este prezent chiar dacă în locul imaginii din oglindă se vorbește de imaginea de film, imagini de reportaj realist, de culori, de scintilații, lumini artificiale sau celeste. Chipul apare mereu deformat, cu o dominantă caracteristică având semnificații deosebite. Elementul multiplicator următor este **portretul în mișcare**. În *REM* (Rapid Eyes Moving), Svetlana este descrisă de autorul-păianjen astfel: „Își scoate mânușile, apoi haina de blană, scurtă... își smulge basmaua colorată... Pare să aibă vreo treizeci și cinci de ani. Nu are o față frumoasă, ci mai curând ciudată... E goală până la brâu, și cu părul zbârlit în toate părțile, vopsit în acel negru artificial, ca al vameșului Rousseau...”. Cel de-al treilea element prezent cu funcția amintită este **portretul fantastic**, întâlnit cu deosebire în *REM*. În lucrarea despre postmodernism, Cărtărescu exemplifică opere ale curentului respectiv vorbind despre „efectul Godard”, efect provenit din imaginea filmelor regizorului francez Jean Luc Godard și care, filmând obiectele reale în cadre clare, la montajul secvențelor apar cu

totul disparate. Revine spectatorului/cititorului rolul de a întregi imaginea coerent și de a-i conferi semnificații. Traducătorul a rezolvat ansamblul ridicat de tehnicile portretului procedând prin ceea ce se numește corespondență pragmatică și îmbinând propoziția cu perifraza și a respectat succesiunea secvențelor narative.

Argumentele prezentate au rolul de a indica două registre care personalizează scrierea lui Mircea Cărtărescu: registrul tehnicilor de elaborare a textului și, cel mai important, registrul stilistic. Vrând-nevrând, literatura este modalitatea de comunicare expresiv–afectivă și generatoare de semnificații artistice.

2. Autor–text–traducător

În structura cărții *Nostalgia* (ediție integrală, Editura Humanitas, 1993, textul de bază al traducerii) autorul indică dramatismul ei și prin dispunerea nuvelor: *Prolog (Ruletistul)*, *Nostalgia (Mendebilul, Gemenii și REM)* și *Epilog (Arhitectul)*. Traducătorul/cititorul poate fi stârnit de o nedumerire. Denunțându-și statutul, autorul scrie: „voi scrie nu ca să vă construiesc o poveste, ci să exorcizez o obsesie, să-mi apăr bietul suflet de monstru, de monstru groaznic nu prin hidoșenie, ca la Kafka, ci prin frumusețe. Mă gândesc acum și la îngerul insuportabil de frumos al lui Rilke...”. O primă dilemă este legată de genul căreia îi aparține scrierea (dramatic prin structură și epic prin text). Tensiunea dramatică, prezentă ca trăsătură unitară, este sugerată de împărțirea amintită. Deși autorul enunță „ca romanticii...”, refuză viziunea aceasta și se detașează ironic spunându-ne: „sunt, după cum știți un prozator de ocazie. Nu scriu decât pentru voi, dragi prieteni, și pentru mine”. Și pentru a (ne) deruta și mai mult subliniază: „...literatura nu e mijlocul potrivit prin care poți spune ceva cât de cât real despre tine”. Acestea sunt strategii prin care autorul este prezent în desfășurarea acțiunii și, în aceeași măsură, dialoghează cu cititorii. Proza postmodernistă – și Cărtărescu nu face excepție – pune în evidență prin text și funcția fatică și cea conotativă, indicate prin adresarea către cititor și prin folosirea persoanei a doua (pronume și verb).

În poetica lui Roman Jakobson sunt originare teoriile traducerii discutate în prezent. Omogenitatea semnificantului și a semnificatului conduce la ceea ce Meschonnic numește traducere–descentrare și care este „un raport textual între două limbi sau culturi, care vizează însăși structura lingvistică a limbii, aceasta constituindu-se ca valoare în sistemul textului” (apud Camelia Petrescu, *Pentru o poetică a traducerii*).

În cazul traducerii *Nostalgiei*, descentrarea înseamnă satisfacerea condițiilor prin care cele două limbi cu structuri diferite pot să asigure circuitul comunicațional pentru opera amintită. Dificultățile legate de traducere apar în toate compartimentele limbii. Experiența culturală îndelungată în domeniul traducerii din poezia românească îndeosebi, prezența neîntreruptă a poezilor și poeziei românești la *Serile de poezie de la Struga*, de-a lungul celor cinci decenii de manifestare, au format un corp de traducători și un context de receptare fertil pentru prezența valorilor românești. Proza însă a fost vitregită, îndeosebi cea postmodernă. Cu atât mai mare e meritul scriitorului Ermis Lafazanovski când a optat pentru un asemenea act de cultură.

Sub pana traducătorului, limba macedoneană a fost condusă la îndeplinirea celor două condiții fundamentale; prima, să găzduiască, să primească favorabil limba română, și acest lucru s-a întâmplat prin munca susținută a celui care a căutat și a găsit echivalențe semantice și stilistice. Cea de-a doua, mai dificilă, a fost satisfăcută prin efortul de a recrea după modelul limbii române conținutul textului cărtărescian. Dificultățile legate de lipsa articolului în macedoneană, de timpurile verbelor, de lexicul în care coexistă termeni interșanjabili au fost depășite tocmai prin forțarea limitelor inteligibilității.

Prin Editura Ikona participăm la un act de cultură, într-un dialog deschis în orizontul valorilor identitare. Traducerea operei lui Mircea Cărtărescu înseamnă o nouă situație a literaturii române în modelul cultural al prezentului globalizant.

Scriitorul și traducătorul interviu cu Ermis Lafazanovski*, realizat de Dumitru Mărcuș**

*„O mare parte din copilăria mea,
adică primii zece ani, am petrecut-o în România, la Brașov”*

D. M.: — Stimate domnule Ermis Lafazanovski, circuitele culturale româno-macedonene sunt consolidate istoric. Literatura celor două tipuri de spiritualitate se află la un nivel de comunicare actual. Vă rog să descrieți repererele literaturii macedonene actuale. Nu omiteți propria creație.

E. L.: — Eu însumi sunt dovada că literaturile română și macedoneană comunică frecvent. În istoria culturilor noastre, mereu erau entuziaști care țineau împreună literatura (cu toate că aceste legături erau și încă sunt destul de slabe). Dacă nu mă înșel, chiar și în jurul lui Eminescu, când făcea studiile la Viena, era un macedonean. Literatura macedoneană, ca și celelalte literaturi din regiune, crede că are puterea să se descopere în fața Europei, nu ca o literatură care e interesantă numai ca literatură necunoscută, mistică și folclorică (exotică), ci ca literatură care este egală cu literaturile din restul Europei din punct de vedere al ideilor și obsesiilor literare. Scriitorii tineri nu mai stau acasă așteptând ca literatura lor să fie descoperită de „cineva”, ci se duc la acel „cineva” și bat la ușă. Cultura și literatura noastră așteaptă ca din cantitatea celor care bat la ușile literare din Europa, să se găsească și lucrări de calitate. Literatura mea, deocamdată, e tradusă în câteva limbi balcanice. În limba română am câteva povestiri scurte.

D. M.: Paradigma postmodernă a literaturii are concretizări, unele chiar anterioare stabilirii înainte principiilor teoretice, în creația de aici. Piesa *Jane Zadrogaz* a lui Goran Stefanovski, marea revelație de la

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BITEF 1974, poezia și scrierile critice ale Katiței Kulafkova, eseurile Lidiei Dimkovska, opera lui Risto Vasilevski, (cel mai tânăr academician), premiul european din anul trecut a lui Goce Smilevski, pentru *Sora lui Sigmund Freud*, arată și deschiderea unui public către perceperea modelelor culturale dinamice. Vorbiți-mi despre strategiile și orientările în traduceri.

E. L.: În Macedonia se traduc cel mai mult cărți de calitate *second-hand*, scrise de scriitori de care nimeni nu a auzit niciodată nimic, pentru că cineva din străinătate ne-a șoptit la ureche despre cartea cutare și cutare, pentru că acolo la ei (în occident), merge ca halvaua și este la modă. Și nouă atâta ne trebuie – vrem și noi să fim la modă! Toată fericirea că există edituri care publică, cu ajutorul unor fundații străine, ba chiar și a Ministerului Culturii din Macedonia, scriitori care au mare valoare în cercurile intelectual-literare din Europa, cu toate că ele sunt citite numai în cercurile elitei, care se interesează de ceea ce e nou în literatură. Invers, noi nu avem prea mulți scriitori ca să scriem de toate, așa că încă suntem tradiționaliști și ținem de renumele literaturii, ceea ce se vede din punctul de vedere al scriitorilor macedoneni pe care i-ați pomenit. Cât despre strategiile traducerii, pot să spun că literatura macedoneană nu se prea traduce în străinătate, cu excepția scriitorilor ca Stefanovski, Smilevski, Dimkovska, Prokopiev, și chiar și acestea sunt rezultatul unor eforturi individuale. Din această cauză și după multe consultări și dezbateri culturale pro și contra, Ministerul Culturii din Macedonia a realizat acum doi-trei ani un proiect pe care l-a intitulat „130 de cărți din literatura macedoneană”, vrând să adune la un loc tot ce e mai bun în această literatură. Anul trecut, întregul proiect a fost tradus și în limba engleză, iar cărțile au fost distribuite pe la mai toate bibliotecile și pe la alte instituții culturale importante din lume. Acum acest proiect se traduce și în limbile germană, spaniolă, arabă și așa mai departe. Aceasta este un fel de strategie literară construită de guvern, ca reacție la criza de identitate pe care o produce Grecia în toată lumea. Dar sunt oare astfel de proiecte productive? O să vedem.

D. M.: Mircea Cărtărescu este un nume consacrat internațional. *Nostalgia*, de la prima traducere în franceză, a fost propusă la premiul MEDICIS. Lista traducerilor operelor autorului român este cuprinzătoare, valoarea lor a fost receptată în limbi de mare circulație ale spațiului european. În Balcani, doar cititorii bulgari și greci, (anul trecut) au putut cunoaște forța creativă și cea expresivă a scriitorului. Ce înseamnă *Nostalgia* pentru cititorul macedonean așa cum vi-l reprezentați dumneavoastră?

E. L.: O mare parte din copilăria mea, adică primii zece ani, am petrecut-o în România, la Brașov, undeva la periferia orașului. Când am

citit *Nostalgia* prima dată, cu deosebire *Mandenbilul* și *REM*, am avut impresia că, împreună cu domnul Cărtărescu și personajele sale, am fost în aceeași gașcă, iar pe parcurs, în timp, am uitat unii de alții. Dar iată că unul dintre noi și-a cam reamintit de tot ce făceam și a scris o poveste. M-am simțit așa de tare întors în copilărie, că, la un moment dat, am fost iarăși acolo, pe strada Minerva nr. 7. Aceasta e o impresie individuală și nu știu încă, dacă aceeași impresie, o va lăsa și cititorilor din Macedonia. Dar, desigur, dacă avem în vedere anii despre care Cărtărescu povestește, ar trebui să descoperim un mesaj foarte puternic: în orice ambient politic, ideologic și așa mai departe, trăiesc oameni la un moment dat, copilăriile și adolescențele sunt pretutindeni aceleași. Și asta e dimensiunea globală pe care cred că cititorii străini au găsit-o în această carte.

D. M.: În opinia mea, cartea se impune sub trei aspecte: a) strategiile postmodernismului sunt configurate, chiar și teoretic, de gândirea autorului. Accentuarea laturii biografice, rolul privirii, al percepției vizuale și sonore, ludicul și simbolistica implicită dau originalitate întregului b) autorul își constituie textul bazându-se pe tensiunea modelată de relația scriitură-situație deosebită, relație ce dă dramatism nuvelor c) alternanțele actual-real-fantastic dau un ritm povestirii și, ceea ce este important, coerență textului. Cât de dificilă este, într-o translație cu diferențe lexicale (privind nuanțele), găsirea echivalențelor?

E. L.: Este o întrebare din domeniul teoriei traducerii, care în primul rând pune întrebarea: ce trebuie traducătorul să cunoască mai bine? Limba în care traduce sau limba din care traduce? Sau amândouă, ceea ce e mai greu de închipuit. Eu cred că e foarte important ca îndeosebi cititorul să primească nu numai mesajul semantic, ci și pe cel stilistic. Eu fac eforturi pentru claritatea stilistică și aici, în domeniul acesta, mă chinui cel mai mult. Echivalențele aici nu sunt prea greu de găsit, deoarece Cărtărescu are un scris modern (actual) care, după opinia mea, a depășit deja postmodernismul sau face eforturi de a ieși din el. Exagerările și bizareriile care au o notă fantastic, caracteristice pentru *Ruletistul* și *Arhitectul*, cred că au un impuls venit din realismul magic.

D. M.: În cele două nuvele *Ruletistul* și *Arhitectul* întâlnim caracteristici ale unor mentalități. Ce reprezintă pentru cercetătorul care sunteți, elementele realiste și cum v-au solicitat la traducere? Ce înseamnă experiența estetică acumulată și în ce măsură vă influențează ideatic și stilistic?

E. L.: Cred că aceste două nuvele sunt simbolurile și reprezentările vieții contemporane în preajma căreia metalitatea, care e o categorie

greu schimbătoare, duc lupta de a fi la curent cu ceva ce nu e ea însăși. Mentalitatea pierde, la urmă, războiul și, din cauza aceasta, totul se termină cu un dezastru, simbolizat prin exagerare (hiperbolizare n.m.). Vă dați seama că aceste piese le-am tradus cel mai ușor, fiindcă am dat de un lucru care ne caracterizează pe noi toți din Estul și Sudul Europei.

D.M.: D-le Lafazanovski, am încercat o configurare a dialogului născut între cele două literaturi. Sunt convins că n-am provocat, poate, cele mai apropiate aspecte caracteristice actului de traducere căruia v-ați consacrat. Spuneți-le dumneavoastră.

E. L.: Este vorba de două limbi diferite, care nu aparțin aceluiași grup lingvistic de limbi, dar aparțin limbilor indo-europene, ceea ce înseamnă că, la un nivel etimologic, se pot găsi cuvinte și fraze foarte interesante, care sunt comune fie prin arhetipuri și rădăcinile cuvintelor, fie prin faptul că cele două culturi, slavă și romană, pe parcursul istoriei, se cam amestecau și făceau împrumuturi la nivel lexical. Există foarte multe exemple de acest tip, dar nu putem să ne bazăm pe ele și să zicem că traducerea din aceste două limbi obține mai mult folos din ele. Este greu de tradus din aceste două limbi, dar, la ora actuală, bucură faptul că se fac eforturi pe acest plan și din partea României, și din partea Macedoniei.

D. M.: Cum se spune în macedonă „vă mulțumesc”, „inspirație și putere de muncă”? Primiți-le din partea mea odată cu urările de succes pentru viitor.

E. L.: „Mulțumesc” se traduce prin *blago(dar)am* – și cuvântul înseamnă: „vă (**dăr**)uiesc cu bine”, sau mai figurativ „vă dăruiesc cu dulciuri”!



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